First published in Daily Greater Kashmir - 27 Dec 2009
Making cynics smile
Would New Delhi own Justice Saghir’s report?
Arjimand Hussain Talib
If something was to describe the symbolism and the substance of the (Rtd.) Justice Saghir Ahmed’s report, a single word would be apt – casual. The first and the fundamental question that arises is: where the report was supposed to go? To India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh – who had formed the working group Justice Saghir headed – or J&K’s Chief Minister?
There are at least two theories about why the report went to Chief Minister, Omar Abdullah, and not to India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. One, that the Congress-led UPA government was not comfortable in owning it at a time when it was deep in trouble dealing with the Telangana crisis. There is a cynics’ viewpoint as well: that since the report’s implementation is ‘unlikely’; it doesn’t matter where the report goes!
The second theory suggests a linkage of the report’s timing with the larger ‘quiet dialogue’ process taking place with some shades of the Hurriyat umbrella. Moreover, the tailor-made nuances and the style of the report’s submission seem to provide the National Conference a political advantage vis-à-vis other political forces of the state. Some would even want to see it something of a political gift to the party from the Congress, for something that is difficult to fathom right now.
Ignoring the PDP’s self rule vision in addressing the grey areas of Srinagar-New Delhi relations in the report smacks of callousness, which looks somewhat deliberate. That should have been avoided.
When it comes to the report’s substance, a whole lot of issues surface. On the face of it, its language is mostly non-categorical. The reports recommendation, ‘The question of autonomy and its demand can be examined in the light of ‘Kashmir Accord’ or in some other manner or on the basis of some other formula as the Prime Minister may deem fit and appropriate to restore autonomy to the extent possible’ leaves a wild scope for interpretation.
The use of term ‘autonomy’ without mentioning the exact political system being referred to does not necessarily mean a reversion to 1953 status. Which ‘Kashmir accord’ does it, for instance, refer to? Is it the 1975 Indira-Sheikh Accord, which J&K’s people continue to see the most brazen political sell out?
As the report says, it may be even a political formula ‘that India’s Prime Minister may deem fit.’
The manner the report has over-emphasised on the term ‘autonomy’ has a peril of being viewed as partisan. It has another implication. The report has looked at certain governance issues which by virtue of the 1975 Indira-Sheikh Accord were supposed to be state subjects. Its focus on such issues also serves to strengthen the suspicion that the report has maintained its focus around the same accord.
Like other such run-of-the-mill political initiatives taken by New Delhi, Justice Saghir’s Working Group has touched almost everything: relief, daily wages, centrally-sponsored schemes, constitutional relations, refugees, financial compensation, education, road communications, health, reservation to backward communities, women, scheduled tribes, human rights, representation of J&K’s judiciary at the Supreme Court, electoral system, Panchayti Raj, educational and economic opportunities for the migrants, and so on.
Looking at the format and the terms of reference (TOR) of this particular working group, it is impossible to expect a consensus. The problem with these kinds of formats is that they do not automatically go to reflect the majoritarian aspirations, based on democratic principles. So the kind of reaction the report has received creates an automatic perception and environment of ‘wide divisions’ and ‘disagreement.’ Such reactions also serve to strengthen the theories of ‘complexity’ and ‘internal contradictions’ of J&K’s polity. But we need to look a little deeper to understand its nuances.
Justice Saghir’s working group was not supposed to look at the state-centre relations per se. It had to look at some other issues at well. Whether that was deliberate is debatable. The working group’s TOR had a specific mention about looking at ‘autonomy, self rule, regional imbalances and backward areas and democracy, secularism and rule of law’. But why all this?
The other four Working Groups, which had submitted their reports in April, 2007 had a broad canvass, which could have easily included the issues other than centre-state relations. The TOR of those four working groups included ‘Strengthening Relations Across LoC’, ‘Confidence Building Measures Across Segments of Society in the State’, ‘Economic Development of Jammu and Kashmir’ and ‘Ensuring Good Governance’.
There is merit in the suggestion that reverting back to the 1953 status does not guarantee resolution of the J&K dispute. The dispute did not cease to exist even prior to 1953. The various accords having been inked by Sheikh Abdullah-led governments with New Delhi after 1953 did not address the external political and the economic dimensions, which remain at the heart of the J&K dispute. That brand of autonomy, inter alia, had nothing to ensure re-opening of the state’s traditional trade routes. There was no guarantee that we would be able to use our own water resources for our economic development.
Saghir Working Group’s silence on the hydropower issue between Srinagar and New Delhi constitutes a grave lapse. Any respectable analysis of Srinagar-New Delhi relations is incomplete without factoring in the hydropower and water resources of the state.
A significant portion of the report’s narrative seems to have been lost in dealing with the issues of ‘regional discrimination’. A lot of its text seems to be a rehash of many other such reports. They were avoidable to maintain a respectable focus.
To say NC’s autonomy formula best suits even today’s changed regional and global conditions would be wrong. For a better collective future of the state it is debatable if re-visiting the past in a unifocal manner without understanding the demands of the changed times would be helpful. It is for sure that self rule is related to autonomy in a wider context. However the fact is that PDP’s self rule vision addresses not only some historical wrongs of Srinagar-New Delhi relation it addresses the external dimension of the issue as well. More importantly, it addresses its economics, which is very critical to today’s context.
Whatever the merit of this report, the fact is that there would be deep cynicism about its implementation. People in J&K are well aware that almost no recommendation of the four other Working Groups has been implemented so far.
So will New Delhi this time round own Justice Saghir’s report? Will it give a reason to cynics to smile? These are some moot questions.
Feedback at Arjimand@greaterkashmir.com
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Divisions between Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh - II
DATELINE SRINAGAR
A ‘collective suffering’? - II
Moving towards a common future
An eminent vice chancellor of a Kashmir-based university made an interesting proposition at the Jammu University workshop: he called for contemplating identity as a verb and not as a noun.
But what does that practically mean for J&K?
The cumulative effect of the processes of economic and cultural globalisation in today’s world for sure often manifests in identities in a verb form. There is so much of integration and assimilation. In a way certain identities keep evolving and changing with the changing circumstances. So can we think of J&K’s identities as verbs?
Treating the question of identity as a verb is a rather contentious question. There are voices which see the process of cultural assimilation and integration a one-sided affair in this uneven world. In other words, it is seen as an agenda driven by the likes and dislikes of a predominant global cultural power. Given this controversy, it would be better not to take this debate in J&K’s context further. It sometimes evokes insecurities.
At the workshop, there were many who questioned the success of the LAHDC model of political devolution. There was a feeling that it had simply ‘failed’, because it was too top-down, and there were many other layers of governance, like the Panchayati system, that had come into collision with its governance system.
Seen from another angle, the model gave the LAHDC the entire say in the use of financial allocations made to the region. The devolution of powers helped Ladakh frame an educational curriculum which the region sees best for itself. It helped the region to have local laws which protect its local economy and environment. It helped it in keeping economic and other outside interests under check, which may have the potential of changing the region’s demography, religious value system, culture and environment.
But as a spin off, it encouraged transformation of this empowerment into isolationist tendencies - breeding intolerance and an aversion to co-existence with other ethnic and regional identities. Virtually, the writ of J&K state government ends at the borders of Ladakh. The region unfurls its own flag. The state’s flag is long gone as the state’s constitution is no more sacrosanct there. There are almost no air connection between Srinagar and Leh. Ladakhi participants had to come to the workshop via Delhi! Leh’s Buddhist population prefers Jammu and Delhi to Srinagar to get education, live at and do business with.
However, we got to know that the people of Ladakh do realise the importance of Article 370. Some of our Ladakhi friends cited the Sindhu Darshan festival organised during the NDA rule on the banks of the River Indus. That is the time when they said they realised the peril from certain Hindutva forces in pushing their Hindutva agenda by saffronising the Sindh festival. There is a sub text here. For a Hindu thought Ladakh has had a Hindu past – reflected in the sculptures and wall paintings of the Hindu era even today. They feel about propagating and promoting it. Ladakh’s Buddhists find this line inconvenient.
In political terms, what was interesting to know was that Ladakh’s people supported the Musharraf Formula for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, as they saw ‘reason and sense’ in it!
When it comes to the Jammu region, there is, again, nothing black and white about it. There is no political or identity homogeneity. The voices for separate statehood represent certain fringe opinion. Regions like Rajouri-Poonch and Doda-Kishtwar-Bhaderwah do not share the political vision of Jammu and Kathua districts. Then there seems to be a divide, possibly a manufactured one, between the Gujjar and Pahari communities in the region on the issue of Scheduled Tribe status for the Pahari people.
The Amarnath Land Controversy is often seen to have deepened the gulf between the Muslims and Hindus in the state. The fact is that there are many people in Jammu who value the state’s composite culture and political make-up more than the religious fault lines.
A senior retired civil servant of the state made a strong argument saying that to him it was wrong to conclude that the BJP and the PDP reaped electoral harvest from the Amarnath land row. To buttress his argument he cited the examples of ‘five major flashpoints of the Amarnath issue’ in Jammu – Samba, Bishna, Gandhi Nagar Cantonment, Udhampur, Vijaypur. BJP lost elections in all of these constituencies despite these places being principal mobilisation points during the Amarnath crisis. And the NC’s victory over the PDP in Kashmir was another case in point.
In this environment of optimism and many underlying competitive struggles is a division of the J&K state a good idea?
These are all questions related to an internal political system in J&K. They also impact the larger unresolved and disputed status of the state. The fact is that J&K’s self determination movement remains in a crisis with this obsession for inclusiveness. Many believe that minus Jammu plains and Leh, the state’s movement for right to self determination is more logical and sans any ‘baggage of liabilities’. And there is no situation wherein minority voices hold the majoritarian aspirations hostage. This is a larger question which needs a larger debate.
What is often neglected in this debate is the revenues issue of the state. Can the three regions generate enough public revenues on their own to sustain economically?
Then there is the question of equitable development of the state, which has become too narrow to mean public spending for infrastructure development, rather than broader human development.
In this debate what is ignored is that equal representation disproportionate to population negates fundamental democratic principles and constitutes gross injustice. Equal public spending, across the regions, in disregard to their contribution to the overall public tax kitty, is again a problem. Contribution to the tax kitty and ability to raise taxes need to be a major consideration in the development discourse of J&K. Why are we competing for creating petty entities based on dependence, sans any strong taxation system?
Contribution to the Union of India treasury in terms of other resources, other than direct and indirect taxes is another factor that is neglected. And all this needs to be done objectively, so that there is no injustice with any region. However, contribution to the tax kitty needs to be based on actual consumption and not where the tax is booked.
Our identities are rooted in our idea of our histories. Without histories, identities would become crude ‘verbs’ and not respectable ‘nouns.’ What is seen as a ‘collective suffering’ could become a collective quest for excellence and human development if we see beyond the confines of the valleys we live in. There are many beautiful worlds beyond the mountains we have been brought up in.
Perhaps, as what the participants at the workshop finally resolved, we need to start our children’s education with ‘J&K ki sair’, rather than ‘Bharat ki sair’ to understand each other better.
Concluded.
Feedback arjimand@greaterkashmir.com
A ‘collective suffering’? - II
Moving towards a common future
An eminent vice chancellor of a Kashmir-based university made an interesting proposition at the Jammu University workshop: he called for contemplating identity as a verb and not as a noun.
But what does that practically mean for J&K?
The cumulative effect of the processes of economic and cultural globalisation in today’s world for sure often manifests in identities in a verb form. There is so much of integration and assimilation. In a way certain identities keep evolving and changing with the changing circumstances. So can we think of J&K’s identities as verbs?
Treating the question of identity as a verb is a rather contentious question. There are voices which see the process of cultural assimilation and integration a one-sided affair in this uneven world. In other words, it is seen as an agenda driven by the likes and dislikes of a predominant global cultural power. Given this controversy, it would be better not to take this debate in J&K’s context further. It sometimes evokes insecurities.
At the workshop, there were many who questioned the success of the LAHDC model of political devolution. There was a feeling that it had simply ‘failed’, because it was too top-down, and there were many other layers of governance, like the Panchayati system, that had come into collision with its governance system.
Seen from another angle, the model gave the LAHDC the entire say in the use of financial allocations made to the region. The devolution of powers helped Ladakh frame an educational curriculum which the region sees best for itself. It helped the region to have local laws which protect its local economy and environment. It helped it in keeping economic and other outside interests under check, which may have the potential of changing the region’s demography, religious value system, culture and environment.
But as a spin off, it encouraged transformation of this empowerment into isolationist tendencies - breeding intolerance and an aversion to co-existence with other ethnic and regional identities. Virtually, the writ of J&K state government ends at the borders of Ladakh. The region unfurls its own flag. The state’s flag is long gone as the state’s constitution is no more sacrosanct there. There are almost no air connection between Srinagar and Leh. Ladakhi participants had to come to the workshop via Delhi! Leh’s Buddhist population prefers Jammu and Delhi to Srinagar to get education, live at and do business with.
However, we got to know that the people of Ladakh do realise the importance of Article 370. Some of our Ladakhi friends cited the Sindhu Darshan festival organised during the NDA rule on the banks of the River Indus. That is the time when they said they realised the peril from certain Hindutva forces in pushing their Hindutva agenda by saffronising the Sindh festival. There is a sub text here. For a Hindu thought Ladakh has had a Hindu past – reflected in the sculptures and wall paintings of the Hindu era even today. They feel about propagating and promoting it. Ladakh’s Buddhists find this line inconvenient.
In political terms, what was interesting to know was that Ladakh’s people supported the Musharraf Formula for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, as they saw ‘reason and sense’ in it!
When it comes to the Jammu region, there is, again, nothing black and white about it. There is no political or identity homogeneity. The voices for separate statehood represent certain fringe opinion. Regions like Rajouri-Poonch and Doda-Kishtwar-Bhaderwah do not share the political vision of Jammu and Kathua districts. Then there seems to be a divide, possibly a manufactured one, between the Gujjar and Pahari communities in the region on the issue of Scheduled Tribe status for the Pahari people.
The Amarnath Land Controversy is often seen to have deepened the gulf between the Muslims and Hindus in the state. The fact is that there are many people in Jammu who value the state’s composite culture and political make-up more than the religious fault lines.
A senior retired civil servant of the state made a strong argument saying that to him it was wrong to conclude that the BJP and the PDP reaped electoral harvest from the Amarnath land row. To buttress his argument he cited the examples of ‘five major flashpoints of the Amarnath issue’ in Jammu – Samba, Bishna, Gandhi Nagar Cantonment, Udhampur, Vijaypur. BJP lost elections in all of these constituencies despite these places being principal mobilisation points during the Amarnath crisis. And the NC’s victory over the PDP in Kashmir was another case in point.
In this environment of optimism and many underlying competitive struggles is a division of the J&K state a good idea?
These are all questions related to an internal political system in J&K. They also impact the larger unresolved and disputed status of the state. The fact is that J&K’s self determination movement remains in a crisis with this obsession for inclusiveness. Many believe that minus Jammu plains and Leh, the state’s movement for right to self determination is more logical and sans any ‘baggage of liabilities’. And there is no situation wherein minority voices hold the majoritarian aspirations hostage. This is a larger question which needs a larger debate.
What is often neglected in this debate is the revenues issue of the state. Can the three regions generate enough public revenues on their own to sustain economically?
Then there is the question of equitable development of the state, which has become too narrow to mean public spending for infrastructure development, rather than broader human development.
In this debate what is ignored is that equal representation disproportionate to population negates fundamental democratic principles and constitutes gross injustice. Equal public spending, across the regions, in disregard to their contribution to the overall public tax kitty, is again a problem. Contribution to the tax kitty and ability to raise taxes need to be a major consideration in the development discourse of J&K. Why are we competing for creating petty entities based on dependence, sans any strong taxation system?
Contribution to the Union of India treasury in terms of other resources, other than direct and indirect taxes is another factor that is neglected. And all this needs to be done objectively, so that there is no injustice with any region. However, contribution to the tax kitty needs to be based on actual consumption and not where the tax is booked.
Our identities are rooted in our idea of our histories. Without histories, identities would become crude ‘verbs’ and not respectable ‘nouns.’ What is seen as a ‘collective suffering’ could become a collective quest for excellence and human development if we see beyond the confines of the valleys we live in. There are many beautiful worlds beyond the mountains we have been brought up in.
Perhaps, as what the participants at the workshop finally resolved, we need to start our children’s education with ‘J&K ki sair’, rather than ‘Bharat ki sair’ to understand each other better.
Concluded.
Feedback arjimand@greaterkashmir.com
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Divisions between Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh
J&K's Collective Suffering
Are Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh really incompatible?
DATELINE SRINAGAR BY ARJIMAND HUSSAIN TALIB
Rational human thought makes the difference between self-interest and want clear. When we humans mature through our early days, we learn that being conscious of one’s interests as an individual and as a community is but natural. But when this consciousness reaches the level of obsession of racial superiority, and assumed victimhood, it borders a sort of narcissism. That sort of narcissism is what, sadly, seems to have gripped the J&K state today.
The unsettled nature of the political status of J&K is a reality. The massive exploitation of its resources by New Delhi - and to some measure by Islamabad - has enlarged the debate on political justice in the state. However, the discourse on regional, sub-regional and ethnic identities is a new construct, which has served two purposes.
One, it has created a ‘complex’ issue out of a simple issue of self determination of this formerly Princely State. Two, it has sought to create an aggressor out of the victim – the Muslims of the J&K state.
The result is tragic. Today almost all the communities in the state are up in arms against each other - making use of regional, sub-regional and ethnic identity cards to promote their economic interests.
The process of manufacturing identities and divergent political goals in the state has been going on on an industrial scale for many decades now. Who is responsible for this? New Delhi? State governments? Both? The implanted bureaucracy? Or it has been a natural process of political evolution?
This debate is not only important for that we have for long remained a good example of syncretism; this debate is critical because we live in a fiercely interdependent and integrated world. Preserving one’s own identity while working in a multi cultural system is very much possible in today’s world. There are ample examples of such systems working well throughout the world. Then why some sections of Jammu and Ladakh regions do not want to co-exist with Kashmir? Or why doesn’t a section of Kashmiri Pandits want to live with Kashmiri Muslims side by side again?
The three-day intra-J&K workshop at the Jammu University last week, organised jointly by the Jammu University; IPCS, New Delhi and the British High Commission provided answers to many of these questions. Many questions, as expected, continue to remain unanswered.
Any such exercise debating regional, sub-regional and other ethnic ‘aspirations’ of J&K is normally interesting. Importantly, what added to the richness of the deliberations was the presence of a few former civil servants, including a few chief secretaries, and their input to the discussions.
Any intra-J&K debate has two essential backdrops. One, that it holds the larger question of ‘Kashmir dispute’ ransom to internal political disagreements, which are not all necessarily natural. Some are manufactured too. Two, it degenerates the larger issue of political emancipation based on inclusive right to self determination into a majority-minority debate.
This tendency of degeneration must bring us back to two fundamental questions. One, why can’t we contemplate a discourse which talks of political inclusiveness and equal citizenship rather than the narrow majority-minority rights? Why for heavens sake we in J&K can’t think of an inclusive polity as an alternative to the narrow regional, sub regional and ethnic-based competitive politicking?
Two, are Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism so incompatible and irreconcilable that the state cannot think of a common future based on our common history and heritage? Why do we demonize Kashmiri Muslims – the real oppressed ones – as the aggressors? Why do we reject their quest for collective justice and the state’s territorial integrity and political inclusiveness as a ‘dangerous ideology’? Is being inclusive radical?
The discussions at the workshop began with an underlying assumption that we guys are not questioning our common future. Yet there were layers and layers of opinions and aspirations. Sadly, a common future is not a widely shared vision.
In the discussions a former senior-most civil servant of the state shared an interesting ‘thought’. To him, he said, the creation of ‘District Autonomous Councils’ on the pattern of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) for all the districts was the best solution to ‘J&K’s problems’. And it opened a floodgate of questions.
Where would this Balkanisation of sorts lead us to? Would there be an end to this competitive quest for best economic opportunities? Would such autonomous councils satiate the thirst for control over power/resources? Isn’t the canard of regional and sub-regional ‘identity’ being used as a façade for competitive political domination in J&K state today? Isn’t this trend serving to make the larger question of Kashmir’s right to self determination fuzzy?
When it came to the presentation of the Ladakhi viewpoint, it began with a rather categorical assertion – that they do not wish to remain with the Kashmir region, or identify with the region’s political goals, under any circumstances.
However, there were voices of disagreement from within the region too. The Muslims of Kargil do not share this vision, we were told. Muslims from Zanaskar and Leh itself do not necessarily share this vision of isolation. To them, this viewpoint – as propagated by the LAHDC – represents a centralised system of top-down political manoeuvring.
Ladakh’s Buddhists, however, see this polarisation within the region as a ‘process of ‘democratisation’. They have some other opinions too: ‘Ladakhi Muslims who had chosen to migrate to Kashmir Valley must learn a lesson from the ill treatment they got from Kashmiri Muslims there’. To LAHDC, ‘all Ladakhis’ future lies in Ladakh and its identity.’ To them, ‘LAHDC remains the best model of governance in the whole of India’. ‘Such a model, if implemented in other regions of the state, would not work’, because ‘Ladakhis are wiser, live values which are far more sophisticated than others in the state’. And, if Ladakh got statehood, ‘it would be the best state in the whole of India’.
This perception, I found, has many takers outside the LAHDC as well. A few former civil servants of the state showed their silent admiration for this thought by nodding their heads.
Ladakh’s Buddhist community also has a few words of caution both for Srinagar and New Delhi. That if Ladakh’s Buddhist aspirations continue to be dishonoured, a time might come when the Chinese might just walk over to the Zojila Pass. ‘Kashmiris must realise, Ladakh is a buffer between them and an ambitious China’, we were told.
And then Chinese Mahayana Buddhism was getting very popular in Ladakh each passing day. Alarm bells are ringing.
To be concluded next week
Feedback at arjimand@greaterkashmir.com
Are Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh really incompatible?
DATELINE SRINAGAR BY ARJIMAND HUSSAIN TALIB
Rational human thought makes the difference between self-interest and want clear. When we humans mature through our early days, we learn that being conscious of one’s interests as an individual and as a community is but natural. But when this consciousness reaches the level of obsession of racial superiority, and assumed victimhood, it borders a sort of narcissism. That sort of narcissism is what, sadly, seems to have gripped the J&K state today.
The unsettled nature of the political status of J&K is a reality. The massive exploitation of its resources by New Delhi - and to some measure by Islamabad - has enlarged the debate on political justice in the state. However, the discourse on regional, sub-regional and ethnic identities is a new construct, which has served two purposes.
One, it has created a ‘complex’ issue out of a simple issue of self determination of this formerly Princely State. Two, it has sought to create an aggressor out of the victim – the Muslims of the J&K state.
The result is tragic. Today almost all the communities in the state are up in arms against each other - making use of regional, sub-regional and ethnic identity cards to promote their economic interests.
The process of manufacturing identities and divergent political goals in the state has been going on on an industrial scale for many decades now. Who is responsible for this? New Delhi? State governments? Both? The implanted bureaucracy? Or it has been a natural process of political evolution?
This debate is not only important for that we have for long remained a good example of syncretism; this debate is critical because we live in a fiercely interdependent and integrated world. Preserving one’s own identity while working in a multi cultural system is very much possible in today’s world. There are ample examples of such systems working well throughout the world. Then why some sections of Jammu and Ladakh regions do not want to co-exist with Kashmir? Or why doesn’t a section of Kashmiri Pandits want to live with Kashmiri Muslims side by side again?
The three-day intra-J&K workshop at the Jammu University last week, organised jointly by the Jammu University; IPCS, New Delhi and the British High Commission provided answers to many of these questions. Many questions, as expected, continue to remain unanswered.
Any such exercise debating regional, sub-regional and other ethnic ‘aspirations’ of J&K is normally interesting. Importantly, what added to the richness of the deliberations was the presence of a few former civil servants, including a few chief secretaries, and their input to the discussions.
Any intra-J&K debate has two essential backdrops. One, that it holds the larger question of ‘Kashmir dispute’ ransom to internal political disagreements, which are not all necessarily natural. Some are manufactured too. Two, it degenerates the larger issue of political emancipation based on inclusive right to self determination into a majority-minority debate.
This tendency of degeneration must bring us back to two fundamental questions. One, why can’t we contemplate a discourse which talks of political inclusiveness and equal citizenship rather than the narrow majority-minority rights? Why for heavens sake we in J&K can’t think of an inclusive polity as an alternative to the narrow regional, sub regional and ethnic-based competitive politicking?
Two, are Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism so incompatible and irreconcilable that the state cannot think of a common future based on our common history and heritage? Why do we demonize Kashmiri Muslims – the real oppressed ones – as the aggressors? Why do we reject their quest for collective justice and the state’s territorial integrity and political inclusiveness as a ‘dangerous ideology’? Is being inclusive radical?
The discussions at the workshop began with an underlying assumption that we guys are not questioning our common future. Yet there were layers and layers of opinions and aspirations. Sadly, a common future is not a widely shared vision.
In the discussions a former senior-most civil servant of the state shared an interesting ‘thought’. To him, he said, the creation of ‘District Autonomous Councils’ on the pattern of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) for all the districts was the best solution to ‘J&K’s problems’. And it opened a floodgate of questions.
Where would this Balkanisation of sorts lead us to? Would there be an end to this competitive quest for best economic opportunities? Would such autonomous councils satiate the thirst for control over power/resources? Isn’t the canard of regional and sub-regional ‘identity’ being used as a façade for competitive political domination in J&K state today? Isn’t this trend serving to make the larger question of Kashmir’s right to self determination fuzzy?
When it came to the presentation of the Ladakhi viewpoint, it began with a rather categorical assertion – that they do not wish to remain with the Kashmir region, or identify with the region’s political goals, under any circumstances.
However, there were voices of disagreement from within the region too. The Muslims of Kargil do not share this vision, we were told. Muslims from Zanaskar and Leh itself do not necessarily share this vision of isolation. To them, this viewpoint – as propagated by the LAHDC – represents a centralised system of top-down political manoeuvring.
Ladakh’s Buddhists, however, see this polarisation within the region as a ‘process of ‘democratisation’. They have some other opinions too: ‘Ladakhi Muslims who had chosen to migrate to Kashmir Valley must learn a lesson from the ill treatment they got from Kashmiri Muslims there’. To LAHDC, ‘all Ladakhis’ future lies in Ladakh and its identity.’ To them, ‘LAHDC remains the best model of governance in the whole of India’. ‘Such a model, if implemented in other regions of the state, would not work’, because ‘Ladakhis are wiser, live values which are far more sophisticated than others in the state’. And, if Ladakh got statehood, ‘it would be the best state in the whole of India’.
This perception, I found, has many takers outside the LAHDC as well. A few former civil servants of the state showed their silent admiration for this thought by nodding their heads.
Ladakh’s Buddhist community also has a few words of caution both for Srinagar and New Delhi. That if Ladakh’s Buddhist aspirations continue to be dishonoured, a time might come when the Chinese might just walk over to the Zojila Pass. ‘Kashmiris must realise, Ladakh is a buffer between them and an ambitious China’, we were told.
And then Chinese Mahayana Buddhism was getting very popular in Ladakh each passing day. Alarm bells are ringing.
To be concluded next week
Feedback at arjimand@greaterkashmir.com
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Who needs to access information under J&K RTI Act?
Unacceptable!
The debate on the legal definition of who can access information under J&K RTI Act, 2009 in J&K has some sub text as well. That sub text has serious political implications for the subjects of the J&K state. It is important that we remain sensitive to those aspects of the debate.
Firstly, the erosion of the special status of the J&K State within the Indian union (as enshrined in the Article 370 of the Indian Constitution), in the post-1953 era, and mainly in the post-1975 era, has sought to bring certain uniformity of the state laws with the Indian union. Such uniformity has resulted in J&K state's disempowerment with regard to key decision making regarding its natural resources, environment, political economy, international trade, etc. Furthermore, such 'tendency of uniformity' has eroded the disputed status of the state.
The cumulative effect of this process of disempowerment and eosion has been a serious loss of sovereignty to the J&K state. The reason today we are unable to even decide about the matters of our own resources and identity is that we have been disempowered by the same process. And today the desperate struggle of the political forces of the state, including that of the ruling National Conference, PDP, etc. in reversing all that is symbolic of that collosal injustice.
While in principle we must stand for qualitative establishment of democratic values and human rights in J&K, bringing in 'uniformity' of J&K state's governance laws with that of the union of India just for the sake of uniformity under the current unjust political system is unacceptable to we Kashmiris.
Secondly, on the issue of RTI, I think replacement of the term 'those residing in the state' by 'the State subjects of the J&K state' would be more apt. If we open up the issue of J&K's information access by non-state subjects (though in principle there is nothing wrong in that), it would result in further erosion of the state's residual political sovereignty. Such a process has to be two-sided. Almost all aspects of information related to the union of India's business in J&K (that of its road communications, defence, hydropower, land occupation, telecommunications, etc.) remain out of the reach of J&K's state subjects in the name of 'national interest', legally shielded by instruments like the Official Secrets Act.
Having said that, our sensitivity to this political aspect is highly desirable. We also need to enlarge the scope of our discourse on RTI in J&K (which we tend to see from the prism of normal centre-state issues in India) to Kashmiris' access to union of India's business in the state.
A further loss of J&K's political sovereignty is unacceptable to we Kashmiris.
In solidarity
Arjimand Hussain Talib
The debate on the legal definition of who can access information under J&K RTI Act, 2009 in J&K has some sub text as well. That sub text has serious political implications for the subjects of the J&K state. It is important that we remain sensitive to those aspects of the debate.
Firstly, the erosion of the special status of the J&K State within the Indian union (as enshrined in the Article 370 of the Indian Constitution), in the post-1953 era, and mainly in the post-1975 era, has sought to bring certain uniformity of the state laws with the Indian union. Such uniformity has resulted in J&K state's disempowerment with regard to key decision making regarding its natural resources, environment, political economy, international trade, etc. Furthermore, such 'tendency of uniformity' has eroded the disputed status of the state.
The cumulative effect of this process of disempowerment and eosion has been a serious loss of sovereignty to the J&K state. The reason today we are unable to even decide about the matters of our own resources and identity is that we have been disempowered by the same process. And today the desperate struggle of the political forces of the state, including that of the ruling National Conference, PDP, etc. in reversing all that is symbolic of that collosal injustice.
While in principle we must stand for qualitative establishment of democratic values and human rights in J&K, bringing in 'uniformity' of J&K state's governance laws with that of the union of India just for the sake of uniformity under the current unjust political system is unacceptable to we Kashmiris.
Secondly, on the issue of RTI, I think replacement of the term 'those residing in the state' by 'the State subjects of the J&K state' would be more apt. If we open up the issue of J&K's information access by non-state subjects (though in principle there is nothing wrong in that), it would result in further erosion of the state's residual political sovereignty. Such a process has to be two-sided. Almost all aspects of information related to the union of India's business in J&K (that of its road communications, defence, hydropower, land occupation, telecommunications, etc.) remain out of the reach of J&K's state subjects in the name of 'national interest', legally shielded by instruments like the Official Secrets Act.
Having said that, our sensitivity to this political aspect is highly desirable. We also need to enlarge the scope of our discourse on RTI in J&K (which we tend to see from the prism of normal centre-state issues in India) to Kashmiris' access to union of India's business in the state.
A further loss of J&K's political sovereignty is unacceptable to we Kashmiris.
In solidarity
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Monday, November 2, 2009
They call silence 'agitational terrorism'
Lab kushayee karo ge toa saza takht-e-daar
Apni har ik sada ki hai ‘dawa’ takht-e-daar
Khamshi takhreeb hai, taqreer bhi takhreeb
Qalam kushayee ki bhi hai saza takht-e-daar
Hai hum ne kaha dard ko ek cheekh bhi lazim
Usne isharey se phir kaha - takht-e-daar!
Hai haath azmayee ko yaan maktal hi jawab
Aur phir hai khamshi ko jaza takht-e-daar
Hai unn ko mukhtari pasand har kaam par apne
Humne jab bhi poocha ‘kyon?’ toa kaha takht-e-daar
Ahwaal kuch badle nehi, sadyaan guzar gayee
Kashmeeriyoon ki qaza ki ada takht-e-daar
Lazim hai ab qoam ko ik naya walwalah
Aur Talib phir likhen ge ‘fana takht-e-daar’
Monday, October 5, 2009
Hunger in Kashmir
DATELINE SRINAGAR (Daily Greater Kashmir, 27 Sept, 2009)
Food for thought
Harsh Mander's report ‘Hunger in the Valley’ deserves attention
BY ARJIMAND HUSSAIN TALIB
Kashmir’s political governance has always been far from easy. The British recognised the challenges of governing this mountainous region even at the pinnacle of its Raj in the sub-continent. Famous British writer, Lord Birdwood, in his book, Two Nations and Kashmir, went to the extent of terming Kashmir a ’geographical monstrosity’.
In 1929, when Sir Albion Bannerji, an Indian Christian, who had served the government of India and was a Senior Member of the Council of the State of J&K, resigned from the would-be post of the State’s Prime Minister, he wrote about the grounds of his resignation in India’s vernacular press, ‘…J&K State is labouring under many disadvantages, with a large Muhammadan population absolutely illiterate, labouring under poverty and very low economic conditions of living in the villages and practically governed like dumb-driven cattle [by the Maharaja regime].’
The 1877-78 famine in Kashmir, triggered by a devastating flood, is an important historical event, which has lessons even for today’s Kashmir. Thousands of Kashmiris died of starvation then because the Maharaja’s border guards refused people to leave and enter Punjab in search of work and food. Political disempowerment, coupled with geographical isolation, created the perfect conditions for the famine.
After analysing the circumstances of the starvation, Lord Kimberley, the then secretary of State for India, in 1884, wrote to his government, ‘… as to the urgent need for reforms in the administration of the State of J&K, there is unfortunately, no room for doubt.’ This British thinking had severely alarmed the Maharaja’s regime.
Times have certainly changed for Kashmir, but the circumstances are not very different than those which existed prior to 1947 here. The process of political disempowerment has continued, albeit in different ways. The crisis in political governance is far from over. The unnatural social and economic circumstances created by the Line of Control (LoC) cannot be ignored. The economic crisis and a situation close to mass-hunger that unfolded in Kashmir during the Amarnath forest land controversy in 2008 reinforce Kashmir’s political and geographical vulnerability even today. Long-needed administrative reforms are elusive because they are seen as ‘politically volatile’.
The just-released report ‘Hunger in the Valley’ by Mr Harsh Mander and his team is thought provoking. At one plane this painstaking effort provides a rare and valuable glimpse into the state of some basic social services in Kashmir. On the other plane, the report falls little short in recognising the distinct social, economic, constitutional and political circumstances which characterise J&K’s political governance.
Mr Harsh’s work for human and civil rights after resigning from the Indian Civil Services in protest against Gujarat’s anti-Muslim carnage is widely recognised. His interest and work in Kashmir deserves respect too.
The report has come up with some significant findings and recommendations on issues like JK Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (JKREGS), Family Benefit Scheme (FBS), food security, Old Age Pension Scheme, ICDS, etc. which require government’s keen attention.
The report has underlined the defunct state of Panchayats as a major reason for improper functioning of public services at the grassroots level. What also needs to be recognised is that the reason the Panchayati system is in suspended animation is that its space is currently meant to be utilised by the MLA tier of the political system. And there are profound political reasons why that is so.
One of the key issues raised in the report is the aggravating food insecurity in this state. The report rightly points to the decreasing land holding as an evolving livelihood challenge.
On JKREGS, the report has supported the widely-existing viewpoint that the minimum wage of Rs 70 in J&K’s context is impractical. Now that J&K government has enhanced the minimum wage, things are expected to get better. However, the finding that not a single individual covered in the sample survey has been able to access unemployment allowance is very serious. So is the finding that 64 per cent of the surveyed people have no job cards.
It is good to know that the coverage of the Mid Day School Meals scheme was found better, with 98 per cent children reporting that they ate hot cooked meals regularly at school.
The survey makes an interesting point when it says that the PDS was functioning better in Kashmir than most parts of India. However, the factors that impact its functioning in far flung areas need an in-depth analysis.
What is also serious is the finding that 65.04 per cent of the surveyed individuals do not receive the ‘old age pension’. The findings on the Family Benefit Scheme (FBS) are serious too. That 92 percent of the respondents, though eligible, had not received any benefit needs immediate governmental attention.
On the issue of caste and discrimination, the report would have done better in recognising the dissimilarities between Kashmir and the rest of India. In India the caste system is rooted as a socio-religious system. In Kashmir, it does not form the basis for separate identities or discrimination.
The report seems to have relied excessively on the official census data in the planning process. On a number of occasions in the past such exercises at non governmental level have experienced serious limitations as the geographical definition of villages and their demography have come in collision with the realities on the ground. Such discrepancies constrain the planning and execution processes. And that is what seems to have happened on the planning process on including religious minorities and the ‘scheduled castes’ and the ‘scheduled tribes’.
Any sample study on J&K’s socio economic issues also needs to recognise that the quality of its governance and the raging political turmoil are closely inter-linked. We are not a normal democratic set up. The reason J&K’s right to information law is differently designed than the rest of India, and largely cosmetic, is that the standards of democracy are different. There are serious problems with our governance because the accountability and transparency standards are shielded and largely secluded from public scrutiny.
Further, if we look at J&K’s governance from the prism of the last two decades of violent conflict alone, we tend to overlook the historical and present political circumstances which fuel the crisis here. And that is where our analysis would come into conflict with the grassroots realities.
The reason most of the centrally-sponsored schemes fail their basic purpose is that their design come in direct collision with the socio-economic and political realities in our state, particularly in the Kashmir region. The case of the centrally-sponsored schemes underlines why we need to see at the project of governance in Kashmir from a different angle. In other words, the yardstick to measure the standards of governance in J&K and the rest of India have to be somewhat different.
At the end of the day, any such grassroots-based sample study in Kashmir, often against heavy odds, must be admired. A second part, looking at other dire issues like health care and linkages between human security and development would be great.
Food for thought
Harsh Mander's report ‘Hunger in the Valley’ deserves attention
BY ARJIMAND HUSSAIN TALIB
Kashmir’s political governance has always been far from easy. The British recognised the challenges of governing this mountainous region even at the pinnacle of its Raj in the sub-continent. Famous British writer, Lord Birdwood, in his book, Two Nations and Kashmir, went to the extent of terming Kashmir a ’geographical monstrosity’.
In 1929, when Sir Albion Bannerji, an Indian Christian, who had served the government of India and was a Senior Member of the Council of the State of J&K, resigned from the would-be post of the State’s Prime Minister, he wrote about the grounds of his resignation in India’s vernacular press, ‘…J&K State is labouring under many disadvantages, with a large Muhammadan population absolutely illiterate, labouring under poverty and very low economic conditions of living in the villages and practically governed like dumb-driven cattle [by the Maharaja regime].’
The 1877-78 famine in Kashmir, triggered by a devastating flood, is an important historical event, which has lessons even for today’s Kashmir. Thousands of Kashmiris died of starvation then because the Maharaja’s border guards refused people to leave and enter Punjab in search of work and food. Political disempowerment, coupled with geographical isolation, created the perfect conditions for the famine.
After analysing the circumstances of the starvation, Lord Kimberley, the then secretary of State for India, in 1884, wrote to his government, ‘… as to the urgent need for reforms in the administration of the State of J&K, there is unfortunately, no room for doubt.’ This British thinking had severely alarmed the Maharaja’s regime.
Times have certainly changed for Kashmir, but the circumstances are not very different than those which existed prior to 1947 here. The process of political disempowerment has continued, albeit in different ways. The crisis in political governance is far from over. The unnatural social and economic circumstances created by the Line of Control (LoC) cannot be ignored. The economic crisis and a situation close to mass-hunger that unfolded in Kashmir during the Amarnath forest land controversy in 2008 reinforce Kashmir’s political and geographical vulnerability even today. Long-needed administrative reforms are elusive because they are seen as ‘politically volatile’.
The just-released report ‘Hunger in the Valley’ by Mr Harsh Mander and his team is thought provoking. At one plane this painstaking effort provides a rare and valuable glimpse into the state of some basic social services in Kashmir. On the other plane, the report falls little short in recognising the distinct social, economic, constitutional and political circumstances which characterise J&K’s political governance.
Mr Harsh’s work for human and civil rights after resigning from the Indian Civil Services in protest against Gujarat’s anti-Muslim carnage is widely recognised. His interest and work in Kashmir deserves respect too.
The report has come up with some significant findings and recommendations on issues like JK Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (JKREGS), Family Benefit Scheme (FBS), food security, Old Age Pension Scheme, ICDS, etc. which require government’s keen attention.
The report has underlined the defunct state of Panchayats as a major reason for improper functioning of public services at the grassroots level. What also needs to be recognised is that the reason the Panchayati system is in suspended animation is that its space is currently meant to be utilised by the MLA tier of the political system. And there are profound political reasons why that is so.
One of the key issues raised in the report is the aggravating food insecurity in this state. The report rightly points to the decreasing land holding as an evolving livelihood challenge.
On JKREGS, the report has supported the widely-existing viewpoint that the minimum wage of Rs 70 in J&K’s context is impractical. Now that J&K government has enhanced the minimum wage, things are expected to get better. However, the finding that not a single individual covered in the sample survey has been able to access unemployment allowance is very serious. So is the finding that 64 per cent of the surveyed people have no job cards.
It is good to know that the coverage of the Mid Day School Meals scheme was found better, with 98 per cent children reporting that they ate hot cooked meals regularly at school.
The survey makes an interesting point when it says that the PDS was functioning better in Kashmir than most parts of India. However, the factors that impact its functioning in far flung areas need an in-depth analysis.
What is also serious is the finding that 65.04 per cent of the surveyed individuals do not receive the ‘old age pension’. The findings on the Family Benefit Scheme (FBS) are serious too. That 92 percent of the respondents, though eligible, had not received any benefit needs immediate governmental attention.
On the issue of caste and discrimination, the report would have done better in recognising the dissimilarities between Kashmir and the rest of India. In India the caste system is rooted as a socio-religious system. In Kashmir, it does not form the basis for separate identities or discrimination.
The report seems to have relied excessively on the official census data in the planning process. On a number of occasions in the past such exercises at non governmental level have experienced serious limitations as the geographical definition of villages and their demography have come in collision with the realities on the ground. Such discrepancies constrain the planning and execution processes. And that is what seems to have happened on the planning process on including religious minorities and the ‘scheduled castes’ and the ‘scheduled tribes’.
Any sample study on J&K’s socio economic issues also needs to recognise that the quality of its governance and the raging political turmoil are closely inter-linked. We are not a normal democratic set up. The reason J&K’s right to information law is differently designed than the rest of India, and largely cosmetic, is that the standards of democracy are different. There are serious problems with our governance because the accountability and transparency standards are shielded and largely secluded from public scrutiny.
Further, if we look at J&K’s governance from the prism of the last two decades of violent conflict alone, we tend to overlook the historical and present political circumstances which fuel the crisis here. And that is where our analysis would come into conflict with the grassroots realities.
The reason most of the centrally-sponsored schemes fail their basic purpose is that their design come in direct collision with the socio-economic and political realities in our state, particularly in the Kashmir region. The case of the centrally-sponsored schemes underlines why we need to see at the project of governance in Kashmir from a different angle. In other words, the yardstick to measure the standards of governance in J&K and the rest of India have to be somewhat different.
At the end of the day, any such grassroots-based sample study in Kashmir, often against heavy odds, must be admired. A second part, looking at other dire issues like health care and linkages between human security and development would be great.
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Jammu & Kashmir Divide
First published in daily Greater
Time for Divorce?
Looking at the deep divisions and prejudice, J&K state today stands at a crossroads. One way from here goes to absolute anarchy and eventual divorce between
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Marriages of convenience have an inherent problem: they are chronically volatile, but yet compulsively binding. In a relationship where emotional bonding and togetherness remain absent, profit-loss calculations dominate.
The age of colonisation changed the face of our planet in brazen ways. The adventures of drawing boundaries on maps – creating political entities in disregard to ethnic, national, religious and geographical considerations – has created a weird world.
In the post-colonial period,
Similarly, let us honestly accept that history, like in most of the post-colonial world, has given birth to a political and geographical entity in the shape of Jammu & Kashmir state which is far from perfect. The State’s present geographical and political make up is a reflection of the same historical accidents, rooted in colonial imagination of post-colonial borders. The Treaty of Amritsar compounded that historical accident. And then during the subsequent decades of autocratic Dogra Maharaha rule over the majority community, division of the State gave birth to a complex and chaotic polity.
Some of the recent recruitment results of the State Selection Recruitment Board (SSRB) and the Public Service Commission (PSC) to government services are seemingly shaping up as a perfect storm. The administrative disempowerment of the
It is not only the three regions, even the sub regions and sub ethnic groups are simmering with discontent and feelings of discrimination today. But the moot question is: who is gaining at whose expense?
The contention of regional imbalances in
There is no secret in that the commission’s recommendations were politically influenced. One of its core recommendations was the creation of special administrative structures like Regional Development Boards. In
In 1965, Dr. Karan Singh, went a step further by proposing that J&K be ‘reorganized’ on linguistic (communal) lines, and
In 1978,
Soon the violence got little nasty, targeting a particular ethnic group. In the preventive police action, about eighteen people were killed. The then chief minister, Sheikh Abdullah, felt the political heat unbearable and announced setting up of yet another commission to inquire the grievances of discrimination. This time round the commission was headed by a retired Chief Justice, S. M. Sikri. The Sikri Commission, among other things, recommended creation of a State Development Board chaired by the Chief Minister. That never happened.
Since the 80s, almost all State government departments and agencies have been bifurcated or trifurcated. State-level posts were replaced by division and province-level posts. The reservation for socially backward classes and ethnic groups created further social and political divisions.
Ladakh region, for all practical reasons, became a state within a state. But let us don’t ignore the fact that the region’s separatist tendencies have nothing to do with ‘discrimination.’ The region’s preference for a separate status has its roots in early 1949 when its rulers proposed Ladakh’s direct incorporation into the Indian Union.
Today’s debate over discrimination with
Similarly, the process of population growth, as presented in census figures in the two regions, requires in-depth analysis.
It is true that some rulers from the Kashmir region in the past have not acted too sensitively to the needs and aspirations of some of the people of
Looking at the deep divisions and prejudice, J&K state today stands at a crossroads. One way from here goes to absolute anarchy and eventual divorce between
The first responsibility towards reconciliation lies at
The government must bring out a white paper on the real state of empowerment and disempowerment in the three regions. It has to come up with real statistics, whatever they are. There have to be educational, cultural and political exchanges between the three regions, mainly amongst the youth. There have to be debates surrounding a perfect vision of a common future.
At a different level, the recruitment boards have to be restructured. The way the recruitment boards are constituted in favour of one particular region is preposterous. Recruitment to government services, most importantly to Indian and
No matter our perceptions and biases, history’s accidents are a reality. J&K state looks beautiful together, with a diversity which is gorgeous. Divorced, we all stand to lose. And we will surely miss each other. It is time for us to talk and undo the excesses which seek petty domination and brinkmanship.
Feedback at Arjimand@greaterkashmir.com
Jammu & Kashmir divide
First published in daily Greater
Time for Divorce?
Looking at the deep divisions and prejudice, J&K state today stands at a crossroads. One way from here goes to absolute anarchy and eventual divorce between
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Marriages of convenience have an inherent problem: they are chronically volatile, but yet compulsively binding. In a relationship where emotional bonding and togetherness remain absent, profit-loss calculations dominate.
The age of colonisation changed the face of our planet in brazen ways. The adventures of drawing boundaries on maps – creating political entities in disregard to ethnic, national, religious and geographical considerations – has created a weird world.
In the post-colonial period,
Similarly, let us honestly accept that history, like in most of the post-colonial world, has given birth to a political and geographical entity in the shape of Jammu & Kashmir state which is far from perfect. The State’s present geographical and political make up is a reflection of the same historical accidents, rooted in colonial imagination of post-colonial borders. The Treaty of Amritsar compounded that historical accident. And then during the subsequent decades of autocratic Dogra Maharaha rule over the majority community, division of the State gave birth to a complex and chaotic polity.
Some of the recent recruitment results of the State Selection Recruitment Board (SSRB) and the Public Service Commission (PSC) to government services are seemingly shaping up as a perfect storm. The administrative disempowerment of the
It is not only the three regions, even the sub regions and sub ethnic groups are simmering with discontent and feelings of discrimination today. But the moot question is: who is gaining at whose expense?
The contention of regional imbalances in
There is no secret in that the commission’s recommendations were politically influenced. One of its core recommendations was the creation of special administrative structures like Regional Development Boards. In
In 1965, Dr. Karan Singh, went a step further by proposing that J&K be ‘reorganized’ on linguistic (communal) lines, and
In 1978,
Soon the violence got little nasty, targeting a particular ethnic group. In the preventive police action, about eighteen people were killed. The then chief minister, Sheikh Abdullah, felt the political heat unbearable and announced setting up of yet another commission to inquire the grievances of discrimination. This time round the commission was headed by a retired Chief Justice, S. M. Sikri. The Sikri Commission, among other things, recommended creation of a State Development Board chaired by the Chief Minister. That never happened.
Since the 80s, almost all State government departments and agencies have been bifurcated or trifurcated. State-level posts were replaced by division and province-level posts. The reservation for socially backward classes and ethnic groups created further social and political divisions.
Ladakh region, for all practical reasons, became a state within a state. But let us don’t ignore the fact that the region’s separatist tendencies have nothing to do with ‘discrimination.’ The region’s preference for a separate status has its roots in early 1949 when its rulers proposed Ladakh’s direct incorporation into the Indian Union.
Today’s debate over discrimination with
Similarly, the process of population growth, as presented in census figures in the two regions, requires in-depth analysis.
It is true that some rulers from the Kashmir region in the past have not acted too sensitively to the needs and aspirations of some of the people of
Looking at the deep divisions and prejudice, J&K state today stands at a crossroads. One way from here goes to absolute anarchy and eventual divorce between
The first responsibility towards reconciliation lies at
The government must bring out a white paper on the real state of empowerment and disempowerment in the three regions. It has to come up with real statistics, whatever they are. There have to be educational, cultural and political exchanges between the three regions, mainly amongst the youth. There have to be debates surrounding a perfect vision of a common future.
At a different level, the recruitment boards have to be restructured. The way the recruitment boards are constituted in favour of one particular region is preposterous. Recruitment to government services, most importantly to Indian and
No matter our perceptions and biases, history’s accidents are a reality. J&K state looks beautiful together, with a diversity which is gorgeous. Divorced, we all stand to lose. And we will surely miss each other. It is time for us to talk and undo the excesses which seek petty domination and brinkmanship.
Feedback at Arjimand@greaterkashmir.com
Monday, September 14, 2009
Jammu & Kashmir's divorce?
First published in daily Greater Kashmir, Dateline Srinagar Column, 13 Sept, 2009
Time for Divorce?
Looking at the deep divisions and prejudice, J&K state today stands at a crossroads. One way from here goes to absolute anarchy and eventual divorce between
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Marriages of convenience have an inherent problem: they are chronically volatile, but yet compulsively binding. In a relationship where emotional bonding and togetherness remain absent, profit-loss calculations dominate.
The age of colonisation changed the face of our planet in brazen ways. The adventures of drawing boundaries on maps – creating political entities in disregard to ethnic, national, religious and geographical considerations – has created a weird world.
In the post-colonial period,
Similarly, let us honestly accept that history, like in most of the post-colonial world, has given birth to a political and geographical entity in the shape of Jammu & Kashmir state which is far from perfect. The State’s present geographical and political make up is a reflection of the same historical accidents, rooted in colonial imagination of post-colonial borders. The Treaty of Amritsar compounded that historical accident. And then during the subsequent decades of autocratic Dogra Maharaha rule over the majority community, division of the State gave birth to a complex and chaotic polity.
Some of the recent recruitment results of the State Selection Recruitment Board (SSRB) and the Public Service Commission (PSC) to government services are seemingly shaping up as a perfect storm. The administrative disempowerment of the
It is not only the three regions, even the sub regions and sub ethnic groups are simmering with discontent and feelings of discrimination today. But the moot question is: who is gaining at whose expense?
The contention of regional imbalances in
There is no secret in that the commission’s recommendations were politically influenced. One of its core recommendations was the creation of special administrative structures like Regional Development Boards. In
In 1965, Dr. Karan Singh, went a step further by proposing that J&K be ‘reorganized’ on linguistic (communal) lines, and
In 1978,
Soon the violence got little nasty, targeting a particular ethnic group. In the preventive police action, about eighteen people were killed. The then chief minister, Sheikh Abdullah, felt the political heat unbearable and announced setting up of yet another commission to inquire the grievances of discrimination. This time round the commission was headed by a retired Chief Justice, S. M. Sikri. The Sikri Commission, among other things, recommended creation of a State Development Board chaired by the Chief Minister. That never happened.
Since the 80s, almost all State government departments and agencies have been bifurcated or trifurcated. State-level posts were replaced by division and province-level posts. The reservation for socially backward classes and ethnic groups created further social and political divisions.
Ladakh region, for all practical reasons, became a state within a state. But let us don’t ignore the fact that the region’s separatist tendencies have nothing to do with ‘discrimination.’ The region’s preference for a separate status has its roots in early 1949 when its rulers proposed Ladakh’s direct incorporation into the Indian Union.
Today’s debate over discrimination with
Similarly, the process of population growth, as presented in census figures in the two regions, requires in-depth analysis.
It is true that some rulers from the Kashmir region in the past have not acted too sensitively to the needs and aspirations of some of the people of
Looking at the deep divisions and prejudice, J&K state today stands at a crossroads. One way from here goes to absolute anarchy and eventual divorce between
The first responsibility towards reconciliation lies at
The government must bring out a white paper on the real state of empowerment and disempowerment in the three regions. It has to come up with real statistics, whatever they are. There have to be educational, cultural and political exchanges between the three regions, mainly amongst the youth. There have to be debates surrounding a perfect vision of a common future.
At a different level, the recruitment boards have to be restructured. The way the recruitment boards are constituted in favour of one particular region is preposterous. Recruitment to government services, most importantly to Indian and
No matter our perceptions and biases, history’s accidents are a reality. J&K state looks beautiful together, with a diversity which is gorgeous. Divorced, we all stand to lose. And we will surely miss each other. It is time for us to talk and undo the excesses which seek petty domination and brinkmanship.
Feedback at Arjimand@greaterkashmir.com
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