Brothers in Arms?
Can Geelani, Mirwaiz, Abdullahs, Muftis, etc. agree to agree?
Arjimand Hussain Talib
A few days back, The New York Times reproduced a power point image of a stakeholder analysis done by the United States in Afghanistan. The image was bizarrely complex, making it beyond normal human comprehension. US political and military analysts shared jokes about the image. They saw it the most apt description of ‘a complexity called Afghanistan’, and also the reason why the US was not winning the war there.
The image had hundreds of stakeholders – political parties, jirgas, militias, drug cartels, civil services, police, local army, foreign armies, central government, local governments, media, religious groups, tribal chiefs, NGOs, et al - denoted as points in the image. The points were joined by a complex web of lines, which crossed, crisscrossed and double crossed across the image, sending brains into a state of tizzy.
Now imagine if we were to do a similar stakeholder analysis for J&K state, what would be the end product? Would a power point image depicting our situation be really different than that of Afghanistan?
Quite likely, our image will also be a complex web of varied actors, joined and separated by relationships, shared visions and disagreements. Lines would also show alignments. Some would symbolize disagreements. Some points and lines would show multiple visions, multiple relations and multiple loyalties.
In a nutshell, we may have to refer to the standard stakeholder analysis guidebook, which has a disclaimer: stakeholder analysis is not a helpful tool in understanding stakeholders and their stakes when the subjects - barring a few exceptions - are a free floating lot!
To have a complex stakeholder analysis image is bad in itself. A simpler image is a depiction of how simple and less complex our life is - as simple as that. An image to the contrary, obviously, refers to the contrary.
Jammu & Kashmir’s problem is that its stakeholder analysis gets all the more complex with each passing year. Every year there is a new addition of stakeholders, stakes and their relationships. Our collective catastrophe is aggravating. Kashmiri people are losing their spirit. There is a strong feeling that it is time to make a new beginning. There are some irreparable losses too. Some will take a long time to overcome.
We have talked a lot about the economic and social costs of the raging conflict and political instability J&K is in since decades. That is a colossal loss, we all know. But can we quantify the spiritual and psychological loss we are suffering?
Living a life of uncertainty and darkness for sixty long years – even longer than that – is a human catastrophe. A lack of certainty about the future is breeding sick minds in Kashmir. A lack of direction is breeding a strong sense of pessimism. Perpetual insecurity is breeding newer kind of disorders, which are impacting people’s genes. Psychological disorders are manifesting in physiological problems – which no research has been able capture or seek to fix so far. And it has not something to do with one generation or two alone; we are passing on adapted abnormalities through our genes to our coming generations too. It is a kind of epidemic which we need to talk about now.
Lately, the Muftis have been calling the pro-azadi groups to join hands for a ‘common cause’. The latter have shrugged off the suggestion. Mirwaiz Umar asked Geelani to come along. The latter too chose to take own path. Looking broadly, there are hardly any alignments or broad agreements to see in Kashmir today. People, groups and parties are disintegrating. A chain reaction of sorts is making the larger political goal look fuzzy. The irony is that Kashmir now has so many political voices, often working at cross purposes, that achieving political goals has become difficult. It is a party time for the foreign ruler.
In an environment where the mighty ruler can’t be overcome by force or by self ruin (like hartals) can disparate political voices help achieve political justice? Is there nothing in political terms that Geelani, Mirwaiz, Abdullahs, Muftis, Yasin, Sajjad, Shabir, Nayeem etc. can agree on? Is their vision for their land so disparate that they can’t even begin from one point?
Thinking of the impossible, sometimes, isn’t too naïve. The situation in Jammu & Kashmir - in particular the Kashmir Valley and the Muslim majority districts in Jammu – has reached a point which demands an honest introspection by the state’s key political players. And, finally, action.
What are the hurdles that come in the way of realizing the common dream of a politically free and economically sovereign Jammu & Kashmir? Between the extremes of political positions, are in-between political tangibles impossible to conceive? And what are the differences, by the way? Political? Personal?
What are the complexities? Are they fixations? Obsessions? Clash of ideologies? Clash of egos? Or a mix of these?
Disagreement of thought and approaches is a natural trait of the human race. There can be no utopia where all the people agree with each other all the times in all the circumstances. Disagreement is but natural.
Agreements over a broad range of issues amongst a broad spectrum of political thought are easier said than done, but not impossible.
Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah’s long struggle to reclaim J&K’s lost political sovereignty came to naught for many reasons. One reason had, of course, some thing to do with his political ambitions. Second was the polity itself. Whenever he was imprisoned by New Delhi, replacements were always handy. Did Sadiq, Mir Qasim, Ghulam Muhammad Shah and others come from the moon? Is today’s political environment any different?
If we deeply analyse J&K’s political environment, we realize the political status quo is entrenched as never before. There was a time when finding a replacement to a particular political formation in Srinagar wasn’t that easy. Today there is a wide array of political forces to choose from.
Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s vision of a political utopia is not bad in itself. But do today’s circumstances support overnight shift to such a political system? What about application of hikmah, which has been applied since ages by Muslim scholars, conquerors and leaders? The political system which the Abdullahs and the Muftis are part of can’t be a recipe for stability. The unjust political status quo in J&K can’t be a solution. An idea for political utopia doesn’t work in today’s world of acute interdependence and softer borders either.
A time has come when Kashmiris’ decades-old suffering must go. A time has arrived when its people desperately need a life of political freedom, dignity, friendship and a mutually beneficial engagement with its neighbors. There has to be a new relation based on shared visions and interests.
Sunday, October 3, 2010
Are Hurriyats Irrelevant?
Well, the ground realities say not really
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, during his last week’s Valley visit repeated what he and his predecessors have said previously: that “New Delhi was ready to talk to representatives of all sections who are opposed to terrorism and violence.”
The repetition of the “representatives of all sections” phrase needs to be underlined again. It marks a continuity of a policy. It also underscores that there is no shift of New Delhi’s policy on Jammu & Kashmir. It, most importantly, symbolizes the root of the problem – reluctance in accepting some hard facts, which go beyond numerical logic.
In the beginning, however, Dr Singh said something which is particularly interesting: “We felt that the people of the state are not only interested in financial assistance and development projects, but also desire a political process that meets their aspirations. We want to take the dialogue process forward.”
This sentence symbolizes a genuine acknowledgment of a reality which, however, needs to go beyond statements. This acknowledgement needs to translate into a policy practice on the ground.
Surprisingly, a caveat after this statement soon followed. One of the state Congress leaders, Ghulam Nabi Azad, came up with a sort of corrigendum to Dr. Singh’s statement. He said the Prime Minister “basically hinted towards a dialogue with militant groups in case they eschewed violence.” So the earlier guess that the offer may have been thrown before the two Hurriyats stood null and void.
The question about a dialogue between the two Hurriyat Conferences and New Delhi has to be viewed from two angles. One from New Delhi’s angle. And, two, from the Hurriyats’ angle itself.
Sensing the nuances behind the “talks invitation”, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was quick to dismiss such a talks format, where New Delhi would make non political entities like trade unions, NGOs, social activists and even academics part of the dialogue process. So far so good, but there are questions.
Let us first play the devil’s advocate. Does New Delhi see it necessary to talk to the two Hurriyats under the present circumstances?
Fundamentally, Jammu & Kashmir’s political space has to be understood in terms of geography as well as identities – both majority and minority. And then there is the cyber space, which cannot be ignored either.
Which political space do the two Hurriyats represent and occupy?
From New Delhi’s point of view, things by and large are stable in Jammu & Kashmir if gone by the geography logic – “the trouble is limited to a small geographical space”. Militancy has also been largely contained. In terms of regions, it has almost no problems in Ladakh and Jammu now. Within the Kashmir region, New Delhi’s policy mandarins argue, it sees resistance to its rule merely emanating from Old Srinagar and one police station area each in Sopore, Varmul and Islamabad.
On the ground, even though its armed forces are overstretched in a costly military campaign, it sees this campaign “manageable.” New Delhi gets a bad, nasty press, both locally and internationally, yet, somehow, it sees that manageable as well.
We often hear the two Hurriyats saying that New Delhi is not sincere about resolving the Jammu & Kashmir issue. Well, to expect an adversary to be sincere sounds little naïve. Every party to a dispute comes to the table with its own overt and covert agendas, to get the best bargain for itself. The term ‘sincerity’ in diplomacy is a misnomer. It is the conditions that parties find themselves in that make them to strike a bargain. So what is the two Hurriyats’ bargaining chip?
When these parties say that economic packages and developmental activities won’t resolve the J&K problem – something latently voiced by Dr. Singh himself - they only reflect the ground reality. Have the past sixty years of New Delhi-injected economic activities changed something greatly here?
Then is the question of Srinagar, where Dr. Singh felt the youth were particularly angry. Say whatever, Srinagar is politically very important. It impacts the political thinking and course in rest of the Valley in significant ways. The political message that is regularly conveyed on the streets of Srinagar, Varmul, Sopore, Islamabad and other parts of the Valley is what the two Hurriyats say. It is here where the Hurriyats are mostly based. Then the occasional expressions of anger voiced against New Delhi’s rule in other parts of Kashmir tightly controlled militarily convey the same message.
Then there is the cyber space. The cyber space is controlled neither by the two Hurriyats nor by the state. It is controlled by those who prefer to go by their conscience and political common sense. In a nutshell, the dominant viewpoint in the cyberspace is that J&K’s political future remains resolved. New Delhi’s actions here are questioned, and too vociferously. In other words, what the two Hurriyats say is echoed in the cyberspace.
A lot has been said about the two Hurriyats’ failure in enlarging their support base and their inability to speak for other non-Kashmiri speaking and non Muslim communities of the state. To some extent it is true that both the Hurriyat factions have had limitations in understanding the nuts and bolts of inclusive politics. It is also a fact that they had limitations in organizational effectiveness and leadership. Questions have also been raised on their values about accommodation and inclusiveness.
There is also a perception – which echoes every now and then – that the reason minority ethnic and religious identities have not wholeheartedly joined Kashmiri movement for restoration of J&K’s political sovereignty is because it acquired overly Islamist overtures.
Today those who see the two Hurriyats inconsequential say it on the grounds that they do not represent the state’s Pahari, Gujjar, Dogra, Rajput, Ladakhi and Dard political aspirations. That is only partly true. At any point of history, communities in J&K have nursed both economic and political aspirations, which may not necessarily coincide. It is not that confusing to understand. The two Hurriyats surely may not represent the economic aspirations of many of these communities, but when it comes to the political aspirations, the Hurriyats, whether we like it or not, have a claim.
If we do not accept this logic, then a plebiscite in J&K should today go in India’s favor. The reason there continues to be aversion to a plebiscite in J&K is that New Delhi and the ruling formations here do not represent its dominant political space. That explains why the two Hurriyats remain relevant despite their limitations of numerical representation and inclusiveness. The sooner that is acknowledged, the better.
Quite often we sound cynics in saying that the whole population does not fully support the movement for the restoration of Kashmir’s political sovereignty. That is partly right. Kuldeep Nayar in an article in Pakistan’s leading English daily – the Dawn – on Thursday wrote something interesting. He said that there are very few movements in the world that have sustained and persevered like the Kashmiri movement for so long. That is not a bad way of looking at things.
The other day senior lawyer, G N Shaheen at a meeting said something very interesting which appealed to one’s senses greatly. He said Kashmir did not have a democratic culture of organization. We have a culture of groupism. Perhaps that is where the answer lies.
It is not that those that support the state’s accession with New Delhi are a homogeneous lot. The most glaring divide – which reflects an ethnic divide as well – could be seen in the State’s Congress Party. Similarly, the divide within the National Conference has its own stories to tell.
Arjimand Hussain Talib
Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, during his last week’s Valley visit repeated what he and his predecessors have said previously: that “New Delhi was ready to talk to representatives of all sections who are opposed to terrorism and violence.”
The repetition of the “representatives of all sections” phrase needs to be underlined again. It marks a continuity of a policy. It also underscores that there is no shift of New Delhi’s policy on Jammu & Kashmir. It, most importantly, symbolizes the root of the problem – reluctance in accepting some hard facts, which go beyond numerical logic.
In the beginning, however, Dr Singh said something which is particularly interesting: “We felt that the people of the state are not only interested in financial assistance and development projects, but also desire a political process that meets their aspirations. We want to take the dialogue process forward.”
This sentence symbolizes a genuine acknowledgment of a reality which, however, needs to go beyond statements. This acknowledgement needs to translate into a policy practice on the ground.
Surprisingly, a caveat after this statement soon followed. One of the state Congress leaders, Ghulam Nabi Azad, came up with a sort of corrigendum to Dr. Singh’s statement. He said the Prime Minister “basically hinted towards a dialogue with militant groups in case they eschewed violence.” So the earlier guess that the offer may have been thrown before the two Hurriyats stood null and void.
The question about a dialogue between the two Hurriyat Conferences and New Delhi has to be viewed from two angles. One from New Delhi’s angle. And, two, from the Hurriyats’ angle itself.
Sensing the nuances behind the “talks invitation”, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was quick to dismiss such a talks format, where New Delhi would make non political entities like trade unions, NGOs, social activists and even academics part of the dialogue process. So far so good, but there are questions.
Let us first play the devil’s advocate. Does New Delhi see it necessary to talk to the two Hurriyats under the present circumstances?
Fundamentally, Jammu & Kashmir’s political space has to be understood in terms of geography as well as identities – both majority and minority. And then there is the cyber space, which cannot be ignored either.
Which political space do the two Hurriyats represent and occupy?
From New Delhi’s point of view, things by and large are stable in Jammu & Kashmir if gone by the geography logic – “the trouble is limited to a small geographical space”. Militancy has also been largely contained. In terms of regions, it has almost no problems in Ladakh and Jammu now. Within the Kashmir region, New Delhi’s policy mandarins argue, it sees resistance to its rule merely emanating from Old Srinagar and one police station area each in Sopore, Varmul and Islamabad.
On the ground, even though its armed forces are overstretched in a costly military campaign, it sees this campaign “manageable.” New Delhi gets a bad, nasty press, both locally and internationally, yet, somehow, it sees that manageable as well.
We often hear the two Hurriyats saying that New Delhi is not sincere about resolving the Jammu & Kashmir issue. Well, to expect an adversary to be sincere sounds little naïve. Every party to a dispute comes to the table with its own overt and covert agendas, to get the best bargain for itself. The term ‘sincerity’ in diplomacy is a misnomer. It is the conditions that parties find themselves in that make them to strike a bargain. So what is the two Hurriyats’ bargaining chip?
When these parties say that economic packages and developmental activities won’t resolve the J&K problem – something latently voiced by Dr. Singh himself - they only reflect the ground reality. Have the past sixty years of New Delhi-injected economic activities changed something greatly here?
Then is the question of Srinagar, where Dr. Singh felt the youth were particularly angry. Say whatever, Srinagar is politically very important. It impacts the political thinking and course in rest of the Valley in significant ways. The political message that is regularly conveyed on the streets of Srinagar, Varmul, Sopore, Islamabad and other parts of the Valley is what the two Hurriyats say. It is here where the Hurriyats are mostly based. Then the occasional expressions of anger voiced against New Delhi’s rule in other parts of Kashmir tightly controlled militarily convey the same message.
Then there is the cyber space. The cyber space is controlled neither by the two Hurriyats nor by the state. It is controlled by those who prefer to go by their conscience and political common sense. In a nutshell, the dominant viewpoint in the cyberspace is that J&K’s political future remains resolved. New Delhi’s actions here are questioned, and too vociferously. In other words, what the two Hurriyats say is echoed in the cyberspace.
A lot has been said about the two Hurriyats’ failure in enlarging their support base and their inability to speak for other non-Kashmiri speaking and non Muslim communities of the state. To some extent it is true that both the Hurriyat factions have had limitations in understanding the nuts and bolts of inclusive politics. It is also a fact that they had limitations in organizational effectiveness and leadership. Questions have also been raised on their values about accommodation and inclusiveness.
There is also a perception – which echoes every now and then – that the reason minority ethnic and religious identities have not wholeheartedly joined Kashmiri movement for restoration of J&K’s political sovereignty is because it acquired overly Islamist overtures.
Today those who see the two Hurriyats inconsequential say it on the grounds that they do not represent the state’s Pahari, Gujjar, Dogra, Rajput, Ladakhi and Dard political aspirations. That is only partly true. At any point of history, communities in J&K have nursed both economic and political aspirations, which may not necessarily coincide. It is not that confusing to understand. The two Hurriyats surely may not represent the economic aspirations of many of these communities, but when it comes to the political aspirations, the Hurriyats, whether we like it or not, have a claim.
If we do not accept this logic, then a plebiscite in J&K should today go in India’s favor. The reason there continues to be aversion to a plebiscite in J&K is that New Delhi and the ruling formations here do not represent its dominant political space. That explains why the two Hurriyats remain relevant despite their limitations of numerical representation and inclusiveness. The sooner that is acknowledged, the better.
Quite often we sound cynics in saying that the whole population does not fully support the movement for the restoration of Kashmir’s political sovereignty. That is partly right. Kuldeep Nayar in an article in Pakistan’s leading English daily – the Dawn – on Thursday wrote something interesting. He said that there are very few movements in the world that have sustained and persevered like the Kashmiri movement for so long. That is not a bad way of looking at things.
The other day senior lawyer, G N Shaheen at a meeting said something very interesting which appealed to one’s senses greatly. He said Kashmir did not have a democratic culture of organization. We have a culture of groupism. Perhaps that is where the answer lies.
It is not that those that support the state’s accession with New Delhi are a homogeneous lot. The most glaring divide – which reflects an ethnic divide as well – could be seen in the State’s Congress Party. Similarly, the divide within the National Conference has its own stories to tell.
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