New Delhi can capitalise on an environment of compromise
Arjimand Hussain Talib
There is a sixth century fable which tells about a boy playing in the fields, and who got stung by a nettle. The boy ran home to his mother, telling her that he had just touched that nasty weed, and it had stung him.
“It was just your touching it my boy,” said the mother, “that caused it to sting you; the next time you meddle with a nettle, grasp it tightly, and it will do you no hurt.”
There is a key lesson in this story on why embracing a new approach on Kashmir by New Delhi and Islamabad may not be as catastrophic as made to be. Something very significant happened at the end of the week. There are some real openings for hope.
The Allahabad High Court’s verdict on the Babri Masjid demolition case is arguably far from perfect. But the response from Indian masses has been unexpectedly mature – belying the apprehensions about mass unrest.
There is a viewpoint that the reason there was no unrest is because the verdict has been interpreted as being overly favorable to the majority Hindu community. But this viewpoint is questionable. Both the parties to the dispute have already said that they are dissatisfied with the verdict, and, hence, will appeal before the Supreme Court.
The fact is that despite the differing perceptions, the overwhelming public opinion is that of accommodation. There were no mass celebrations or expressions of disquiet from any side. Indian intellectuals are saying that the reason for this attitude is that India has actually come a long way since 1992. The generation that was believed to be driven by religious jingoism and passion seems to have really been subdued by the new culture of accommodation and tolerance. India, there is a widely-held belief, has changed.
One of the classic responses to the verdict was heard from Indian Supreme Court’s leading lawyer Rajeev Dhawan, who called the Allahabad High Court’s verdict as a “Panchayati style justice.” He opined that he saw the verdict based on a compromise solution rather than basic principles of natural justice. Even as he argues that the legal process on the case was supposed to establish the ownership of the land in dispute, and not go beyond the standard legal practice, he acknowledges the decision as “consensual.”
Then there are other viewpoints, which are besides the point here. One being that the verdict is patently unjust with Muslims. Two, that despite the court granting possession rights to the Muslim Waqf Board over one third of the land, in practice the land will be actually used by the Hindus.
There is another opinion which believes that the matters of faith cannot be subject to legal scrutiny and analysis. And that religious beliefs are beyond the worldly legal considerations of proof and legal logic.
People are entitled to have their own opinions, but the point here to make is different. The environment of peaceful consideration of the judgment in India – if not its complete acceptance - makes a strong case for an out-of-box thinking on Kashmir today.
There are always people who have been propounding doomsday scenarios in case New Delhi chooses to think beyond that traditional ‘box.’ The theories surrounding that doomsday scenario may well be a myth if the response to an extremely sensitive issue like the Babri Masjid verdict is anything to go by.
There are compelling reasons why thinking out of the box is a dire necessity today.
The happenings since 2008 in Kashmir in general and those since June 11 this year in particular have changed many things. The gulf between an average Kashmir and the Indian state has deepened considerably. For India, the biggest matter of worry must be the estrangement of Kashmir’s ‘generation next’, whose thinking has gone even beyond what their elders have nursed.
It is very much within the hard and soft power of the Indian state to manage the brewing alienation and unrest in Kashmir. But it needs to come in terms with the reality that it cannot resolve this issue as such. It will always have a crowd available in Kashmir which provides its rule a critical mass necessary to keep things going, but it is unlikely that it will be able to create a respectable acceptance and legitimacy to its current brand of rule in Kashmir.
Then there is the external image factor. India – despite its oft-talked about vices of mass deprivation, caste system and alienated poor communities – is seen as one of the emerging global economic powers, if not a political or military one. It is mostly respected for its democracy and a political culture which are not to be found everywhere. But Kashmir dents its image of being a land of Gandhi and Buddha.
And look how far people are going about this country. An article in Jerusalem Post “Why isn’t India a pariah state?” by Rob Brown on 19 September explains that. Rob wrote “But what the world is never told by The New York Times, nor by most other supposedly liberal organs, is that New Delhi’s response to such civil disobedience has been far more savage and brutal than anything authorized in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, leading in the past to serious armed insurrection (often incited by Pakistan).”
And then there are pragmatic Indians themselves. Consider this thought from a recent essay by Pankaj Mishra, “The killing fields of Kashmir dwarf those of Palestine and Tibet. In addition to the everyday regime of arbitrary arrests, curfews, raids and checkpoints enforced by nearly 700,000 Indian soldiers, the valley’s 4 million Muslims are exposed to extrajudicial execution, rape and torture, with such barbaric variations as live electric wires inserted into the p----.”
So let the nettle be held firmly. And sure nothing is going to happen.
Sunday, October 3, 2010
UN OCHA and Kashmir
Thinking beyond the UNMOGIP, and its mandate
Arjimand Hussain Talib
A spokesperson for the United Nations (UN) Secretary General said last week that their office was closely monitoring the on-going situation in Kashmir. He further said they were in regular touch with the UN Military Observers’ Group (UNMOGIP) office in Srinagar. But what beyond that?
The unrest and the civilian killings in Kashmir over the last one month are colossal in scale. The state actions in containing demonstrations of unarmed civilians are extraordinary. The use of live ammunition on unarmed protesters, army deployment prolonged curfews, widespread detentions, media and communications curbs, etc. signal to an extraordinary political and humanitarian situation. Although the unrest has received some degree of international media attention, yet the international community remains as oblivious to the happenings in Kashmir as ever before.
There are basically two reasons why the international community is not so concerned about the current Kashmir situation. One reason is that there is almost negligible advocacy at international level for an international intervention. If at all there is some advocacy by a handful of groups that is symbolic and ill guided. Globally, Kashmiri Diaspora is largely ill-organized. Facebook activism is no substitute to other recognized methods of advocacy.
Another reason has surely something to do with 9/11. Kashmir has acquired an image of a place which is part of the “problem”, read “international terrorism”. There are fewer takers for the argument that Kashmir’s unrest is driven by a peaceful nationalist movement – seeking a change in political status quo and tight military control. There are hardly any takers for the argument that if unaddressed Kashmir will impact Pakistan and Afghanistan’s stability.
On another plane, the current international indifference has also something to do with the obsession of Kashmir’s political groups in looking exclusively at the UN’s political resolutions on Kashmir. It is a fact that the UN continues to portray Kashmir as a disputed region in all its maps. Its communications also recognize it as such. But there is a technical difference between depiction of a region as ‘disputed’ and ‘conflict affected’. The ‘disputed’ status, despite its own political significance, does not necessarily underline humanitarian urgency. Designation of Kashmir as a ‘conflict zone’ would do that.
The question here is why hasn’t such thing happened so far? Naturally, the governments in New Delhi and Srinagar would not do that. Those advocating for Kashmiri right to self determination and safeguarding of their human rights at home and abroad have missed an important point over the years: the role of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Kashmir. And also the absence of the UN Cluster System and a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in Kashmir
The United Nations’ Military Observers’ Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), based in Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, has a limited mandate. Their primary work is to report any violations or change in the status quo of the Line of Control (LoC).
OCHA as an arm of the UN Secretariat which has a broader mandate - to “mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action” to alleviate human suffering in emergencies, which includes conflict situations. Importantly, one of its missions is also to “advocate for the rights of people in need.”
Beyond humanitarian coordination, what is required in Kashmir today is underlining the urgency for some urgent political initiatives to ensure that the trouble in Kashmir does not spill over to the larger South Asian region. That urgency would come if there are credible situation reports from a body like the OCHA, which are taken more seriously by the international community. Today Kashmir needs situation reports by impartial international actors who would depict the real humanitarian situation there.
Although the European Commission (EC) some days back announced an emergency aid of 2 million euros ($2.5 million) for the victims of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, it was not a special initiative in response to the current situation. The EU’s low scale humanitarian aid for Kashmir has been pouring in for some eight years now, addressing the longer term impacts of the conflict.
The UN Resolution 46/182 which serves as the basis of the OCHA mandate is clear that the “responsibility for people affected by emergency lies – first and foremost - with their respective states”. But it also says that the “states in need are expected to facilitate the work of responding organizations.” Given the UN’s recognition of Kashmir as a disputed territory, the definition of the governing ‘State’ cannot be normal in meaning and scope.
There are people who argue that since there is no UN OCHA office in India, its ambit of work cannot be extended to Kashmir. That is not a convincing argument. UN OCHA has directly and indirectly responded to many emergency situations in India. One example is the Gujarat earthquake.
Then there is a full-fledged UN OCHA office in Pakistan, whose area of work includes Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK). UN OCHA has played, and continues to play, a key role in the coordination of the government and the international emergency response efforts in PAK.
The UN OCHA has a strong presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) as well. Humanitarian actors, donors, and diplomatic missions alike rely on OCHA for its wide range of information and analytical products in the OPT. These include bridging the gaps in humanitarian needs, weekly and monthly humanitarian updates, briefings and field tours. One of its key functions is the regular reporting on the overall humanitarian situation, and routine monitoring, reporting on, advocating for, and facilitating humanitarian access in the OPT.
Looking at the dire humanitarian situation in Kashmir today, especially the highly inadequate infrastructure to treat the casualties, UN OCHA has a strong case in Kashmir. Its case is also strong for the fact that people are dying for lack of timely medical aid and treatment. The death of two women last week just because their travel to hospital was hindered by troopers serves as a grim reminder. There must be many more instances which go unreported.
The policy of widespread detainment of civilians, including children, on frivolous charges is also a matter of serious concern. These state actions raise serious questions related to juvenile justice. The detainment of prominent human rights defender and President of Kashmir High Court Bar Association, Mian Qayoom, on highly questionable charges, is a grave matter too.
All these matters where the rule of law has hit a low of unacceptable limits in international law deserve international attention. And UN-OCHA could just be apt to do that.
Arjimand Hussain Talib
A spokesperson for the United Nations (UN) Secretary General said last week that their office was closely monitoring the on-going situation in Kashmir. He further said they were in regular touch with the UN Military Observers’ Group (UNMOGIP) office in Srinagar. But what beyond that?
The unrest and the civilian killings in Kashmir over the last one month are colossal in scale. The state actions in containing demonstrations of unarmed civilians are extraordinary. The use of live ammunition on unarmed protesters, army deployment prolonged curfews, widespread detentions, media and communications curbs, etc. signal to an extraordinary political and humanitarian situation. Although the unrest has received some degree of international media attention, yet the international community remains as oblivious to the happenings in Kashmir as ever before.
There are basically two reasons why the international community is not so concerned about the current Kashmir situation. One reason is that there is almost negligible advocacy at international level for an international intervention. If at all there is some advocacy by a handful of groups that is symbolic and ill guided. Globally, Kashmiri Diaspora is largely ill-organized. Facebook activism is no substitute to other recognized methods of advocacy.
Another reason has surely something to do with 9/11. Kashmir has acquired an image of a place which is part of the “problem”, read “international terrorism”. There are fewer takers for the argument that Kashmir’s unrest is driven by a peaceful nationalist movement – seeking a change in political status quo and tight military control. There are hardly any takers for the argument that if unaddressed Kashmir will impact Pakistan and Afghanistan’s stability.
On another plane, the current international indifference has also something to do with the obsession of Kashmir’s political groups in looking exclusively at the UN’s political resolutions on Kashmir. It is a fact that the UN continues to portray Kashmir as a disputed region in all its maps. Its communications also recognize it as such. But there is a technical difference between depiction of a region as ‘disputed’ and ‘conflict affected’. The ‘disputed’ status, despite its own political significance, does not necessarily underline humanitarian urgency. Designation of Kashmir as a ‘conflict zone’ would do that.
The question here is why hasn’t such thing happened so far? Naturally, the governments in New Delhi and Srinagar would not do that. Those advocating for Kashmiri right to self determination and safeguarding of their human rights at home and abroad have missed an important point over the years: the role of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Kashmir. And also the absence of the UN Cluster System and a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in Kashmir
The United Nations’ Military Observers’ Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), based in Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, has a limited mandate. Their primary work is to report any violations or change in the status quo of the Line of Control (LoC).
OCHA as an arm of the UN Secretariat which has a broader mandate - to “mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action” to alleviate human suffering in emergencies, which includes conflict situations. Importantly, one of its missions is also to “advocate for the rights of people in need.”
Beyond humanitarian coordination, what is required in Kashmir today is underlining the urgency for some urgent political initiatives to ensure that the trouble in Kashmir does not spill over to the larger South Asian region. That urgency would come if there are credible situation reports from a body like the OCHA, which are taken more seriously by the international community. Today Kashmir needs situation reports by impartial international actors who would depict the real humanitarian situation there.
Although the European Commission (EC) some days back announced an emergency aid of 2 million euros ($2.5 million) for the victims of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, it was not a special initiative in response to the current situation. The EU’s low scale humanitarian aid for Kashmir has been pouring in for some eight years now, addressing the longer term impacts of the conflict.
The UN Resolution 46/182 which serves as the basis of the OCHA mandate is clear that the “responsibility for people affected by emergency lies – first and foremost - with their respective states”. But it also says that the “states in need are expected to facilitate the work of responding organizations.” Given the UN’s recognition of Kashmir as a disputed territory, the definition of the governing ‘State’ cannot be normal in meaning and scope.
There are people who argue that since there is no UN OCHA office in India, its ambit of work cannot be extended to Kashmir. That is not a convincing argument. UN OCHA has directly and indirectly responded to many emergency situations in India. One example is the Gujarat earthquake.
Then there is a full-fledged UN OCHA office in Pakistan, whose area of work includes Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK). UN OCHA has played, and continues to play, a key role in the coordination of the government and the international emergency response efforts in PAK.
The UN OCHA has a strong presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) as well. Humanitarian actors, donors, and diplomatic missions alike rely on OCHA for its wide range of information and analytical products in the OPT. These include bridging the gaps in humanitarian needs, weekly and monthly humanitarian updates, briefings and field tours. One of its key functions is the regular reporting on the overall humanitarian situation, and routine monitoring, reporting on, advocating for, and facilitating humanitarian access in the OPT.
Looking at the dire humanitarian situation in Kashmir today, especially the highly inadequate infrastructure to treat the casualties, UN OCHA has a strong case in Kashmir. Its case is also strong for the fact that people are dying for lack of timely medical aid and treatment. The death of two women last week just because their travel to hospital was hindered by troopers serves as a grim reminder. There must be many more instances which go unreported.
The policy of widespread detainment of civilians, including children, on frivolous charges is also a matter of serious concern. These state actions raise serious questions related to juvenile justice. The detainment of prominent human rights defender and President of Kashmir High Court Bar Association, Mian Qayoom, on highly questionable charges, is a grave matter too.
All these matters where the rule of law has hit a low of unacceptable limits in international law deserve international attention. And UN-OCHA could just be apt to do that.
Myth of Jammu & Kashmir's Financial Dependence
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Yaoundé (Cameroon), July 19: It is an old story now that 60 percent of Jammu & Kashmir state’s expenditure now comes from central ‘grants.’ Within India, and even abroad, this theory is widely circulated and believed.
Media in India is again posing questions today: ‘how come a state which gets such generous grants from New Delhi remains so discontent and rebels so often?’ These questions reverberate every now and then. But there are many facts which remain unknown. Facts, which are plain facts.
A latest Reserve Bank of India (RBI) study “State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 2009-10” reveals some parts of those facts. It sheds some interesting light on the state’s administrative expenditure and lower social spending. It also gives some comparisons with other states, sharpening our understanding of the ‘dependency syndrome.’
According to the document, J&K received Rs 13,252 crore as grants from the Centre in 2009-10. In comparison, the eight conflict-ridden northeastern states received grants and loans worth Rs 29,084 crore from the Centre in 2009-10, which, as per the report, was 44% of their combined total expenditure. And what does that mean?
It may mean that these states generate more internal revenues and that is why these grants constitute only 44 % of their expenditure. But if that is so, why do these states need such grants in the first place?
The RBI document sheds important light on the pattern of public spending in J&K. It says the government spending on the social sector in the state — education, healthcare, rural development, social welfare, etc — is a mere 30% of the total expenditure. And this kind of social spending has remained stagnant in J&K since 1980.
These percentages mean J&K has the fourth lowest proportion of social spending among all states in India. The all-state average of social spending is 40% in India. And then there are states like Chhattisgarh which spends 54% on social sector, Maharashtra spends 50% and Rajasthan 46%.
According to J&K’s 2010-11 budget document; power, interest payments, security expenditure and ‘other expenditure’ consumes 30 per cent of the state’s budget. The rest about 40 per cent goes into salaries and pension.
Out of this, power, some interest payments and security expenditure are not due to the state’s fault.
Let us take power, for example. Central-government owned National Hydro Power Corporation (NHPC) produces 1560 MW of power from J&K.
NHPC’s generation cost per unit of power in J&K is an average 0.30 paisa, but the state is charged a much higher tariff. Our power deficit and the drain on the budget are primarily for this reason.
Then is the question of the state’s energy deficiency. According to the Draft J&K State Hydel Policy, 2010, at present J&K’s unrestricted demand for power is 2120 MW, while suppressed demand is 1450 MW with scheduled curtailment. That means there is a deficit of about 500 MW even vis-a-vis restricted demand. Can industries really thrive?
The per capita power consumption in J&K makes interesting analysis as well. According to the J&K State Hydel Policy, 2010, J&K’s per capita power consumption is 750 units, compared to 872 units in Himachal Pradesh, 706 units in Uttarakhand, 1506 units in Punjab and 1208 units in Haryana. These are the main states where J&K’s power goes.
Then the political question. Despite repeated demands from the state and the Rangarajan Committee’s recommendation of handing over of some of the power houses back to the state, New Delhi has chosen to look the other way. This is despite the fact that the NHPC-run projects in the state have earned huge profits since commissioning.
J&K’s State Hydel Policy, 2010 proposes a hydel project in private-public partnership to remain out of state hands only for 35 years. That does not apply to the NHPC because New Delhi wishes that so.
Interestingly, NHPC reported a 94 per cent jump in consolidated net profit at Rs 2,090.50 crore for the financial year 2009-10. A bulk of its profits comes from J&K. Its Chairman and Managing Director, S.K. Garg was quoted in the Business Line in May saying that the hydro power firm was looking to invest its surplus funds in the mutual funds market!
The RBI report also sheds interesting light about the high administrative expenditure - 12% of all expenditure - in J&K. The report says that there are states with similar harsh terrains, like Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim, which spend only about 6% on administration.
Then let us take the issue of the annual per capita spending. The RBI document says that J&K’s annual per capita spending by the government was about Rs 20 lakh in 2009-10. In other ‘economically backward’ and conflict-ridden states like Sikkim, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, the per capita spending is much higher - Rs 59 lakh, Rs 35 lakh and Rs 38 lakh respectively for the same period.
Then there are other ‘economically-backward’ states like Meghalaya, Manipur and Nagaland where government per capita spending ranges between Rs 18 to 21 lakh per annum.
Jammu & Kashmir’s annual imports are to the tune of around Rs 25000 crore. There is hardly any official mechanism to calculate the inbuilt taxes that J&K’s citizens pay on those imports, which go directly to government of India’s tax kitty. If an average of 12 percent of such taxes is calculated, J&K state pays Rs 3000 crore in terms of in-built taxes, which are never reflected in any system.
Jammu and Kashmir’s record in internal tax collection is not bad either. It retains its top position in terms of Value Added Tax (VAT) collection in whole of India. The government has already revealed that the Commercial Taxes Department collected record revenue of Rs 1721.59 crore by the end of February 2009 as compared to Rs 1623.87 crore during the same period in 2008.
However, there is a flaw in some direct taxes analysis. Many direct taxes, like the income tax, are not reflected in the state’s finances just because they are directly booked by non local companies outside the state. They get never reflected in the state.
Add to all this the misery of J&K’s tourism sector. Despite a show piece airport at Srinagar labeled as an ‘international airport’, the government of India is yet to find the political will to make it so. And it still looks for the clues for the unrest in Kashmir’s streets.
Yaoundé (Cameroon), July 19: It is an old story now that 60 percent of Jammu & Kashmir state’s expenditure now comes from central ‘grants.’ Within India, and even abroad, this theory is widely circulated and believed.
Media in India is again posing questions today: ‘how come a state which gets such generous grants from New Delhi remains so discontent and rebels so often?’ These questions reverberate every now and then. But there are many facts which remain unknown. Facts, which are plain facts.
A latest Reserve Bank of India (RBI) study “State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 2009-10” reveals some parts of those facts. It sheds some interesting light on the state’s administrative expenditure and lower social spending. It also gives some comparisons with other states, sharpening our understanding of the ‘dependency syndrome.’
According to the document, J&K received Rs 13,252 crore as grants from the Centre in 2009-10. In comparison, the eight conflict-ridden northeastern states received grants and loans worth Rs 29,084 crore from the Centre in 2009-10, which, as per the report, was 44% of their combined total expenditure. And what does that mean?
It may mean that these states generate more internal revenues and that is why these grants constitute only 44 % of their expenditure. But if that is so, why do these states need such grants in the first place?
The RBI document sheds important light on the pattern of public spending in J&K. It says the government spending on the social sector in the state — education, healthcare, rural development, social welfare, etc — is a mere 30% of the total expenditure. And this kind of social spending has remained stagnant in J&K since 1980.
These percentages mean J&K has the fourth lowest proportion of social spending among all states in India. The all-state average of social spending is 40% in India. And then there are states like Chhattisgarh which spends 54% on social sector, Maharashtra spends 50% and Rajasthan 46%.
According to J&K’s 2010-11 budget document; power, interest payments, security expenditure and ‘other expenditure’ consumes 30 per cent of the state’s budget. The rest about 40 per cent goes into salaries and pension.
Out of this, power, some interest payments and security expenditure are not due to the state’s fault.
Let us take power, for example. Central-government owned National Hydro Power Corporation (NHPC) produces 1560 MW of power from J&K.
NHPC’s generation cost per unit of power in J&K is an average 0.30 paisa, but the state is charged a much higher tariff. Our power deficit and the drain on the budget are primarily for this reason.
Then is the question of the state’s energy deficiency. According to the Draft J&K State Hydel Policy, 2010, at present J&K’s unrestricted demand for power is 2120 MW, while suppressed demand is 1450 MW with scheduled curtailment. That means there is a deficit of about 500 MW even vis-a-vis restricted demand. Can industries really thrive?
The per capita power consumption in J&K makes interesting analysis as well. According to the J&K State Hydel Policy, 2010, J&K’s per capita power consumption is 750 units, compared to 872 units in Himachal Pradesh, 706 units in Uttarakhand, 1506 units in Punjab and 1208 units in Haryana. These are the main states where J&K’s power goes.
Then the political question. Despite repeated demands from the state and the Rangarajan Committee’s recommendation of handing over of some of the power houses back to the state, New Delhi has chosen to look the other way. This is despite the fact that the NHPC-run projects in the state have earned huge profits since commissioning.
J&K’s State Hydel Policy, 2010 proposes a hydel project in private-public partnership to remain out of state hands only for 35 years. That does not apply to the NHPC because New Delhi wishes that so.
Interestingly, NHPC reported a 94 per cent jump in consolidated net profit at Rs 2,090.50 crore for the financial year 2009-10. A bulk of its profits comes from J&K. Its Chairman and Managing Director, S.K. Garg was quoted in the Business Line in May saying that the hydro power firm was looking to invest its surplus funds in the mutual funds market!
The RBI report also sheds interesting light about the high administrative expenditure - 12% of all expenditure - in J&K. The report says that there are states with similar harsh terrains, like Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim, which spend only about 6% on administration.
Then let us take the issue of the annual per capita spending. The RBI document says that J&K’s annual per capita spending by the government was about Rs 20 lakh in 2009-10. In other ‘economically backward’ and conflict-ridden states like Sikkim, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, the per capita spending is much higher - Rs 59 lakh, Rs 35 lakh and Rs 38 lakh respectively for the same period.
Then there are other ‘economically-backward’ states like Meghalaya, Manipur and Nagaland where government per capita spending ranges between Rs 18 to 21 lakh per annum.
Jammu & Kashmir’s annual imports are to the tune of around Rs 25000 crore. There is hardly any official mechanism to calculate the inbuilt taxes that J&K’s citizens pay on those imports, which go directly to government of India’s tax kitty. If an average of 12 percent of such taxes is calculated, J&K state pays Rs 3000 crore in terms of in-built taxes, which are never reflected in any system.
Jammu and Kashmir’s record in internal tax collection is not bad either. It retains its top position in terms of Value Added Tax (VAT) collection in whole of India. The government has already revealed that the Commercial Taxes Department collected record revenue of Rs 1721.59 crore by the end of February 2009 as compared to Rs 1623.87 crore during the same period in 2008.
However, there is a flaw in some direct taxes analysis. Many direct taxes, like the income tax, are not reflected in the state’s finances just because they are directly booked by non local companies outside the state. They get never reflected in the state.
Add to all this the misery of J&K’s tourism sector. Despite a show piece airport at Srinagar labeled as an ‘international airport’, the government of India is yet to find the political will to make it so. And it still looks for the clues for the unrest in Kashmir’s streets.
Kashmir: A way forward
Creating a win-win-win for all from the current movement
Arjimand Hussain Talib
For the first time in many decades, Kashmir’s movement for the restoration of its lost political sovereignty has attained a big moral high ground. The current upsurge – which many Indian analysts admit is an uprising - has a real potential of taking Kashmir out from its decades-old suffering. It has also a potential to bring India and Pakistan closer with a new approach. Let us remember, the happenings in Kashmir today are guiding their political responses, and not the vice versa.
For the first time in several decades, India’s political and media establishments are seeing Kashmir’s yearning for rigged political sovereignty as it has been – fundamentally indigenous. There is real nervousness, and even discomfort. New Delhi seems to be short of ideas to contain the vivid political expression in Kashmir today.
Even at the height of militancy, when its rule was challenged to great lengths, it has never been as nervous. There is a growing public perception in India that New Delhi’s moral standing on Kashmir is weak, and hence the need for re-thinking the 60-year-old approach of military control and political manipulation.
Then see the language India’s media is using on Kashmir today. The clichés like ‘Pakistan-instigated’, ‘Pakistan-sponsored’ ‘Pakistani-backed’ etc. seem to have suddenly disappeared. For the first time in our living memory, news anchors on India’s TV news channels are short of words and arguments. The tone and tenor of the opinion makers in print media – including the top columnists – has changed. Such is the awe of the beauty of Kashmir’s current people’s movement.
Pakistan, on its part, seems to be watching and just going by the tide. Its response to the happenings in Kashmir has been muted – which, in the present circumstances, Kashmiris must appreciate fits the situation well.
Clearly, Pakistan cannot afford a groundswell of anger and upsurge among its population at this point of time vis-a-vis Kashmir. It is confronted with too many odds today. For Islamabad too, nothing could be as perfect a time as today to talk to India on Kashmir with its ears to the ground.
There are certain people in Kashmir who expect Pakistan to engage in Kashmir more proactively today. Sensible politics demands that Pakistan steers clear from the current movement of Kashmir, as it has been doing for a long time now. That will be as much a good to Kashmir as Pakistan itself. Admitted, there is a political cost to that – Kashmiris will mistake Pakistan’s silence and lack of support to its indifference. But given the longer term benefits of letting Kashmir’s movement evolve on its own, this cost will be paltry.
Kashmiris, on their part, must maintain the momentum of the current movement at all costs. That is a feeling nursed by an overwhelming majority of Kashmiris today. If the momentum of this movement is lost, it will take quite a lot to renew that again.
There is also an overwhelming view making the rounds in Kashmir today - that it is much better to undergo a prolonged suffering in one go to achieve a meaningful political goal rather than dying in perpetual everyday uncertainty and chaos. Such an opinion has its merit too.
But Kashmiris today have to guard against the temptations of militant transformation of this movement. The current level of oppression is seen by many youngsters as a big provocation and challenge ‘to their power and manhood.’ There are already stray voices of youngsters on social networking sites talking about guns and suicide missions. That course would be a collective suicide for Kashmiris, which must be avoided at all costs.
Sooner or later, given the supremacy of people’s peaceful movement, New Delhi will have to budge from its traditional standpoint on Kashmir in a significant manner. It has no other options. If it takes the Sri Lanka’s approach of mass slaughter of the Tamils last year, its cause in Kashmir will be lost for ever, with much wider ramifications. If it tries to buy time and take to same experiments it has been fiddling with since decades here, it is poised for a much larger upsurge among Kashmiris in the future. Kashmiris’ Gen-Next is different, so are their means and resolve to resist.
India’s Home Minister P Chidambaram’s offer of talks to the pro-freedom parties in Kashmir needs not be rejected altogether. Today pro-freedom parties in Kashmir have a big bargaining chip at hand. For that to materialize into some political achievement, both the Hurriyat factions need to meet and discuss a possible agenda for talks. If they do not meet, they will lose it again. Entering into a dialogue does not mean an automatic surrender or sell-out. However, sensible diplomacy demands that these people keep their doors half-open once they enter the dialogue room.
However, for the Hurriyats entering into any such dialogue without some confidence building steps from New Delhi would be too risky. The people of Kashmir today are too sensitive about the question of talks. They must get a feeling of achievement before talks could be initiated. It is not a bad idea to keep homework on one’s bottom lines done well ahead of time.
But there has to be caution. Any talks which may boil down to salvaging New Delhi from the current situation will be unacceptable to Kashmiris. The two Hurriyats can always walk out if they feel that the format and the substance of talks are no different than the past.
If, however, they sense a change in New Delhi’s heart, they could enlarge the scope of dialogue by inviting parties like the NC and PDP to support that process.
It would also not be a bad time to consult Islamabad before entering into such talks. At this point of time Islamabad might have some good ideas about such a dialogue process. However, it would be nice to leave the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) out from the scope of discussions at this moment. Pakistan has some real concerns if the treaty is taken up for re-negotiations. There is ample space for Kashmir under the present system of IWT which could be maneuvered.
As a sequel to such process, further Kashmir-centric Indo-Pak talks which are held in the spirit of mutual win-win as against the usual one-upmanship would not be bad either. It could well be the beginning of a new era of conflict resolution, disengagement from Afghanistan and real cooperation between the two countries.
Latest reports indicate that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has called for an all-J&K-parties’ meeting in New Delhi on Tuesday. In theory it makes sense to consult ‘democratically elected representatives’, but it is now a well established fact that these representatives at best represent certain people’s day to day governance needs and not the political aspirations of the masses.
As such, the process must go beyond the parties which are part basically part of the problem than a solution for Kashmir.
Arjimand Hussain Talib
For the first time in many decades, Kashmir’s movement for the restoration of its lost political sovereignty has attained a big moral high ground. The current upsurge – which many Indian analysts admit is an uprising - has a real potential of taking Kashmir out from its decades-old suffering. It has also a potential to bring India and Pakistan closer with a new approach. Let us remember, the happenings in Kashmir today are guiding their political responses, and not the vice versa.
For the first time in several decades, India’s political and media establishments are seeing Kashmir’s yearning for rigged political sovereignty as it has been – fundamentally indigenous. There is real nervousness, and even discomfort. New Delhi seems to be short of ideas to contain the vivid political expression in Kashmir today.
Even at the height of militancy, when its rule was challenged to great lengths, it has never been as nervous. There is a growing public perception in India that New Delhi’s moral standing on Kashmir is weak, and hence the need for re-thinking the 60-year-old approach of military control and political manipulation.
Then see the language India’s media is using on Kashmir today. The clichés like ‘Pakistan-instigated’, ‘Pakistan-sponsored’ ‘Pakistani-backed’ etc. seem to have suddenly disappeared. For the first time in our living memory, news anchors on India’s TV news channels are short of words and arguments. The tone and tenor of the opinion makers in print media – including the top columnists – has changed. Such is the awe of the beauty of Kashmir’s current people’s movement.
Pakistan, on its part, seems to be watching and just going by the tide. Its response to the happenings in Kashmir has been muted – which, in the present circumstances, Kashmiris must appreciate fits the situation well.
Clearly, Pakistan cannot afford a groundswell of anger and upsurge among its population at this point of time vis-a-vis Kashmir. It is confronted with too many odds today. For Islamabad too, nothing could be as perfect a time as today to talk to India on Kashmir with its ears to the ground.
There are certain people in Kashmir who expect Pakistan to engage in Kashmir more proactively today. Sensible politics demands that Pakistan steers clear from the current movement of Kashmir, as it has been doing for a long time now. That will be as much a good to Kashmir as Pakistan itself. Admitted, there is a political cost to that – Kashmiris will mistake Pakistan’s silence and lack of support to its indifference. But given the longer term benefits of letting Kashmir’s movement evolve on its own, this cost will be paltry.
Kashmiris, on their part, must maintain the momentum of the current movement at all costs. That is a feeling nursed by an overwhelming majority of Kashmiris today. If the momentum of this movement is lost, it will take quite a lot to renew that again.
There is also an overwhelming view making the rounds in Kashmir today - that it is much better to undergo a prolonged suffering in one go to achieve a meaningful political goal rather than dying in perpetual everyday uncertainty and chaos. Such an opinion has its merit too.
But Kashmiris today have to guard against the temptations of militant transformation of this movement. The current level of oppression is seen by many youngsters as a big provocation and challenge ‘to their power and manhood.’ There are already stray voices of youngsters on social networking sites talking about guns and suicide missions. That course would be a collective suicide for Kashmiris, which must be avoided at all costs.
Sooner or later, given the supremacy of people’s peaceful movement, New Delhi will have to budge from its traditional standpoint on Kashmir in a significant manner. It has no other options. If it takes the Sri Lanka’s approach of mass slaughter of the Tamils last year, its cause in Kashmir will be lost for ever, with much wider ramifications. If it tries to buy time and take to same experiments it has been fiddling with since decades here, it is poised for a much larger upsurge among Kashmiris in the future. Kashmiris’ Gen-Next is different, so are their means and resolve to resist.
India’s Home Minister P Chidambaram’s offer of talks to the pro-freedom parties in Kashmir needs not be rejected altogether. Today pro-freedom parties in Kashmir have a big bargaining chip at hand. For that to materialize into some political achievement, both the Hurriyat factions need to meet and discuss a possible agenda for talks. If they do not meet, they will lose it again. Entering into a dialogue does not mean an automatic surrender or sell-out. However, sensible diplomacy demands that these people keep their doors half-open once they enter the dialogue room.
However, for the Hurriyats entering into any such dialogue without some confidence building steps from New Delhi would be too risky. The people of Kashmir today are too sensitive about the question of talks. They must get a feeling of achievement before talks could be initiated. It is not a bad idea to keep homework on one’s bottom lines done well ahead of time.
But there has to be caution. Any talks which may boil down to salvaging New Delhi from the current situation will be unacceptable to Kashmiris. The two Hurriyats can always walk out if they feel that the format and the substance of talks are no different than the past.
If, however, they sense a change in New Delhi’s heart, they could enlarge the scope of dialogue by inviting parties like the NC and PDP to support that process.
It would also not be a bad time to consult Islamabad before entering into such talks. At this point of time Islamabad might have some good ideas about such a dialogue process. However, it would be nice to leave the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) out from the scope of discussions at this moment. Pakistan has some real concerns if the treaty is taken up for re-negotiations. There is ample space for Kashmir under the present system of IWT which could be maneuvered.
As a sequel to such process, further Kashmir-centric Indo-Pak talks which are held in the spirit of mutual win-win as against the usual one-upmanship would not be bad either. It could well be the beginning of a new era of conflict resolution, disengagement from Afghanistan and real cooperation between the two countries.
Latest reports indicate that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has called for an all-J&K-parties’ meeting in New Delhi on Tuesday. In theory it makes sense to consult ‘democratically elected representatives’, but it is now a well established fact that these representatives at best represent certain people’s day to day governance needs and not the political aspirations of the masses.
As such, the process must go beyond the parties which are part basically part of the problem than a solution for Kashmir.
End of Kashmiri fallacy?
Arjimand Hussain Talib
In a tussle for justice, when a stronger party controls almost all the options of the weaker party, the outcome is inevitably cynical.
“The Little” Brown Book of Anecdotes, edited by Clifton Fadiman (1985), has an interesting story about Basmarck - a former German Chancellor and a German liberal politician. It is said that Basmarck, enraged at the constant criticism from Rudolf Virchow (a German liberal politician), had his aides call upon the scientist to challenge him to a duel.
“As the challenged party, I have the choice of weapons”, said Virchow, “and I choose these.” He held aloft two large and apparently identical sausages. “One of these,” he went on “is infected with deadly germs; the other is perfectly sound. Let His Excellency decide which one he wishes to eat, and I will eat the other.” Almost immediately, the message came back that the Chancellor had decided to cancel the duel!
Today, all the options before the people of Kashmir seem to be perfectly controlled. So, it is quite hard for them to make a choice – a choice which could ensure justice with the blood of young boys and girls who chose to die than live a life of suffocation and humiliation. Sadly enough, some of the Kashmiris’ long-held beliefs – which look like their fallacies today - stand shattered too.
The outcome of the All-Parties Meeting held in New Delhi last week has disappointed the people in Kashmir beyond words. The message conveyed by the meeting is being interpreted by Kashmiris this way: no matter the nature and the means of Kashmiri quest for regaining their political sovereignty, New Delhi controls and chooses all their options. And a harsh way.
Shockingly, the meeting doesn’t seem to have considered any political and humane approaches to the political message Kashmiris are conveying through the street protests. The harsher military crackdown unleashed on the peaceful Kashmiri movement since then seems to rubbish the Kashmiri ‘fallacies.’
Fallacy number 1: Kashmiri people had long internalized a ‘realization’ that a transformation of their militant movement to a peaceful political one would gain them friends and political achievement.
Kashmiris’ embrace of an armed movement in the late 80s saw a strong military response from New Delhi. That response hardly raised any eye brows within India and abroad. Kashmiris got isolated, and even demonized, than ever before. There were hardly any supporters to their cause. The loss they suffered was colossal. Their political goal looked even more distant. In the process, New Delhi managed to consolidate its political, military and cultural control of Kashmir even further.
That period also made Kashmir’s civil society be at a loss of words. They were easily defeated in discussions and conferences. India’s civil society sometimes promised support if only Kashmiris abjured the gun. The JKLF example is well known. It shunned the armed path on the promise from some of India’s prominent civil society actors that doing so will mean proximity to their political goal. That never happened.
Post 2008, Kashmir’s political movement has been overwhelmingly peaceful. Peaceful demonstrations, street protests and Internet-based activism replaced the armed movement. Was New Delhi’s response any different?
Let us consider India’s media semantics and the political response to Kashmir’s current peaceful movement. Most of India’s media call the peaceful protest demonstrations ‘clashes’. So when news headlines read ‘2 killed in Kashmir clashes’, it automatically goes on to justify the killings.
‘Clashes’ justify unconstitutional and undemocratic Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), Disturbed Areas Act, Public Safety Act and so on. ‘Clashes’ justify the killings of innocent men in fake encounters on the LoC for army officers to win prizes. And yet, Kashmiris are reminded that they live in a ‘democratic’ system.
The term ‘clash’ in itself is quite judgmental. It is common sense, unarmed men, women and children asking for right to demonstrate, and confronted by armed forces armed to the teeth, does not qualify for a clash. The statistics of loss speak for themselves. Over a hundred civilians have been killed, thousands are injured till date. And, except for a few minor injuries, there is not a single casualty on the side of the armed forces so far.
Barring a few exceptions, most of India’s media organizations are misleading the Indian people again. The images shown on the TV are smartly edited and censored. Their local reporters are under great pressure from their news rooms and ‘editorial advice’. Hardly any news channel has shown the ‘violence’ perpetrated on hundreds of thousands of Kashmiri homes by armed forces during protests. The broken windows and glasses of Kashmiri homes are crying for cameras. So do peaceful protests and the slogans raised there.
Fallacy number 2: It is quite well known that Kashmiris for a long time now have preferred to wage their political struggle on their own, leaving Pakistan out of the equation, in spite of it being a genuine party to the issue. Post 2008, Kashmir’s renewed political movement has been completely indigenous, with almost no outside support. But look at the irony.
Since June, a number of conspiracy theories have been floated about the current movement - this being LeT-sponsored, Pakistan-instigated, jehadi-masterminded and so on. These theories were laid to rest when chief minister Omar Abdullah himself termed this movement self propelled and leaderless. Why these contradictions, Kashmiris have a right to ask?
Fallacy number 3: The leaders of the post 90s Kashmiri political and militant movement have always been advised that if their movement were a secular one, they would gain sympathizers not only within India but beyond as well. Despite the fact that Kashmir’s mainstream political movement has never been Islamist, Kashmiri leaders have taken great pains lately to insist that while Kashmiris were overwhelmingly Muslim, that did not automatically mean religious exclusivity.
One of India’s respected newspapers, The Hindu, carried an article on Friday titled “Kashmir's new Islamist movement” by analyst Praveen Swami. As usual, Mr Swami’s sermon was that a quest for ‘Islamist exclusivity’ was driving the present Kashmiri movement. Unfortunately, this is what seems is being believed and consumed by New Delhi’s political establishment too.
As Kashmiris today try to come to terms with these hard realities, they have questions. They are holding no guns today. There is no Pakistan supplying arms and ammunition. And yet, New Delhi’s response is no different.
New Delhi says it still needs AFSPA, DAA, PSA etc. to maintain order (sic.). Curfews are endless. Bullets are being showered on peaceful protesters like water cannons. Army has been given a go ahead to submit people into silence. People are being detained at a large scale. Media has been silenced.
Despite all this, Kashmiris find no friends today. No sympathizers. No civil society actors of India demanding all this to end. No international community shedding tears. No one saying Kashmiris do not deserve all this. No one supporting their political cause.
And all these are disturbing questions.
In a tussle for justice, when a stronger party controls almost all the options of the weaker party, the outcome is inevitably cynical.
“The Little” Brown Book of Anecdotes, edited by Clifton Fadiman (1985), has an interesting story about Basmarck - a former German Chancellor and a German liberal politician. It is said that Basmarck, enraged at the constant criticism from Rudolf Virchow (a German liberal politician), had his aides call upon the scientist to challenge him to a duel.
“As the challenged party, I have the choice of weapons”, said Virchow, “and I choose these.” He held aloft two large and apparently identical sausages. “One of these,” he went on “is infected with deadly germs; the other is perfectly sound. Let His Excellency decide which one he wishes to eat, and I will eat the other.” Almost immediately, the message came back that the Chancellor had decided to cancel the duel!
Today, all the options before the people of Kashmir seem to be perfectly controlled. So, it is quite hard for them to make a choice – a choice which could ensure justice with the blood of young boys and girls who chose to die than live a life of suffocation and humiliation. Sadly enough, some of the Kashmiris’ long-held beliefs – which look like their fallacies today - stand shattered too.
The outcome of the All-Parties Meeting held in New Delhi last week has disappointed the people in Kashmir beyond words. The message conveyed by the meeting is being interpreted by Kashmiris this way: no matter the nature and the means of Kashmiri quest for regaining their political sovereignty, New Delhi controls and chooses all their options. And a harsh way.
Shockingly, the meeting doesn’t seem to have considered any political and humane approaches to the political message Kashmiris are conveying through the street protests. The harsher military crackdown unleashed on the peaceful Kashmiri movement since then seems to rubbish the Kashmiri ‘fallacies.’
Fallacy number 1: Kashmiri people had long internalized a ‘realization’ that a transformation of their militant movement to a peaceful political one would gain them friends and political achievement.
Kashmiris’ embrace of an armed movement in the late 80s saw a strong military response from New Delhi. That response hardly raised any eye brows within India and abroad. Kashmiris got isolated, and even demonized, than ever before. There were hardly any supporters to their cause. The loss they suffered was colossal. Their political goal looked even more distant. In the process, New Delhi managed to consolidate its political, military and cultural control of Kashmir even further.
That period also made Kashmir’s civil society be at a loss of words. They were easily defeated in discussions and conferences. India’s civil society sometimes promised support if only Kashmiris abjured the gun. The JKLF example is well known. It shunned the armed path on the promise from some of India’s prominent civil society actors that doing so will mean proximity to their political goal. That never happened.
Post 2008, Kashmir’s political movement has been overwhelmingly peaceful. Peaceful demonstrations, street protests and Internet-based activism replaced the armed movement. Was New Delhi’s response any different?
Let us consider India’s media semantics and the political response to Kashmir’s current peaceful movement. Most of India’s media call the peaceful protest demonstrations ‘clashes’. So when news headlines read ‘2 killed in Kashmir clashes’, it automatically goes on to justify the killings.
‘Clashes’ justify unconstitutional and undemocratic Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), Disturbed Areas Act, Public Safety Act and so on. ‘Clashes’ justify the killings of innocent men in fake encounters on the LoC for army officers to win prizes. And yet, Kashmiris are reminded that they live in a ‘democratic’ system.
The term ‘clash’ in itself is quite judgmental. It is common sense, unarmed men, women and children asking for right to demonstrate, and confronted by armed forces armed to the teeth, does not qualify for a clash. The statistics of loss speak for themselves. Over a hundred civilians have been killed, thousands are injured till date. And, except for a few minor injuries, there is not a single casualty on the side of the armed forces so far.
Barring a few exceptions, most of India’s media organizations are misleading the Indian people again. The images shown on the TV are smartly edited and censored. Their local reporters are under great pressure from their news rooms and ‘editorial advice’. Hardly any news channel has shown the ‘violence’ perpetrated on hundreds of thousands of Kashmiri homes by armed forces during protests. The broken windows and glasses of Kashmiri homes are crying for cameras. So do peaceful protests and the slogans raised there.
Fallacy number 2: It is quite well known that Kashmiris for a long time now have preferred to wage their political struggle on their own, leaving Pakistan out of the equation, in spite of it being a genuine party to the issue. Post 2008, Kashmir’s renewed political movement has been completely indigenous, with almost no outside support. But look at the irony.
Since June, a number of conspiracy theories have been floated about the current movement - this being LeT-sponsored, Pakistan-instigated, jehadi-masterminded and so on. These theories were laid to rest when chief minister Omar Abdullah himself termed this movement self propelled and leaderless. Why these contradictions, Kashmiris have a right to ask?
Fallacy number 3: The leaders of the post 90s Kashmiri political and militant movement have always been advised that if their movement were a secular one, they would gain sympathizers not only within India but beyond as well. Despite the fact that Kashmir’s mainstream political movement has never been Islamist, Kashmiri leaders have taken great pains lately to insist that while Kashmiris were overwhelmingly Muslim, that did not automatically mean religious exclusivity.
One of India’s respected newspapers, The Hindu, carried an article on Friday titled “Kashmir's new Islamist movement” by analyst Praveen Swami. As usual, Mr Swami’s sermon was that a quest for ‘Islamist exclusivity’ was driving the present Kashmiri movement. Unfortunately, this is what seems is being believed and consumed by New Delhi’s political establishment too.
As Kashmiris today try to come to terms with these hard realities, they have questions. They are holding no guns today. There is no Pakistan supplying arms and ammunition. And yet, New Delhi’s response is no different.
New Delhi says it still needs AFSPA, DAA, PSA etc. to maintain order (sic.). Curfews are endless. Bullets are being showered on peaceful protesters like water cannons. Army has been given a go ahead to submit people into silence. People are being detained at a large scale. Media has been silenced.
Despite all this, Kashmiris find no friends today. No sympathizers. No civil society actors of India demanding all this to end. No international community shedding tears. No one saying Kashmiris do not deserve all this. No one supporting their political cause.
And all these are disturbing questions.
Kashmir 2010 Unrest
Beyond the cul-de-sac
All Kashmiri parties need to sit and chart a common agenda now
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Kashmir today has a moment of truth across the political divide - for the ruling National Conference (NC), for the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP), for the two factions of the Hurriyat Conference and others on their side. It is a moment of truth for any Baskhshis-or-G M Shahs-in-the-making too.
It is also a moment for Kashmir’s opinion makers to shun ambiguity and speak out of their heart.
The sacred blood of Kashmiri youngsters spilled on our roads today must remind everybody that it has been enough of political bluffing and politicking. It is a moment of sincere introspection by everybody - New Delhi, Islamabad, the Hurriyats, United Jehad Council (UJC), NC, PDP, just everybody.
For NC, it is a moment which seems to raise questions on its very existence. A party which formed the government in 2008 on the basis of some 25,000 votes it got in eight assembly segments of Srinagar out of some 700,000 eligible voters; it is a moment of real worry.
There are reasons to believe that the Chief Minister Omar Abdullah continues to remain anonymously on the Facebook. If so, he must be aware of the extremities of public mood against his party, government and his actions today.
Logically speaking, the options before Omar are limited today. If his government decides to take a cue from the recent National Conference’s political resolution on the restoration of autonomy he can’t do that because he rules with a coalition with the Congress Party. If the party today continues with its policy of ratifying New Delhi’s iron hand approach in dealing with the unrest, its political loss is surely going to aggravate. It has to think beyond for the sake of its political survival.
When it comes to the PDP, NC’s woes do not necessarily mean its advantage today. Since it came to power in 2004 it has had the advantage of a ‘feel good feeling’ about its rule among certain rural pockets in the valley. That ‘feel good’ feeling had something to do with the reigning in of the Special Operations Group (SOG) and creating a sense of security among the people in the country side. But that ‘feel good’ feeling for it is also withering away.
There are credible reports that New Delhi through some of its emissaries did explore the possibility of this party forming the government during the last few weeks. Credible sources also indicate that the PDP dismissed this probability. The party is understood to have set three pre-conditions for considering such a possibility - revocation of AFSPA, withdrawal of some forces from civilian areas and release of some political prisoners.
For New Delhi heeding to these demands at this moment looks improbable. Obviously, it would prefer offering such a political ‘package’ to those groups which challenge its rule altogether in the state. It is also highly improbable that the National Conference would take such an arrangement with grace, allowing huge political advantage to PDP.
New Delhi’s political position on and military actions in Kashmir stand seriously questioned at the international level today. There was a time when it won real sympathies from big powers when it showcased Islamic radicalism being at the heart of Kashmir’s political movement. As Kashmir’s political movement is getting increasingly peaceful again New Delhi is facing some real problems. Its political and economic investments in Kashmir also lie in tatters today. The street movement of the youngsters will not die down. It has no option other than to negotiate a new political arrangement with Srinagar today.
Although the two factions of the Hurriyat Conference enjoy clear political advantage in the current situation, this advantage could be short-lived. The problem is that while staying away from each other, they acquire some serious limitations in transforming this advantage into some meaningful political achievement. Their organizational limitations about embracing a purposeful dialogue and offering viable political and economic visions beyond the status quo are serious.
The second limitation of two Hurriyats is that they are today not in a position to greatly influence the people on the streets who go by their own wisdom and instincts in conveying their political aspirations.
The two individuals who are currently underground and are setting the protest calendars have limitations too. No matter their commitment to their political cause, they have limited political acumen to translate the strengths of the people’s street mobilisation into a tangible political achievement.
The people of Kashmir have yet again demonstrated that the political status quo to them is both unbearable and unacceptable. They have offered immense sacrifices, but there is a word of caution for the people charting protest calendars: they must not push people beyond a point. Moderation is key to every success.
A tangible political achievement which can bring Kashmiris the much-needed freedom from military oppression, political control, economic plunder and cultural onslaught could be brought about only if all the Kashmiri parties across the political divide come together to chart out a common minimum agenda. That would require personal egos to be shun. That would also require a realisation that monumental psychological, economic and physical suffering of the last six decades is too immense to be continued as such.
This line of thinking does not symbolise political idealism only. It is a real necessity for the Kashmiri nation today.
Political untouchability may satisfy personal egos of political figures but it will not help the cause of the Kashmiri nation. Any attempt by any political formation to create conditions for grabbing power at this point of time will be a monumental folly.
For a common ground some principles are important to agree on. Under no circumstances should this peaceful people’s movement transform into an armed movement. New Delhi, on its part, must publicly commit itself to a political position and process as set out by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in 1947. United Jehad Council (UJC) must renounce armed struggle and join the political process. The United Nations must be the principal organization overseeing demilitarisation and demobilization of arms. This process must accompany a dignified return of Kashmiri Pandits to their homes under UN supervision.
Such process also needs some more appreciations. One that Kashmir’s current relation with New Delhi is both unjust and unnatural. Two, absolute independence for Kashmir cannot come overnight. It will have to be a gradual process, with building of institutions, capacities and viable economic relations with its neighbors. An accession with Pakistan at this point of time is improbable too.
This approach could be possible only if Islamabad also commits itself to the principles that former President Gen. Parvez Musharraf voiced during his rule.
Kashmiris, on their part, need to appreciate and understand the challenges faced by Pakistan to its interests and existence. They need to remain sensitive to its water needs in any future political set up. They also need to remain sensitive to India’s geo-political interests towards its northern borders. Nothing will come in a single go. But, yes, if all Kashmiri parties shun egos and narrow political power ambitions, many things are possible.
All Kashmiri parties need to sit and chart a common agenda now
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Kashmir today has a moment of truth across the political divide - for the ruling National Conference (NC), for the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP), for the two factions of the Hurriyat Conference and others on their side. It is a moment of truth for any Baskhshis-or-G M Shahs-in-the-making too.
It is also a moment for Kashmir’s opinion makers to shun ambiguity and speak out of their heart.
The sacred blood of Kashmiri youngsters spilled on our roads today must remind everybody that it has been enough of political bluffing and politicking. It is a moment of sincere introspection by everybody - New Delhi, Islamabad, the Hurriyats, United Jehad Council (UJC), NC, PDP, just everybody.
For NC, it is a moment which seems to raise questions on its very existence. A party which formed the government in 2008 on the basis of some 25,000 votes it got in eight assembly segments of Srinagar out of some 700,000 eligible voters; it is a moment of real worry.
There are reasons to believe that the Chief Minister Omar Abdullah continues to remain anonymously on the Facebook. If so, he must be aware of the extremities of public mood against his party, government and his actions today.
Logically speaking, the options before Omar are limited today. If his government decides to take a cue from the recent National Conference’s political resolution on the restoration of autonomy he can’t do that because he rules with a coalition with the Congress Party. If the party today continues with its policy of ratifying New Delhi’s iron hand approach in dealing with the unrest, its political loss is surely going to aggravate. It has to think beyond for the sake of its political survival.
When it comes to the PDP, NC’s woes do not necessarily mean its advantage today. Since it came to power in 2004 it has had the advantage of a ‘feel good feeling’ about its rule among certain rural pockets in the valley. That ‘feel good’ feeling had something to do with the reigning in of the Special Operations Group (SOG) and creating a sense of security among the people in the country side. But that ‘feel good’ feeling for it is also withering away.
There are credible reports that New Delhi through some of its emissaries did explore the possibility of this party forming the government during the last few weeks. Credible sources also indicate that the PDP dismissed this probability. The party is understood to have set three pre-conditions for considering such a possibility - revocation of AFSPA, withdrawal of some forces from civilian areas and release of some political prisoners.
For New Delhi heeding to these demands at this moment looks improbable. Obviously, it would prefer offering such a political ‘package’ to those groups which challenge its rule altogether in the state. It is also highly improbable that the National Conference would take such an arrangement with grace, allowing huge political advantage to PDP.
New Delhi’s political position on and military actions in Kashmir stand seriously questioned at the international level today. There was a time when it won real sympathies from big powers when it showcased Islamic radicalism being at the heart of Kashmir’s political movement. As Kashmir’s political movement is getting increasingly peaceful again New Delhi is facing some real problems. Its political and economic investments in Kashmir also lie in tatters today. The street movement of the youngsters will not die down. It has no option other than to negotiate a new political arrangement with Srinagar today.
Although the two factions of the Hurriyat Conference enjoy clear political advantage in the current situation, this advantage could be short-lived. The problem is that while staying away from each other, they acquire some serious limitations in transforming this advantage into some meaningful political achievement. Their organizational limitations about embracing a purposeful dialogue and offering viable political and economic visions beyond the status quo are serious.
The second limitation of two Hurriyats is that they are today not in a position to greatly influence the people on the streets who go by their own wisdom and instincts in conveying their political aspirations.
The two individuals who are currently underground and are setting the protest calendars have limitations too. No matter their commitment to their political cause, they have limited political acumen to translate the strengths of the people’s street mobilisation into a tangible political achievement.
The people of Kashmir have yet again demonstrated that the political status quo to them is both unbearable and unacceptable. They have offered immense sacrifices, but there is a word of caution for the people charting protest calendars: they must not push people beyond a point. Moderation is key to every success.
A tangible political achievement which can bring Kashmiris the much-needed freedom from military oppression, political control, economic plunder and cultural onslaught could be brought about only if all the Kashmiri parties across the political divide come together to chart out a common minimum agenda. That would require personal egos to be shun. That would also require a realisation that monumental psychological, economic and physical suffering of the last six decades is too immense to be continued as such.
This line of thinking does not symbolise political idealism only. It is a real necessity for the Kashmiri nation today.
Political untouchability may satisfy personal egos of political figures but it will not help the cause of the Kashmiri nation. Any attempt by any political formation to create conditions for grabbing power at this point of time will be a monumental folly.
For a common ground some principles are important to agree on. Under no circumstances should this peaceful people’s movement transform into an armed movement. New Delhi, on its part, must publicly commit itself to a political position and process as set out by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in 1947. United Jehad Council (UJC) must renounce armed struggle and join the political process. The United Nations must be the principal organization overseeing demilitarisation and demobilization of arms. This process must accompany a dignified return of Kashmiri Pandits to their homes under UN supervision.
Such process also needs some more appreciations. One that Kashmir’s current relation with New Delhi is both unjust and unnatural. Two, absolute independence for Kashmir cannot come overnight. It will have to be a gradual process, with building of institutions, capacities and viable economic relations with its neighbors. An accession with Pakistan at this point of time is improbable too.
This approach could be possible only if Islamabad also commits itself to the principles that former President Gen. Parvez Musharraf voiced during his rule.
Kashmiris, on their part, need to appreciate and understand the challenges faced by Pakistan to its interests and existence. They need to remain sensitive to its water needs in any future political set up. They also need to remain sensitive to India’s geo-political interests towards its northern borders. Nothing will come in a single go. But, yes, if all Kashmiri parties shun egos and narrow political power ambitions, many things are possible.
Kishenganga Hydel Power Project
Battle for Kishenganga
So is it ‘Deuce’ or ‘Advantage Pakistan’?
Arjimand Hussain Talib
The India-Pakistan battle for Kishenganga Hydro-electric Project is now international. Late May, Pakistan informed India that it had instituted arbitration proceedings on the Kishenganga issue with the World Bank on May 18, 2010. It cited failure of bilateral talks with India on the project and the latter’s failure in addressing its concerns as the key reasons for doing so.
This news came close on the heels of the claims by the two countries earlier this month that they resolved their differences over three power projects in J&K, namely Baglihar Power Project, Uri II and Chutak Power Project. During those talks between Indus Water Commissioner G Ranganathan and his counterpart Jamaat Ali Shah, there was a mention of disagreement only related to the Nimoo Bazgo hydel power project in Ladakh region. There was no mention of Kishenganga.
The latest move also comes in the backdrop of the all-is-well environment created by the two countries’ Indus Commissioners’ meeting. So, now that the Kishenganga’s fate, like the Baglihar’s, will be decided by neutral arbitration, it is ‘advantage Pakistan’ or a ‘deuce’?
More than this move, what evokes curiosity is the ease with which both these countries seem to have taken this decision. Pakistan seems determined to make a point that bilateral talks have failed, necessitating neutral arbitration. India doesn’t seem to be alarmed by the proposition either.
Pakistan’s stand is that it is doing all this well within the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) provisions. According to it, its arbitration proceedings are in line with the paragraph 2 (b) and paragraph 6 of Annexure G to the IWT. It informed India that it is appointing H.E. Mr. Bruno Simma, Judge of the International Court of Justice and Mr. Jan Paulsson, an international legal consultant, as its arbitrators for the 7-member Court of Arbitration. Pakistani newspaper The Dawn on May 10th reported that Pakistan government had earmarked 10 million US dollars for fighting the arbitration case.
New Delhi, on its part, seems unalarmed. That is despite the inevitable spin off leading to internationalisation environment of the larger Jammu & Kashmir issue.
On Wednesday, India said that it has conveyed names of its two arbitrators related to the issue to Pakistan. The two persons who would plead India’s case are Peter Tomka, Vice President of the International Court of Justice and Professor Lucius Caflisch, an international legal expert and Member of the International Law Commission.
There are conflicting signals on why the two countries have in fact decided to take the international arbitration route. But one thing is certain: it marks an inevitable internationalization of Kashmir’s water issue.
In the first week of May, Mail Today reported that India is now finally open to neutral arbitration on the Kishenganga Project. The report said that the matter was discussed during the meeting between Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Yusuf Raza Gilani on the sidelines of the SAARC summit at Thimpu. The report further quoted an Indian official source saying that even though the Indian Indus Water Commission officials have been in continuous touch with their Pakistani counterparts, offering bilateral talks to resolve the Kishenganga issue, the Pakistani side was adamant on neutral arbitration by the World Bank. Interestingly, the report quoted the Indian official saying that India did not see "any harm" in doing so.
There are reasons to believe that Pakistan’s political establishment was not too happy about the all-is-well feeling generated by the Indus Commissioners’ meeting.
On Monday, after being briefed by the Indus Water Commissioner Jamat Ali Shah on his water talks with India, the Chairman of Pakistan’s Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, urged the Pakistan government to construct small dams in line with Indus Water Treaty rather than, what he said, wasting time in holding talks with India on water issue.
Fazl said “India prolonged the dialogue process on water issue and constructed Baglihar Dam by buying the time in contravention of Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan was now suffering a shortfall of 200,000 acre-feet.”
It is now the second time that the arbitration mechanism under Article IX of Indus Water Treaty is being invoked in the fifty years since the treaty came into force on 1 April 1960. The first arbitration happened on the Baglihar Power Project in February 12, 2007 when Pakistan said it was not satisfied with India’s rationale on the project design. The decision by the neutral arbitrator on Baglihar is widely known to have been more in India’s favor, with he conceding not only the construction of the dam with minor modification in its height but also shooting down Pakistan’s specific concerns relating to the installation of Gated Spillways, which India saw important for silt control.
Pakistan’s says its latest stand is based on Articles 7 & 9 of the International Convention of Non Navigational uses of International waters of 1997. However, the fact remains that it is not binding on either of the two countries and at no point replace the existing provisions of the IWT, which are seen far more favourable to Pakistan.
Pakistan primary fear is that the Wullar Barrage could be used as a geo-strategic weapon by India. It also feels that the project could be used by India as a potential to disrupt its Triple Canal Project (Upper Jhelum-Upper Chenab-Lower Doab). It is also concerned that the project could badly affect its Neelum Jhelum Hydro electro project.
There are two basic points which the neutral arbitrator may look on the issue. His judgment, on the basis of IWT provisions, could go to any side’s favor. Firstly, the arbitrator is expected to examine whether the diversion of water from Kishenganga to the Wullar Lake and thence to the Jhelum river is admissible under the Indus Water Treaty. Such a massive diversion on any of the tributaries of the Indus rivers has not happened before.
Secondly, it would also examine the key issue: whether Pakistan had initiated prior steps on the Neelam Jhelum Hydro electric project before the Kishenganga Project was initiated. In case that is really the case, then Kishenganga project may see some serious modifications, and even complete redesigning.
For the people of Jammu & Kashmir, however, it is a classic wait-and-watch case. Kishenganga project is as unhelpful to it as the Neelam Project on the other side of the LoC.
So is it ‘Deuce’ or ‘Advantage Pakistan’?
Arjimand Hussain Talib
The India-Pakistan battle for Kishenganga Hydro-electric Project is now international. Late May, Pakistan informed India that it had instituted arbitration proceedings on the Kishenganga issue with the World Bank on May 18, 2010. It cited failure of bilateral talks with India on the project and the latter’s failure in addressing its concerns as the key reasons for doing so.
This news came close on the heels of the claims by the two countries earlier this month that they resolved their differences over three power projects in J&K, namely Baglihar Power Project, Uri II and Chutak Power Project. During those talks between Indus Water Commissioner G Ranganathan and his counterpart Jamaat Ali Shah, there was a mention of disagreement only related to the Nimoo Bazgo hydel power project in Ladakh region. There was no mention of Kishenganga.
The latest move also comes in the backdrop of the all-is-well environment created by the two countries’ Indus Commissioners’ meeting. So, now that the Kishenganga’s fate, like the Baglihar’s, will be decided by neutral arbitration, it is ‘advantage Pakistan’ or a ‘deuce’?
More than this move, what evokes curiosity is the ease with which both these countries seem to have taken this decision. Pakistan seems determined to make a point that bilateral talks have failed, necessitating neutral arbitration. India doesn’t seem to be alarmed by the proposition either.
Pakistan’s stand is that it is doing all this well within the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) provisions. According to it, its arbitration proceedings are in line with the paragraph 2 (b) and paragraph 6 of Annexure G to the IWT. It informed India that it is appointing H.E. Mr. Bruno Simma, Judge of the International Court of Justice and Mr. Jan Paulsson, an international legal consultant, as its arbitrators for the 7-member Court of Arbitration. Pakistani newspaper The Dawn on May 10th reported that Pakistan government had earmarked 10 million US dollars for fighting the arbitration case.
New Delhi, on its part, seems unalarmed. That is despite the inevitable spin off leading to internationalisation environment of the larger Jammu & Kashmir issue.
On Wednesday, India said that it has conveyed names of its two arbitrators related to the issue to Pakistan. The two persons who would plead India’s case are Peter Tomka, Vice President of the International Court of Justice and Professor Lucius Caflisch, an international legal expert and Member of the International Law Commission.
There are conflicting signals on why the two countries have in fact decided to take the international arbitration route. But one thing is certain: it marks an inevitable internationalization of Kashmir’s water issue.
In the first week of May, Mail Today reported that India is now finally open to neutral arbitration on the Kishenganga Project. The report said that the matter was discussed during the meeting between Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Yusuf Raza Gilani on the sidelines of the SAARC summit at Thimpu. The report further quoted an Indian official source saying that even though the Indian Indus Water Commission officials have been in continuous touch with their Pakistani counterparts, offering bilateral talks to resolve the Kishenganga issue, the Pakistani side was adamant on neutral arbitration by the World Bank. Interestingly, the report quoted the Indian official saying that India did not see "any harm" in doing so.
There are reasons to believe that Pakistan’s political establishment was not too happy about the all-is-well feeling generated by the Indus Commissioners’ meeting.
On Monday, after being briefed by the Indus Water Commissioner Jamat Ali Shah on his water talks with India, the Chairman of Pakistan’s Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, urged the Pakistan government to construct small dams in line with Indus Water Treaty rather than, what he said, wasting time in holding talks with India on water issue.
Fazl said “India prolonged the dialogue process on water issue and constructed Baglihar Dam by buying the time in contravention of Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan was now suffering a shortfall of 200,000 acre-feet.”
It is now the second time that the arbitration mechanism under Article IX of Indus Water Treaty is being invoked in the fifty years since the treaty came into force on 1 April 1960. The first arbitration happened on the Baglihar Power Project in February 12, 2007 when Pakistan said it was not satisfied with India’s rationale on the project design. The decision by the neutral arbitrator on Baglihar is widely known to have been more in India’s favor, with he conceding not only the construction of the dam with minor modification in its height but also shooting down Pakistan’s specific concerns relating to the installation of Gated Spillways, which India saw important for silt control.
Pakistan’s says its latest stand is based on Articles 7 & 9 of the International Convention of Non Navigational uses of International waters of 1997. However, the fact remains that it is not binding on either of the two countries and at no point replace the existing provisions of the IWT, which are seen far more favourable to Pakistan.
Pakistan primary fear is that the Wullar Barrage could be used as a geo-strategic weapon by India. It also feels that the project could be used by India as a potential to disrupt its Triple Canal Project (Upper Jhelum-Upper Chenab-Lower Doab). It is also concerned that the project could badly affect its Neelum Jhelum Hydro electro project.
There are two basic points which the neutral arbitrator may look on the issue. His judgment, on the basis of IWT provisions, could go to any side’s favor. Firstly, the arbitrator is expected to examine whether the diversion of water from Kishenganga to the Wullar Lake and thence to the Jhelum river is admissible under the Indus Water Treaty. Such a massive diversion on any of the tributaries of the Indus rivers has not happened before.
Secondly, it would also examine the key issue: whether Pakistan had initiated prior steps on the Neelam Jhelum Hydro electric project before the Kishenganga Project was initiated. In case that is really the case, then Kishenganga project may see some serious modifications, and even complete redesigning.
For the people of Jammu & Kashmir, however, it is a classic wait-and-watch case. Kishenganga project is as unhelpful to it as the Neelam Project on the other side of the LoC.
All Parties Hurriyat Conference
Brothers in Arms?
Can Geelani, Mirwaiz, Abdullahs, Muftis, etc. agree to agree?
Arjimand Hussain Talib
A few days back, The New York Times reproduced a power point image of a stakeholder analysis done by the United States in Afghanistan. The image was bizarrely complex, making it beyond normal human comprehension. US political and military analysts shared jokes about the image. They saw it the most apt description of ‘a complexity called Afghanistan’, and also the reason why the US was not winning the war there.
The image had hundreds of stakeholders – political parties, jirgas, militias, drug cartels, civil services, police, local army, foreign armies, central government, local governments, media, religious groups, tribal chiefs, NGOs, et al - denoted as points in the image. The points were joined by a complex web of lines, which crossed, crisscrossed and double crossed across the image, sending brains into a state of tizzy.
Now imagine if we were to do a similar stakeholder analysis for J&K state, what would be the end product? Would a power point image depicting our situation be really different than that of Afghanistan?
Quite likely, our image will also be a complex web of varied actors, joined and separated by relationships, shared visions and disagreements. Lines would also show alignments. Some would symbolize disagreements. Some points and lines would show multiple visions, multiple relations and multiple loyalties.
In a nutshell, we may have to refer to the standard stakeholder analysis guidebook, which has a disclaimer: stakeholder analysis is not a helpful tool in understanding stakeholders and their stakes when the subjects - barring a few exceptions - are a free floating lot!
To have a complex stakeholder analysis image is bad in itself. A simpler image is a depiction of how simple and less complex our life is - as simple as that. An image to the contrary, obviously, refers to the contrary.
Jammu & Kashmir’s problem is that its stakeholder analysis gets all the more complex with each passing year. Every year there is a new addition of stakeholders, stakes and their relationships. Our collective catastrophe is aggravating. Kashmiri people are losing their spirit. There is a strong feeling that it is time to make a new beginning. There are some irreparable losses too. Some will take a long time to overcome.
We have talked a lot about the economic and social costs of the raging conflict and political instability J&K is in since decades. That is a colossal loss, we all know. But can we quantify the spiritual and psychological loss we are suffering?
Living a life of uncertainty and darkness for sixty long years – even longer than that – is a human catastrophe. A lack of certainty about the future is breeding sick minds in Kashmir. A lack of direction is breeding a strong sense of pessimism. Perpetual insecurity is breeding newer kind of disorders, which are impacting people’s genes. Psychological disorders are manifesting in physiological problems – which no research has been able capture or seek to fix so far. And it has not something to do with one generation or two alone; we are passing on adapted abnormalities through our genes to our coming generations too. It is a kind of epidemic which we need to talk about now.
Lately, the Muftis have been calling the pro-azadi groups to join hands for a ‘common cause’. The latter have shrugged off the suggestion. Mirwaiz Umar asked Geelani to come along. The latter too chose to take own path. Looking broadly, there are hardly any alignments or broad agreements to see in Kashmir today. People, groups and parties are disintegrating. A chain reaction of sorts is making the larger political goal look fuzzy. The irony is that Kashmir now has so many political voices, often working at cross purposes, that achieving political goals has become difficult. It is a party time for the foreign ruler.
In an environment where the mighty ruler can’t be overcome by force or by self ruin (like hartals) can disparate political voices help achieve political justice? Is there nothing in political terms that Geelani, Mirwaiz, Abdullahs, Muftis, Yasin, Sajjad, Shabir, Nayeem etc. can agree on? Is their vision for their land so disparate that they can’t even begin from one point?
Thinking of the impossible, sometimes, isn’t too naïve. The situation in Jammu & Kashmir - in particular the Kashmir Valley and the Muslim majority districts in Jammu – has reached a point which demands an honest introspection by the state’s key political players. And, finally, action.
What are the hurdles that come in the way of realizing the common dream of a politically free and economically sovereign Jammu & Kashmir? Between the extremes of political positions, are in-between political tangibles impossible to conceive? And what are the differences, by the way? Political? Personal?
What are the complexities? Are they fixations? Obsessions? Clash of ideologies? Clash of egos? Or a mix of these?
Disagreement of thought and approaches is a natural trait of the human race. There can be no utopia where all the people agree with each other all the times in all the circumstances. Disagreement is but natural.
Agreements over a broad range of issues amongst a broad spectrum of political thought are easier said than done, but not impossible.
Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah’s long struggle to reclaim J&K’s lost political sovereignty came to naught for many reasons. One reason had, of course, some thing to do with his political ambitions. Second was the polity itself. Whenever he was imprisoned by New Delhi, replacements were always handy. Did Sadiq, Mir Qasim, Ghulam Muhammad Shah and others come from the moon? Is today’s political environment any different?
If we deeply analyse J&K’s political environment, we realize the political status quo is entrenched as never before. There was a time when finding a replacement to a particular political formation in Srinagar wasn’t that easy. Today there is a wide array of political forces to choose from.
Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s vision of a political utopia is not bad in itself. But do today’s circumstances support overnight shift to such a political system? What about application of hikmah, which has been applied since ages by Muslim scholars, conquerors and leaders? The political system which the Abdullahs and the Muftis are part of can’t be a recipe for stability. The unjust political status quo in J&K can’t be a solution. An idea for political utopia doesn’t work in today’s world of acute interdependence and softer borders either.
A time has come when Kashmiris’ decades-old suffering must go. A time has arrived when its people desperately need a life of political freedom, dignity, friendship and a mutually beneficial engagement with its neighbors. There has to be a new relation based on shared visions and interests.
Can Geelani, Mirwaiz, Abdullahs, Muftis, etc. agree to agree?
Arjimand Hussain Talib
A few days back, The New York Times reproduced a power point image of a stakeholder analysis done by the United States in Afghanistan. The image was bizarrely complex, making it beyond normal human comprehension. US political and military analysts shared jokes about the image. They saw it the most apt description of ‘a complexity called Afghanistan’, and also the reason why the US was not winning the war there.
The image had hundreds of stakeholders – political parties, jirgas, militias, drug cartels, civil services, police, local army, foreign armies, central government, local governments, media, religious groups, tribal chiefs, NGOs, et al - denoted as points in the image. The points were joined by a complex web of lines, which crossed, crisscrossed and double crossed across the image, sending brains into a state of tizzy.
Now imagine if we were to do a similar stakeholder analysis for J&K state, what would be the end product? Would a power point image depicting our situation be really different than that of Afghanistan?
Quite likely, our image will also be a complex web of varied actors, joined and separated by relationships, shared visions and disagreements. Lines would also show alignments. Some would symbolize disagreements. Some points and lines would show multiple visions, multiple relations and multiple loyalties.
In a nutshell, we may have to refer to the standard stakeholder analysis guidebook, which has a disclaimer: stakeholder analysis is not a helpful tool in understanding stakeholders and their stakes when the subjects - barring a few exceptions - are a free floating lot!
To have a complex stakeholder analysis image is bad in itself. A simpler image is a depiction of how simple and less complex our life is - as simple as that. An image to the contrary, obviously, refers to the contrary.
Jammu & Kashmir’s problem is that its stakeholder analysis gets all the more complex with each passing year. Every year there is a new addition of stakeholders, stakes and their relationships. Our collective catastrophe is aggravating. Kashmiri people are losing their spirit. There is a strong feeling that it is time to make a new beginning. There are some irreparable losses too. Some will take a long time to overcome.
We have talked a lot about the economic and social costs of the raging conflict and political instability J&K is in since decades. That is a colossal loss, we all know. But can we quantify the spiritual and psychological loss we are suffering?
Living a life of uncertainty and darkness for sixty long years – even longer than that – is a human catastrophe. A lack of certainty about the future is breeding sick minds in Kashmir. A lack of direction is breeding a strong sense of pessimism. Perpetual insecurity is breeding newer kind of disorders, which are impacting people’s genes. Psychological disorders are manifesting in physiological problems – which no research has been able capture or seek to fix so far. And it has not something to do with one generation or two alone; we are passing on adapted abnormalities through our genes to our coming generations too. It is a kind of epidemic which we need to talk about now.
Lately, the Muftis have been calling the pro-azadi groups to join hands for a ‘common cause’. The latter have shrugged off the suggestion. Mirwaiz Umar asked Geelani to come along. The latter too chose to take own path. Looking broadly, there are hardly any alignments or broad agreements to see in Kashmir today. People, groups and parties are disintegrating. A chain reaction of sorts is making the larger political goal look fuzzy. The irony is that Kashmir now has so many political voices, often working at cross purposes, that achieving political goals has become difficult. It is a party time for the foreign ruler.
In an environment where the mighty ruler can’t be overcome by force or by self ruin (like hartals) can disparate political voices help achieve political justice? Is there nothing in political terms that Geelani, Mirwaiz, Abdullahs, Muftis, Yasin, Sajjad, Shabir, Nayeem etc. can agree on? Is their vision for their land so disparate that they can’t even begin from one point?
Thinking of the impossible, sometimes, isn’t too naïve. The situation in Jammu & Kashmir - in particular the Kashmir Valley and the Muslim majority districts in Jammu – has reached a point which demands an honest introspection by the state’s key political players. And, finally, action.
What are the hurdles that come in the way of realizing the common dream of a politically free and economically sovereign Jammu & Kashmir? Between the extremes of political positions, are in-between political tangibles impossible to conceive? And what are the differences, by the way? Political? Personal?
What are the complexities? Are they fixations? Obsessions? Clash of ideologies? Clash of egos? Or a mix of these?
Disagreement of thought and approaches is a natural trait of the human race. There can be no utopia where all the people agree with each other all the times in all the circumstances. Disagreement is but natural.
Agreements over a broad range of issues amongst a broad spectrum of political thought are easier said than done, but not impossible.
Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah’s long struggle to reclaim J&K’s lost political sovereignty came to naught for many reasons. One reason had, of course, some thing to do with his political ambitions. Second was the polity itself. Whenever he was imprisoned by New Delhi, replacements were always handy. Did Sadiq, Mir Qasim, Ghulam Muhammad Shah and others come from the moon? Is today’s political environment any different?
If we deeply analyse J&K’s political environment, we realize the political status quo is entrenched as never before. There was a time when finding a replacement to a particular political formation in Srinagar wasn’t that easy. Today there is a wide array of political forces to choose from.
Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s vision of a political utopia is not bad in itself. But do today’s circumstances support overnight shift to such a political system? What about application of hikmah, which has been applied since ages by Muslim scholars, conquerors and leaders? The political system which the Abdullahs and the Muftis are part of can’t be a recipe for stability. The unjust political status quo in J&K can’t be a solution. An idea for political utopia doesn’t work in today’s world of acute interdependence and softer borders either.
A time has come when Kashmiris’ decades-old suffering must go. A time has arrived when its people desperately need a life of political freedom, dignity, friendship and a mutually beneficial engagement with its neighbors. There has to be a new relation based on shared visions and interests.
Are Hurriyats Irrelevant?
Well, the ground realities say not really
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, during his last week’s Valley visit repeated what he and his predecessors have said previously: that “New Delhi was ready to talk to representatives of all sections who are opposed to terrorism and violence.”
The repetition of the “representatives of all sections” phrase needs to be underlined again. It marks a continuity of a policy. It also underscores that there is no shift of New Delhi’s policy on Jammu & Kashmir. It, most importantly, symbolizes the root of the problem – reluctance in accepting some hard facts, which go beyond numerical logic.
In the beginning, however, Dr Singh said something which is particularly interesting: “We felt that the people of the state are not only interested in financial assistance and development projects, but also desire a political process that meets their aspirations. We want to take the dialogue process forward.”
This sentence symbolizes a genuine acknowledgment of a reality which, however, needs to go beyond statements. This acknowledgement needs to translate into a policy practice on the ground.
Surprisingly, a caveat after this statement soon followed. One of the state Congress leaders, Ghulam Nabi Azad, came up with a sort of corrigendum to Dr. Singh’s statement. He said the Prime Minister “basically hinted towards a dialogue with militant groups in case they eschewed violence.” So the earlier guess that the offer may have been thrown before the two Hurriyats stood null and void.
The question about a dialogue between the two Hurriyat Conferences and New Delhi has to be viewed from two angles. One from New Delhi’s angle. And, two, from the Hurriyats’ angle itself.
Sensing the nuances behind the “talks invitation”, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was quick to dismiss such a talks format, where New Delhi would make non political entities like trade unions, NGOs, social activists and even academics part of the dialogue process. So far so good, but there are questions.
Let us first play the devil’s advocate. Does New Delhi see it necessary to talk to the two Hurriyats under the present circumstances?
Fundamentally, Jammu & Kashmir’s political space has to be understood in terms of geography as well as identities – both majority and minority. And then there is the cyber space, which cannot be ignored either.
Which political space do the two Hurriyats represent and occupy?
From New Delhi’s point of view, things by and large are stable in Jammu & Kashmir if gone by the geography logic – “the trouble is limited to a small geographical space”. Militancy has also been largely contained. In terms of regions, it has almost no problems in Ladakh and Jammu now. Within the Kashmir region, New Delhi’s policy mandarins argue, it sees resistance to its rule merely emanating from Old Srinagar and one police station area each in Sopore, Varmul and Islamabad.
On the ground, even though its armed forces are overstretched in a costly military campaign, it sees this campaign “manageable.” New Delhi gets a bad, nasty press, both locally and internationally, yet, somehow, it sees that manageable as well.
We often hear the two Hurriyats saying that New Delhi is not sincere about resolving the Jammu & Kashmir issue. Well, to expect an adversary to be sincere sounds little naïve. Every party to a dispute comes to the table with its own overt and covert agendas, to get the best bargain for itself. The term ‘sincerity’ in diplomacy is a misnomer. It is the conditions that parties find themselves in that make them to strike a bargain. So what is the two Hurriyats’ bargaining chip?
When these parties say that economic packages and developmental activities won’t resolve the J&K problem – something latently voiced by Dr. Singh himself - they only reflect the ground reality. Have the past sixty years of New Delhi-injected economic activities changed something greatly here?
Then is the question of Srinagar, where Dr. Singh felt the youth were particularly angry. Say whatever, Srinagar is politically very important. It impacts the political thinking and course in rest of the Valley in significant ways. The political message that is regularly conveyed on the streets of Srinagar, Varmul, Sopore, Islamabad and other parts of the Valley is what the two Hurriyats say. It is here where the Hurriyats are mostly based. Then the occasional expressions of anger voiced against New Delhi’s rule in other parts of Kashmir tightly controlled militarily convey the same message.
Then there is the cyber space. The cyber space is controlled neither by the two Hurriyats nor by the state. It is controlled by those who prefer to go by their conscience and political common sense. In a nutshell, the dominant viewpoint in the cyberspace is that J&K’s political future remains resolved. New Delhi’s actions here are questioned, and too vociferously. In other words, what the two Hurriyats say is echoed in the cyberspace.
A lot has been said about the two Hurriyats’ failure in enlarging their support base and their inability to speak for other non-Kashmiri speaking and non Muslim communities of the state. To some extent it is true that both the Hurriyat factions have had limitations in understanding the nuts and bolts of inclusive politics. It is also a fact that they had limitations in organizational effectiveness and leadership. Questions have also been raised on their values about accommodation and inclusiveness.
There is also a perception – which echoes every now and then – that the reason minority ethnic and religious identities have not wholeheartedly joined Kashmiri movement for restoration of J&K’s political sovereignty is because it acquired overly Islamist overtures.
Today those who see the two Hurriyats inconsequential say it on the grounds that they do not represent the state’s Pahari, Gujjar, Dogra, Rajput, Ladakhi and Dard political aspirations. That is only partly true. At any point of history, communities in J&K have nursed both economic and political aspirations, which may not necessarily coincide. It is not that confusing to understand. The two Hurriyats surely may not represent the economic aspirations of many of these communities, but when it comes to the political aspirations, the Hurriyats, whether we like it or not, have a claim.
If we do not accept this logic, then a plebiscite in J&K should today go in India’s favor. The reason there continues to be aversion to a plebiscite in J&K is that New Delhi and the ruling formations here do not represent its dominant political space. That explains why the two Hurriyats remain relevant despite their limitations of numerical representation and inclusiveness. The sooner that is acknowledged, the better.
Quite often we sound cynics in saying that the whole population does not fully support the movement for the restoration of Kashmir’s political sovereignty. That is partly right. Kuldeep Nayar in an article in Pakistan’s leading English daily – the Dawn – on Thursday wrote something interesting. He said that there are very few movements in the world that have sustained and persevered like the Kashmiri movement for so long. That is not a bad way of looking at things.
The other day senior lawyer, G N Shaheen at a meeting said something very interesting which appealed to one’s senses greatly. He said Kashmir did not have a democratic culture of organization. We have a culture of groupism. Perhaps that is where the answer lies.
It is not that those that support the state’s accession with New Delhi are a homogeneous lot. The most glaring divide – which reflects an ethnic divide as well – could be seen in the State’s Congress Party. Similarly, the divide within the National Conference has its own stories to tell.
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, during his last week’s Valley visit repeated what he and his predecessors have said previously: that “New Delhi was ready to talk to representatives of all sections who are opposed to terrorism and violence.”
The repetition of the “representatives of all sections” phrase needs to be underlined again. It marks a continuity of a policy. It also underscores that there is no shift of New Delhi’s policy on Jammu & Kashmir. It, most importantly, symbolizes the root of the problem – reluctance in accepting some hard facts, which go beyond numerical logic.
In the beginning, however, Dr Singh said something which is particularly interesting: “We felt that the people of the state are not only interested in financial assistance and development projects, but also desire a political process that meets their aspirations. We want to take the dialogue process forward.”
This sentence symbolizes a genuine acknowledgment of a reality which, however, needs to go beyond statements. This acknowledgement needs to translate into a policy practice on the ground.
Surprisingly, a caveat after this statement soon followed. One of the state Congress leaders, Ghulam Nabi Azad, came up with a sort of corrigendum to Dr. Singh’s statement. He said the Prime Minister “basically hinted towards a dialogue with militant groups in case they eschewed violence.” So the earlier guess that the offer may have been thrown before the two Hurriyats stood null and void.
The question about a dialogue between the two Hurriyat Conferences and New Delhi has to be viewed from two angles. One from New Delhi’s angle. And, two, from the Hurriyats’ angle itself.
Sensing the nuances behind the “talks invitation”, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was quick to dismiss such a talks format, where New Delhi would make non political entities like trade unions, NGOs, social activists and even academics part of the dialogue process. So far so good, but there are questions.
Let us first play the devil’s advocate. Does New Delhi see it necessary to talk to the two Hurriyats under the present circumstances?
Fundamentally, Jammu & Kashmir’s political space has to be understood in terms of geography as well as identities – both majority and minority. And then there is the cyber space, which cannot be ignored either.
Which political space do the two Hurriyats represent and occupy?
From New Delhi’s point of view, things by and large are stable in Jammu & Kashmir if gone by the geography logic – “the trouble is limited to a small geographical space”. Militancy has also been largely contained. In terms of regions, it has almost no problems in Ladakh and Jammu now. Within the Kashmir region, New Delhi’s policy mandarins argue, it sees resistance to its rule merely emanating from Old Srinagar and one police station area each in Sopore, Varmul and Islamabad.
On the ground, even though its armed forces are overstretched in a costly military campaign, it sees this campaign “manageable.” New Delhi gets a bad, nasty press, both locally and internationally, yet, somehow, it sees that manageable as well.
We often hear the two Hurriyats saying that New Delhi is not sincere about resolving the Jammu & Kashmir issue. Well, to expect an adversary to be sincere sounds little naïve. Every party to a dispute comes to the table with its own overt and covert agendas, to get the best bargain for itself. The term ‘sincerity’ in diplomacy is a misnomer. It is the conditions that parties find themselves in that make them to strike a bargain. So what is the two Hurriyats’ bargaining chip?
When these parties say that economic packages and developmental activities won’t resolve the J&K problem – something latently voiced by Dr. Singh himself - they only reflect the ground reality. Have the past sixty years of New Delhi-injected economic activities changed something greatly here?
Then is the question of Srinagar, where Dr. Singh felt the youth were particularly angry. Say whatever, Srinagar is politically very important. It impacts the political thinking and course in rest of the Valley in significant ways. The political message that is regularly conveyed on the streets of Srinagar, Varmul, Sopore, Islamabad and other parts of the Valley is what the two Hurriyats say. It is here where the Hurriyats are mostly based. Then the occasional expressions of anger voiced against New Delhi’s rule in other parts of Kashmir tightly controlled militarily convey the same message.
Then there is the cyber space. The cyber space is controlled neither by the two Hurriyats nor by the state. It is controlled by those who prefer to go by their conscience and political common sense. In a nutshell, the dominant viewpoint in the cyberspace is that J&K’s political future remains resolved. New Delhi’s actions here are questioned, and too vociferously. In other words, what the two Hurriyats say is echoed in the cyberspace.
A lot has been said about the two Hurriyats’ failure in enlarging their support base and their inability to speak for other non-Kashmiri speaking and non Muslim communities of the state. To some extent it is true that both the Hurriyat factions have had limitations in understanding the nuts and bolts of inclusive politics. It is also a fact that they had limitations in organizational effectiveness and leadership. Questions have also been raised on their values about accommodation and inclusiveness.
There is also a perception – which echoes every now and then – that the reason minority ethnic and religious identities have not wholeheartedly joined Kashmiri movement for restoration of J&K’s political sovereignty is because it acquired overly Islamist overtures.
Today those who see the two Hurriyats inconsequential say it on the grounds that they do not represent the state’s Pahari, Gujjar, Dogra, Rajput, Ladakhi and Dard political aspirations. That is only partly true. At any point of history, communities in J&K have nursed both economic and political aspirations, which may not necessarily coincide. It is not that confusing to understand. The two Hurriyats surely may not represent the economic aspirations of many of these communities, but when it comes to the political aspirations, the Hurriyats, whether we like it or not, have a claim.
If we do not accept this logic, then a plebiscite in J&K should today go in India’s favor. The reason there continues to be aversion to a plebiscite in J&K is that New Delhi and the ruling formations here do not represent its dominant political space. That explains why the two Hurriyats remain relevant despite their limitations of numerical representation and inclusiveness. The sooner that is acknowledged, the better.
Quite often we sound cynics in saying that the whole population does not fully support the movement for the restoration of Kashmir’s political sovereignty. That is partly right. Kuldeep Nayar in an article in Pakistan’s leading English daily – the Dawn – on Thursday wrote something interesting. He said that there are very few movements in the world that have sustained and persevered like the Kashmiri movement for so long. That is not a bad way of looking at things.
The other day senior lawyer, G N Shaheen at a meeting said something very interesting which appealed to one’s senses greatly. He said Kashmir did not have a democratic culture of organization. We have a culture of groupism. Perhaps that is where the answer lies.
It is not that those that support the state’s accession with New Delhi are a homogeneous lot. The most glaring divide – which reflects an ethnic divide as well – could be seen in the State’s Congress Party. Similarly, the divide within the National Conference has its own stories to tell.
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