Questions before New Delhi and Geelani Sahib
DATELINE SRINAGAR BY ARJIMAND HUSSAIN TALIB
Former Indian diplomat G Parthasarthy, while commenting on New Delhi’s latest Kashmir initiative, in an article “Not all in J&K are Kashmiris” on October 14 in Deccan Chronicle, made an interesting statement, “Let us not forget 45 per cent of the people of Jammu & Kashmir are Dogras, Punjabis, Paharis, Bakarwals, Gujjars, Buddhists and Shias.”
Mr. Parthasarthy’s views are a general reflection of how most of the people in India’s political establishment think about Kashmir. It is also a reflection of New Delhi’s political approach on this issue ever since 1947.
The problem is that few people today realize the gravity of the powder keg situation of Kashmir. Few people are able to objectively visualize the cumulative effect of Kashmir’s failing economy, militarized governance, New Delhi’s political micro management, acute unemployment, tight military control and religious radicalism on both sides.
New Delhi’s latest Kashmir initiative in the form of new interlocutors has shocked many. The terms of reference and the format of the initiative looks like a classic NGO needs assessment exercise. Worse, it sounds a repetition of many such past exercises. There is a lot of cynicism about the outcome in Kashmir. Everyone seems to remember that the ink on the reports of the five Working Groups Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had formed is yet to dry up.
There are many in Kashmir who feel that the very idea of ‘interlocutors’ on Kashmir is out of sync with the real need – that is engagement between New Delhi and the state’s political formations at a political level. This view has a great merit.
Technically, political interlocutors are engaged to open lines of communications between two estranged parties in a political conflict. The new Kashmir interlocutors will end up meeting at least 1001 groups and individuals in its one-year time frame – who, in all probability, will include politicians, activists, business groups, ‘civil society’ actors, academics, journalists, NGOs, state-sponsored minority ‘representative’ groups, trade unions, students’ groups and so on.
Over the years, the centre of gravity of New Delhi’s political engagement on Kashmir has shifted towards engagement with the ‘civil society’ here. What needs to be appreciated is that engagement with the kind of ‘civil society’ Kashmir has today has limitations. Civil society does in fact play a pivotal role in influencing public opinion, but in Kashmir’s context its ability to do so to an extent where it can alter political dynamics is highly limited.
Admitted, the three interlocutors have an objective view about Kashmir. At the end of the day it is not what these ‘interlocutors’ will report back that will matter. What will matter is New Delhi’s political will of addressing Kashmir’s real political issues, which it knows quite well, and which it does not need any interlocutors to understand.
On the other extreme end in Kashmir are the position and the political approach taken by Hurriyat (G) leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani. The strategy of long shutdowns and a political approach which seems to be frozen somewhere in the times of Maulana Maudoodi and 1980s need fresh thinking too. It is true that the formidable support base Geelani sahib has, does not want him to budge an inch from his stand and approach. But, as a leader, who is being followed, he needs to understand the follies of his approach as well.
The first thing to realize is that what was politically applicable in 1980s as a strategy may not necessarily hold true today. A lot has changed since then locally as well as globally. It is true that his movement is denied democratic space for peaceful mobilization and expression, but his strategy needs to factor in this limitation too.
The premise that Kashmir’s moral high ground through long shutdowns will force New Delhi to accept Kashmir as a dispute and win international support is little too misplaced.
It is true there are many people in India and beyond who are sympathetic to Kashmir’s basic political cause, but does sympathy alone translate into support and political transformation?
In international politics and diplomacy it is only self interest that guides political stands. Currently, most of the international community’s interest, including that of most of Muslim countries, lies in the political status quo in Kashmir. This reality needs to be factored in Hurriyat (G)’s strategy.
The second question relates to political inclusiveness and joint advocacy. The fact is that no single leader can stake claim to sole leadership of Kashmir. Any political approach based on honest resolution of this issue will have to be inclusive and accommodative. Beyond core ideologies, a break from the deadlock demands accommodation. In the absence of a united Hurriyat – speaking for all those who do not believe in the status quo – New Delhi will always have ample political and geographical space for conflict management in Kashmir.
What Geelani sahib also needs to come to terms with is the bitter reality of Parthasarthy’s “45 per cent” argument. Why Hurriyat (G)’s politics shrunk exclusively to Kashmir Valley and failed inclusiveness across Pinpanjal and among Gujjar, Pahari and Shia sections needs introspection too.
There is another side to the current deadlock - that is economic. A daylong of shutdown in the 80s or 90s meant largely disruption to government services in Kashmir. There wasn’t as great private economic activity then as today. Services sector was limited. Today’s daylong shutdown results in economic catastrophe, the results of which will be felt in several decades to come. Further economic deprivation and job losses will ultimately push people closer to the state.
Then there is the issue of power inequality. The power equation between Srinagar and New Delhi is overly in the latter’s favor. Hurriyat (G)’s current strategy will deteriorate Kashmir’s this equation not only vis-à-vis New Delhi but Jammu and Ladakh regions as well. That will mean the centre of gravity of most of the economic activities will shift to Jammu, something that has already happened to alarming levels in the last two decades. The end result will be political. Jammu will attain greater economic, demographic and political stature, leaving Kashmir as an entity of secondary or even tertiary importance. That has already happened. That is a process which Kashmir will find impossible to reverse. Kashmir will have been politically defeated by its own hands.
Then is the question of brain drain and reverse investment. Kashmiris, who had lately begun to come back, invest and create institutions here, are going back again. A precarious private investment climate will mean the state will attain greater role as an economic moderator. That will make people even more dependent on the state.
Finally, there is a psychological aspect of this deadlock too. Long spells of hopelessness, economic loss and stress will result in an epidemic of anxiety disorders among its hapless people, whose ability to take rational decisions will increasingly fail. It will also breed family and social unrest. And all this will make the state monopoly to thrive. And the deadlock will be perpetual.
Saturday, October 16, 2010
Monday, October 11, 2010
Kashmir and jugaad
Delhi Common Wealth Games, 2010 have taught us many things. Leave aside the debate on the relativity of the idea of hygiene and the corruption charges; one thing is clear: that India’s peculiar way of doing things – so eloquently and fondly called jugaad – is alive and works even today.
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Most of the world is dumb-struck. A week before the games started, there were few optimists outside the Games’ Organising Committee who believed that the games would be possible at all. For a moment, ignore the goof up, the international humiliation and the unrelenting bad press about the messy day-to-day affairs at the games, the fact is that the games are on. That is what makes jugaad wonderful – and, obviously, beyond the comprehension of a common westerner, who loves to be driven by a definite idea of the goal and the outcome, a set process, precision and attention to detail.
Writing in The Times of India on October 3 in “In defence of Jugaad” Santosh Desai writes, “Jugaad is the name we give to our subversive disdain for reality; we could change its name if it offends us but it would be a shame if we were to lose this unique ability to see the world in a distinctive way.”
So jugaad a civilisational attribute, so to say, which, if talked about by foreigners, may even border racism. In local parlance its negative characteristics are often shrugged off with two cold words – chalta hai.
Jugaad – if we reflect – somehow best explains how Kashmir has been ruled and managed post 1947. This tool explains the micro management of Kashmir’s political and security affairs from New Delhi despite the occasional appearance of ‘democratically-elected’ governments in Srinagar. This tool may also explain the announcement of 8 ‘concessions’ by New Delhi last month, which constitutional pundits say should have ideally been done by Srinagar, as the issues fall easily within the latter’s jurisdiction.
Jugaad basically doesn’t care for protocols or systems. It doesn’t mind political micro management either. It is like being beyond and above everything. So when chief minister Omar Abdullah spoke his heart out in the State Assembly on Wednesday, calling the state’s relationship with the union of India a conditional accession and not a merger, a state of denial persists. Jugaad isn’t comfortable with shocks. That is the reason, we learn now, additional Union Home Secretary, K Sikandan arrived in Srinagar on Saturday to get a CD of Omar’s speech.
Now take the post-APD visit initiative of the appointment of a possible interlocutor by New Delhi on Kashmir. The very terms of reference of such interlocutors seeking engagement with ‘all shades of opinion’ – bypassing basic democratic principles – is nothing but jugaad. The point is: is New Delhi really unaware about the demands and the bottom line of these ‘shades of opinions’?
Let us do not go much into history. Spare me for any dementia issues here, post 90s we have had so many of these interlocutors, emissaries, committees and delegations visiting Kashmir and trying to understand what people actually want here. We have had Ram Jethmalani, the present Governor N. N. Vohra, K. C. Pant, C. Rangarajan, Wajahat Habibullah, O. P. Shah, A. S. Dullat, Justice (Retd.) Sagheer Ahmed, and the recent All Party Parliamentary Delegation (APD). All did the same job. Why start afresh?
The problem, as ever, one need to acknowledge, is with the format and the goals of such exercises. As an example, consider the present Governor N N Vohra’s visit to Kashmir in 2003. As per official records, Mr. Vohra met 36 ‘leaders’ of various political parties/groups and 183 individuals and representatives of various organizations at Srinagar’s Circuit House during nine days. The meeting statistics of the recent APD may be hardly different. And now when a new interlocutor will come, can one expect a different format?
The policy of engaging with minority groups, NGOs, trusts, ‘civil society groups’, student teams, mohalla and village welfare committees and so on of fringe nature has never worked on Kashmir. Tiny minorities cannot help alter any political process because they are disproportionate to the realities on the ground in the real world.
If that were so, 63 years is a very long time to manage a conflict. Seeking to create a psychological condition of diversity of opinion will never work on Kashmir. There is no substitute for a political engagement with the real stakeholders.
It is not that New Delhi needs a fact finding mission every year to understand the mass pulse in Kashmir. Union Home Secretary G.K. Pillai in an interview to the latest issue of The Week reflects that when he says, “Though we spend 10,000 crore a year [on Kashmir], you have not been able to win hearts and minds. It is not just development. There are roads; the rail link is coming. [But] we have not been able to reach out to people much. Maybe [we have been] reaching out to the government. There is a subtle difference.”
Then there are hard line voices like that of Shankar Roychowdhury, former Chief of Army Staff. In an article “Reclaiming Kashmir” on October 5 in Deccan Chronicle he writes, “… those in government surely realise that no amount of “Red Cross parcels” are going to win hearts and minds. How much more is the government prepared to concede to “win the unwinnable” in terms of hearts and minds in the Valley…?”
But then there are other realities, which parties like the Hurriyat and Islamabad need to acknowledge as well. A dialogue initiated by New Delhi, like the process of demilitarization in Kashmir, cannot be a one-way affair. There will have to be matching steps of confidence building by New Delhi and Islamabad for a forward movement.
For instance, New Delhi will find it impossible to initiate demilitarization unilaterally without similar steps by Islamabad in its administered part of Kashmir and guarantees by the state and non-state actors on that side that there will be no military campaigns on this side. That is where engagement with Islamabad becomes an inevitable necessity.
And no amount of jugaad can help skirt that.
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Most of the world is dumb-struck. A week before the games started, there were few optimists outside the Games’ Organising Committee who believed that the games would be possible at all. For a moment, ignore the goof up, the international humiliation and the unrelenting bad press about the messy day-to-day affairs at the games, the fact is that the games are on. That is what makes jugaad wonderful – and, obviously, beyond the comprehension of a common westerner, who loves to be driven by a definite idea of the goal and the outcome, a set process, precision and attention to detail.
Writing in The Times of India on October 3 in “In defence of Jugaad” Santosh Desai writes, “Jugaad is the name we give to our subversive disdain for reality; we could change its name if it offends us but it would be a shame if we were to lose this unique ability to see the world in a distinctive way.”
So jugaad a civilisational attribute, so to say, which, if talked about by foreigners, may even border racism. In local parlance its negative characteristics are often shrugged off with two cold words – chalta hai.
Jugaad – if we reflect – somehow best explains how Kashmir has been ruled and managed post 1947. This tool explains the micro management of Kashmir’s political and security affairs from New Delhi despite the occasional appearance of ‘democratically-elected’ governments in Srinagar. This tool may also explain the announcement of 8 ‘concessions’ by New Delhi last month, which constitutional pundits say should have ideally been done by Srinagar, as the issues fall easily within the latter’s jurisdiction.
Jugaad basically doesn’t care for protocols or systems. It doesn’t mind political micro management either. It is like being beyond and above everything. So when chief minister Omar Abdullah spoke his heart out in the State Assembly on Wednesday, calling the state’s relationship with the union of India a conditional accession and not a merger, a state of denial persists. Jugaad isn’t comfortable with shocks. That is the reason, we learn now, additional Union Home Secretary, K Sikandan arrived in Srinagar on Saturday to get a CD of Omar’s speech.
Now take the post-APD visit initiative of the appointment of a possible interlocutor by New Delhi on Kashmir. The very terms of reference of such interlocutors seeking engagement with ‘all shades of opinion’ – bypassing basic democratic principles – is nothing but jugaad. The point is: is New Delhi really unaware about the demands and the bottom line of these ‘shades of opinions’?
Let us do not go much into history. Spare me for any dementia issues here, post 90s we have had so many of these interlocutors, emissaries, committees and delegations visiting Kashmir and trying to understand what people actually want here. We have had Ram Jethmalani, the present Governor N. N. Vohra, K. C. Pant, C. Rangarajan, Wajahat Habibullah, O. P. Shah, A. S. Dullat, Justice (Retd.) Sagheer Ahmed, and the recent All Party Parliamentary Delegation (APD). All did the same job. Why start afresh?
The problem, as ever, one need to acknowledge, is with the format and the goals of such exercises. As an example, consider the present Governor N N Vohra’s visit to Kashmir in 2003. As per official records, Mr. Vohra met 36 ‘leaders’ of various political parties/groups and 183 individuals and representatives of various organizations at Srinagar’s Circuit House during nine days. The meeting statistics of the recent APD may be hardly different. And now when a new interlocutor will come, can one expect a different format?
The policy of engaging with minority groups, NGOs, trusts, ‘civil society groups’, student teams, mohalla and village welfare committees and so on of fringe nature has never worked on Kashmir. Tiny minorities cannot help alter any political process because they are disproportionate to the realities on the ground in the real world.
If that were so, 63 years is a very long time to manage a conflict. Seeking to create a psychological condition of diversity of opinion will never work on Kashmir. There is no substitute for a political engagement with the real stakeholders.
It is not that New Delhi needs a fact finding mission every year to understand the mass pulse in Kashmir. Union Home Secretary G.K. Pillai in an interview to the latest issue of The Week reflects that when he says, “Though we spend 10,000 crore a year [on Kashmir], you have not been able to win hearts and minds. It is not just development. There are roads; the rail link is coming. [But] we have not been able to reach out to people much. Maybe [we have been] reaching out to the government. There is a subtle difference.”
Then there are hard line voices like that of Shankar Roychowdhury, former Chief of Army Staff. In an article “Reclaiming Kashmir” on October 5 in Deccan Chronicle he writes, “… those in government surely realise that no amount of “Red Cross parcels” are going to win hearts and minds. How much more is the government prepared to concede to “win the unwinnable” in terms of hearts and minds in the Valley…?”
But then there are other realities, which parties like the Hurriyat and Islamabad need to acknowledge as well. A dialogue initiated by New Delhi, like the process of demilitarization in Kashmir, cannot be a one-way affair. There will have to be matching steps of confidence building by New Delhi and Islamabad for a forward movement.
For instance, New Delhi will find it impossible to initiate demilitarization unilaterally without similar steps by Islamabad in its administered part of Kashmir and guarantees by the state and non-state actors on that side that there will be no military campaigns on this side. That is where engagement with Islamabad becomes an inevitable necessity.
And no amount of jugaad can help skirt that.
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