First published in Daily Greater Kashmir
Saving Gurez and Karewas
After Kishenganga, J&K loses its oil and gas
Arjimand Hussain Talib
J&K state and its people are bracing for two catastrophes. One is shaping up in the form of the Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project in Gurez. The other one is still in the making – the on-going oil and gas exploration in Kashmir’s beautiful Karewa lands.
The use of word ‘catastrophe’ with these two projects is no exaggeration. The social, environmental and economic costs to us are colossal. There is also the spiritual cost – which is totally ignored in the standard cost-benefit analysis. Most importantly, the loss of the Kishenganga Project and our Karewas would mean our coming generations would inherit our centuries of suffering. Optimism for tomorrow dims even further.
A dam in Gurez and a power house on the River Kishenganga has devastating consequences. One, it is fully owned by the Government of India. J&K state will get its usual 12 per cent power share. Two, it will severely impact the natural environment of the Gurez valley, Bandipora and the Wullar Lake. It will severely impact water availability in River Neelam in the other Kashmir. The 24-km long tunnel across the Razdan mountains, bringing water from the Kishenganga to the Wullar Lake through Bunar-Madumati Nullah is going to be an environmental disaster.
One of the biggest losses would be the loss of the centuries-old habitat of the Dard community. The loss to precious flora and fauna would be irreversible.
The catastrophe-in-the-making due to the on-going oil and gas exploration in our Karewa lands deserves attention too. A news report in the Economic Times on 5 January said the government of India had entered into an agreement with a Hungarian exploration company, namely MOL Plc., for oil and gas exploration in J&K, including Kashmir’s Karewas. It is the same company, the report said, which has made two oil and gas discoveries in Pakistan in similar geological conditions.
The news report further said that the ONGC sees J&K’s three basins— Karewa and Spiti-Zanskar in Kashmir, and Himalayan Foothills— with significant oil and gas potential. The corporation has been carrying out geological and geo-physical surveys in the state since 1957 but without much success, it said. The ONGC has now acquired new seismic data for these basins and has also drilled four exploratory wells recently that have shown potential, the news report revealed.
Coming to Kishenganga Project, it is well known that J&K state was all set to execute it in the state sector. For eight years we carried out surveys and explored funding for the project on our own. As we failed to get counter guarantees and ‘defence and political clearances’ from New Delhi, J&K state finally handed over the project to the NHPC. So the project became one of the seven hydroelectric projects – aggregating 2798 MWs - that J&K state handed over to the government of India through a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
As per the MoU, our state will get 12 per cent ‘free power’ from these projects. In addition, we will also get ‘15 per cent central share of unallocated power at bus-bar rates to meet our need for winter peak requirements.’ That is the power we will buy in hard cash. No charity is involved.
The contract for Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project has been awarded to HCC (Hindustan Construction Company Ltd), in joint venture with Halcrow Group Ltd. U.K. (Halcrow). The contract is on turnkey basis and cost about Rs. 3642 crore. Both these companies were supposed to raise these funds on their own. The HCC-Halcrow Consortium will have a share in the ratio of 98:2 respectively.
The question why J&K state on its own cannot manage such a relatively small funding would always be raised. Many states in India are able to raise loans from both domestic and international markets for much bigger projects. The question is why can’t J&K state do the same? Why we couldn’t have gone for a public issue within the state, to ensure a major chunk of the stake remains within the state itself?
The most disturbing part of the project is its engineering. This project involves construction of a 37m high concrete faced rockfill dam, which will submergence vast tracts of the Gurez Valley. It will swallow habitations, agricultural and grazing lands. The project involves construction of a head race tunnel which will divert water from Kishanganga River to Wullar Lake. Such a massive water diversion will result in serious instability of many mountains in the area. Given India’s poor environmental preservation standards, it is unlikely environmental preservation will remain a high priority.
There is another dimension to this project – the Pakistan factor. That J&K’s rivers are part of India and Pakistan’s geo-political struggle is no secret. It is common sense that Kishenganga is not just any other hydroelectric project. Why both countries have been keen on developing a power house on this river has also something to do with an interesting clause in the Indus Waters Treaty, which says that the country that completes a power project on a river first will win the rights to the river.
Pakistan had started construction on a power house on the same river in its part in 1989, christened as the Neelam-Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (N-JHP). However, it could not make much progress on the project due to financial constraints. In 1994 India conveyed its plan for construction of the Kishanganga Project to Pakistan. Since the place wherefrom India plans to divert Kishenganga’s water through a tunnel to Wullar Lake is upstream, it means most of the areas in Pakistan Administered Kashmir served by Neelam will go dry. Pakistan’s dream of building a power house in its part may never materialise.
When it comes to oil and gas exploration in the Karewas, like the state’s water and hydropower resources it is likely that the ownership of any such resources will go to the government of India. J&K state might, at best, get a 12 per cent share. Massive exploration and drilling activities in our Karewas – our best dry and fresh fruit producing lands – will destroy them ecologically.
The question that needs to be raised vociferously is: why J&K’s governments fail to safeguard J&K people’s interests? Who gives them the mandate to decide on such crucial issues without consulting the people? These questions must take the shape of a peaceful movement. And all of us need to be a part of it. That movement must begin today. Tomorrow will be too late.
Feedback at arjimand@greaterkashmir.com
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
Justice Saghir's Kashmir Report
First published in Daily Greater Kashmir - 27 Dec 2009
Making cynics smile
Would New Delhi own Justice Saghir’s report?
Arjimand Hussain Talib
If something was to describe the symbolism and the substance of the (Rtd.) Justice Saghir Ahmed’s report, a single word would be apt – casual. The first and the fundamental question that arises is: where the report was supposed to go? To India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh – who had formed the working group Justice Saghir headed – or J&K’s Chief Minister?
There are at least two theories about why the report went to Chief Minister, Omar Abdullah, and not to India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. One, that the Congress-led UPA government was not comfortable in owning it at a time when it was deep in trouble dealing with the Telangana crisis. There is a cynics’ viewpoint as well: that since the report’s implementation is ‘unlikely’; it doesn’t matter where the report goes!
The second theory suggests a linkage of the report’s timing with the larger ‘quiet dialogue’ process taking place with some shades of the Hurriyat umbrella. Moreover, the tailor-made nuances and the style of the report’s submission seem to provide the National Conference a political advantage vis-à-vis other political forces of the state. Some would even want to see it something of a political gift to the party from the Congress, for something that is difficult to fathom right now.
Ignoring the PDP’s self rule vision in addressing the grey areas of Srinagar-New Delhi relations in the report smacks of callousness, which looks somewhat deliberate. That should have been avoided.
When it comes to the report’s substance, a whole lot of issues surface. On the face of it, its language is mostly non-categorical. The reports recommendation, ‘The question of autonomy and its demand can be examined in the light of ‘Kashmir Accord’ or in some other manner or on the basis of some other formula as the Prime Minister may deem fit and appropriate to restore autonomy to the extent possible’ leaves a wild scope for interpretation.
The use of term ‘autonomy’ without mentioning the exact political system being referred to does not necessarily mean a reversion to 1953 status. Which ‘Kashmir accord’ does it, for instance, refer to? Is it the 1975 Indira-Sheikh Accord, which J&K’s people continue to see the most brazen political sell out?
As the report says, it may be even a political formula ‘that India’s Prime Minister may deem fit.’
The manner the report has over-emphasised on the term ‘autonomy’ has a peril of being viewed as partisan. It has another implication. The report has looked at certain governance issues which by virtue of the 1975 Indira-Sheikh Accord were supposed to be state subjects. Its focus on such issues also serves to strengthen the suspicion that the report has maintained its focus around the same accord.
Like other such run-of-the-mill political initiatives taken by New Delhi, Justice Saghir’s Working Group has touched almost everything: relief, daily wages, centrally-sponsored schemes, constitutional relations, refugees, financial compensation, education, road communications, health, reservation to backward communities, women, scheduled tribes, human rights, representation of J&K’s judiciary at the Supreme Court, electoral system, Panchayti Raj, educational and economic opportunities for the migrants, and so on.
Looking at the format and the terms of reference (TOR) of this particular working group, it is impossible to expect a consensus. The problem with these kinds of formats is that they do not automatically go to reflect the majoritarian aspirations, based on democratic principles. So the kind of reaction the report has received creates an automatic perception and environment of ‘wide divisions’ and ‘disagreement.’ Such reactions also serve to strengthen the theories of ‘complexity’ and ‘internal contradictions’ of J&K’s polity. But we need to look a little deeper to understand its nuances.
Justice Saghir’s working group was not supposed to look at the state-centre relations per se. It had to look at some other issues at well. Whether that was deliberate is debatable. The working group’s TOR had a specific mention about looking at ‘autonomy, self rule, regional imbalances and backward areas and democracy, secularism and rule of law’. But why all this?
The other four Working Groups, which had submitted their reports in April, 2007 had a broad canvass, which could have easily included the issues other than centre-state relations. The TOR of those four working groups included ‘Strengthening Relations Across LoC’, ‘Confidence Building Measures Across Segments of Society in the State’, ‘Economic Development of Jammu and Kashmir’ and ‘Ensuring Good Governance’.
There is merit in the suggestion that reverting back to the 1953 status does not guarantee resolution of the J&K dispute. The dispute did not cease to exist even prior to 1953. The various accords having been inked by Sheikh Abdullah-led governments with New Delhi after 1953 did not address the external political and the economic dimensions, which remain at the heart of the J&K dispute. That brand of autonomy, inter alia, had nothing to ensure re-opening of the state’s traditional trade routes. There was no guarantee that we would be able to use our own water resources for our economic development.
Saghir Working Group’s silence on the hydropower issue between Srinagar and New Delhi constitutes a grave lapse. Any respectable analysis of Srinagar-New Delhi relations is incomplete without factoring in the hydropower and water resources of the state.
A significant portion of the report’s narrative seems to have been lost in dealing with the issues of ‘regional discrimination’. A lot of its text seems to be a rehash of many other such reports. They were avoidable to maintain a respectable focus.
To say NC’s autonomy formula best suits even today’s changed regional and global conditions would be wrong. For a better collective future of the state it is debatable if re-visiting the past in a unifocal manner without understanding the demands of the changed times would be helpful. It is for sure that self rule is related to autonomy in a wider context. However the fact is that PDP’s self rule vision addresses not only some historical wrongs of Srinagar-New Delhi relation it addresses the external dimension of the issue as well. More importantly, it addresses its economics, which is very critical to today’s context.
Whatever the merit of this report, the fact is that there would be deep cynicism about its implementation. People in J&K are well aware that almost no recommendation of the four other Working Groups has been implemented so far.
So will New Delhi this time round own Justice Saghir’s report? Will it give a reason to cynics to smile? These are some moot questions.
Feedback at Arjimand@greaterkashmir.com
Making cynics smile
Would New Delhi own Justice Saghir’s report?
Arjimand Hussain Talib
If something was to describe the symbolism and the substance of the (Rtd.) Justice Saghir Ahmed’s report, a single word would be apt – casual. The first and the fundamental question that arises is: where the report was supposed to go? To India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh – who had formed the working group Justice Saghir headed – or J&K’s Chief Minister?
There are at least two theories about why the report went to Chief Minister, Omar Abdullah, and not to India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. One, that the Congress-led UPA government was not comfortable in owning it at a time when it was deep in trouble dealing with the Telangana crisis. There is a cynics’ viewpoint as well: that since the report’s implementation is ‘unlikely’; it doesn’t matter where the report goes!
The second theory suggests a linkage of the report’s timing with the larger ‘quiet dialogue’ process taking place with some shades of the Hurriyat umbrella. Moreover, the tailor-made nuances and the style of the report’s submission seem to provide the National Conference a political advantage vis-à-vis other political forces of the state. Some would even want to see it something of a political gift to the party from the Congress, for something that is difficult to fathom right now.
Ignoring the PDP’s self rule vision in addressing the grey areas of Srinagar-New Delhi relations in the report smacks of callousness, which looks somewhat deliberate. That should have been avoided.
When it comes to the report’s substance, a whole lot of issues surface. On the face of it, its language is mostly non-categorical. The reports recommendation, ‘The question of autonomy and its demand can be examined in the light of ‘Kashmir Accord’ or in some other manner or on the basis of some other formula as the Prime Minister may deem fit and appropriate to restore autonomy to the extent possible’ leaves a wild scope for interpretation.
The use of term ‘autonomy’ without mentioning the exact political system being referred to does not necessarily mean a reversion to 1953 status. Which ‘Kashmir accord’ does it, for instance, refer to? Is it the 1975 Indira-Sheikh Accord, which J&K’s people continue to see the most brazen political sell out?
As the report says, it may be even a political formula ‘that India’s Prime Minister may deem fit.’
The manner the report has over-emphasised on the term ‘autonomy’ has a peril of being viewed as partisan. It has another implication. The report has looked at certain governance issues which by virtue of the 1975 Indira-Sheikh Accord were supposed to be state subjects. Its focus on such issues also serves to strengthen the suspicion that the report has maintained its focus around the same accord.
Like other such run-of-the-mill political initiatives taken by New Delhi, Justice Saghir’s Working Group has touched almost everything: relief, daily wages, centrally-sponsored schemes, constitutional relations, refugees, financial compensation, education, road communications, health, reservation to backward communities, women, scheduled tribes, human rights, representation of J&K’s judiciary at the Supreme Court, electoral system, Panchayti Raj, educational and economic opportunities for the migrants, and so on.
Looking at the format and the terms of reference (TOR) of this particular working group, it is impossible to expect a consensus. The problem with these kinds of formats is that they do not automatically go to reflect the majoritarian aspirations, based on democratic principles. So the kind of reaction the report has received creates an automatic perception and environment of ‘wide divisions’ and ‘disagreement.’ Such reactions also serve to strengthen the theories of ‘complexity’ and ‘internal contradictions’ of J&K’s polity. But we need to look a little deeper to understand its nuances.
Justice Saghir’s working group was not supposed to look at the state-centre relations per se. It had to look at some other issues at well. Whether that was deliberate is debatable. The working group’s TOR had a specific mention about looking at ‘autonomy, self rule, regional imbalances and backward areas and democracy, secularism and rule of law’. But why all this?
The other four Working Groups, which had submitted their reports in April, 2007 had a broad canvass, which could have easily included the issues other than centre-state relations. The TOR of those four working groups included ‘Strengthening Relations Across LoC’, ‘Confidence Building Measures Across Segments of Society in the State’, ‘Economic Development of Jammu and Kashmir’ and ‘Ensuring Good Governance’.
There is merit in the suggestion that reverting back to the 1953 status does not guarantee resolution of the J&K dispute. The dispute did not cease to exist even prior to 1953. The various accords having been inked by Sheikh Abdullah-led governments with New Delhi after 1953 did not address the external political and the economic dimensions, which remain at the heart of the J&K dispute. That brand of autonomy, inter alia, had nothing to ensure re-opening of the state’s traditional trade routes. There was no guarantee that we would be able to use our own water resources for our economic development.
Saghir Working Group’s silence on the hydropower issue between Srinagar and New Delhi constitutes a grave lapse. Any respectable analysis of Srinagar-New Delhi relations is incomplete without factoring in the hydropower and water resources of the state.
A significant portion of the report’s narrative seems to have been lost in dealing with the issues of ‘regional discrimination’. A lot of its text seems to be a rehash of many other such reports. They were avoidable to maintain a respectable focus.
To say NC’s autonomy formula best suits even today’s changed regional and global conditions would be wrong. For a better collective future of the state it is debatable if re-visiting the past in a unifocal manner without understanding the demands of the changed times would be helpful. It is for sure that self rule is related to autonomy in a wider context. However the fact is that PDP’s self rule vision addresses not only some historical wrongs of Srinagar-New Delhi relation it addresses the external dimension of the issue as well. More importantly, it addresses its economics, which is very critical to today’s context.
Whatever the merit of this report, the fact is that there would be deep cynicism about its implementation. People in J&K are well aware that almost no recommendation of the four other Working Groups has been implemented so far.
So will New Delhi this time round own Justice Saghir’s report? Will it give a reason to cynics to smile? These are some moot questions.
Feedback at Arjimand@greaterkashmir.com
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