The message from Kashmir's street is clear
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Barack Obama’s sacking of the top American commander, General McChrystal, for Afghanistan last week was preceded by an interesting drama. American commanders had banned use of Microsoft PowerPoint (PP) presentations for all kinds of meetings and briefings in that country. The logic was that PowerPoint presentations for new commanders, or visiting political leaders, were grotesquely misleading in understanding the country’s situation.
International Herald Tribune produced an interesting article on the issue some weeks ago, titled “The enemy has been found, and it is PowerPoint.” The article analyzed why America, in its opinion, was losing the war in Afghanistan. It reasoned that the US Army commanders and the civilian leaders, responsible for the Afghanistan mission, were misinformed about the country. It said that the reason economic and military strategies were not working in stabilizing the country was that PowerPoint presentations formed the backbone of information analysis among the military and the political leadership!
In Afghanistan, a massive developmental effort is on in the country, which includes building of roads, schools, hospitals, drinking water facilities and so on. Yet, in spite of the enormous US investment to win over the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, the country is taking its own course. It may mean anything. Even a NATO deal with the Taliban to take over power in Kabul, based on certain conditions.
Now, back home, look at the mayhem being unleashed by security agencies on the streets of Kashmir. Look at the people’s anger on the streets. On the Internet. Clearly, no strategy of New Delhi seems to work to “win over the Kashmiri hearts and minds.” The streets are seething with anger for the political status quo and the huge military presence as severely as ever. But is New Delhi learning any lessons?
Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has also lately taken to PowerPoint to present the state’s political and economic situation before visiting political leaders of New Delhi. Army commanders and police officers are said to be doing the same.
Omar has won many admirers in New Delhi for his eloquent PP presentations. From the officials of the Planning Commission to the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, Omar’s PP presentations has fans.
PowerPoint is arguably good in displaying statistics. It is also effective in keeping focus while making a point. It is just awesome in highlighting one’s achievements and challenges in a bullet form. But it is miserably bad in presenting an effective analysis of a complex political situation like the one prevalent in J&K, or even Afghanistan, today. Despite its pleasing eloquence, PP easily hides more than what it reveals.
There is something strikingly common between Afghanistan and Kashmir – the US-led coalition tends to believe that economic and social bounties targeted at local populations will win the war of it. New Delhi and the governments in Srinagar have been nursing the same expectations since 1947.
This June was the bloodiest month for the NATO forces in Afghanistan since they started the military campaign in the country in 2001. This June also happens to be the bloodiest so far in Kashmir since Omar Abdullah took over.
Quite often – like when Omar Abdullah was voted to power – India’s political and media establishment wrote off Jammu & Kashmir’s movement for political sovereignty. The possibility of people ever challenging the state’s accession with India was seen to be too bleak. Even as Jammu & Kashmir’s Legislature and the Judiciary – normally two important pillars of a democratic system – remain handicapped in exercising real power, they have been expected to deliver a favorable change for New Delhi. All such premises are being proved wrong on the streets today, just like they were ever since 1947.
New Delhi needs to understand that the policy of doling out a variety of economic benefits to local populations through various methods does not necessarily mean political loyalty has been won. State-sponsored development and welfare programs aimed at aggrieved populations often create a deceptive sense of political loyalty. PowerPoint cannot explain the complex web of the contrary process.
Omar Abdullah has many a time voiced a perception that all trouble in the state basically emanates from, and is confined to, a few pockets in Srinagar. He needs to understand that the reason there is a greater expression of anger and frustration in Srinagar is because its protesters have a sense of security by virtue of its demography and landscape. The reason people in the countryside do not venture out on the roads too much is because they are vulnerable. A strong military grip ensures every protester is called to a military or police camp in the night if a demonstration happens.
Even as hundreds of Srinagar’s protesting boys have been arrested since the last few weeks, streets are not silent. Exactly, the opposite is happening.
Quite often, Omar, and his Srinagar right hand – Ali Sagar – have accused “vested interests” for instigating protests. Completely wrong. People who feel that way need to experience a protest or stone pelting first hand. The point is, most often, these boys do not act on behalf of – or are members of – any party. They are individual parties, who go by their political instincts; nurse a fire, love to vent anger on security forces by slogans and stones, take risks and do not bother about repercussions.
Over the years, a greater interaction of the Kashmiris with the Indian mainland has worked in two distinct ways. At one level it has broadened the horizons of Kashmiri understanding of the idea of India. But at another level, which is significant, the gulf between a common Kashmiri and the Indian state has deepened. That gulf has deepened because a common Kashmiri in India has been made to perceive himself or herself as the ‘other’.
Various acts of violence and terrorism in India, and the state’s security reaction, have compounded this situation. A general culture of Kashmiri witch hunt and public hyper vigilante for them has aggravated that feeling of being the ‘other’, especially among the youngsters.
If one goes by common sense, the intended cultural and political assimilation of Kashmiris with India through the satellite TV, communications technologies like the Internet should have bridged the gap between a Kashmiri youngster and the rest of India.
This generation is artificially pulled by the glitter of a shining India – economically more robust with a great cinema and music. But all these influences are neutralized by the daily experiences of humiliation and feelings by a common Kashmiri of being the ‘other.’ A PowerPoint presentation does not capture these complex political and sociological relations.
And look at the Internet. See the seething anger there. See this newspaper’s mailbox.
PP presentations miserably fail in identifying the hundreds of psychological and political currents and undercurrents in Kashmir’s political system. They fail in portraying the complex grid of multiple loyalties. PP does not address the issue of the latent anger either. PowerPoint also does not depict the complex ideological flip flops driven by psychological impulses. It does not picturise the unpredictable political and ideological cross-overs. It may enhance our graphical understanding of economic benefits matrix driven by government spending and schemes, but it does not necessarily show us the real political outcome.
At the end of it, we need to understand that economic benefits do not necessarily win political loyalties in the long run. The day this is acknowledged in PP presentations, Kashmir and Afghanistan will be on a real road to peace and stability.
(The writer is Online Editor with Greater Kashmir. Feedback at arjimand@greaterkashmir.com)
