Divisions between Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh - II

DATELINE SRINAGAR

A ‘collective suffering’? - II

Moving towards a common future


An eminent vice chancellor of a Kashmir-based university made an interesting proposition at the Jammu University workshop: he called for contemplating identity as a verb and not as a noun.

But what does that practically mean for J&K?

The cumulative effect of the processes of economic and cultural globalisation in today’s world for sure often manifests in identities in a verb form. There is so much of integration and assimilation. In a way certain identities keep evolving and changing with the changing circumstances. So can we think of J&K’s identities as verbs?

Treating the question of identity as a verb is a rather contentious question. There are voices which see the process of cultural assimilation and integration a one-sided affair in this uneven world. In other words, it is seen as an agenda driven by the likes and dislikes of a predominant global cultural power. Given this controversy, it would be better not to take this debate in J&K’s context further. It sometimes evokes insecurities.

At the workshop, there were many who questioned the success of the LAHDC model of political devolution. There was a feeling that it had simply ‘failed’, because it was too top-down, and there were many other layers of governance, like the Panchayati system, that had come into collision with its governance system.

Seen from another angle, the model gave the LAHDC the entire say in the use of financial allocations made to the region. The devolution of powers helped Ladakh frame an educational curriculum which the region sees best for itself. It helped the region to have local laws which protect its local economy and environment. It helped it in keeping economic and other outside interests under check, which may have the potential of changing the region’s demography, religious value system, culture and environment.

But as a spin off, it encouraged transformation of this empowerment into isolationist tendencies - breeding intolerance and an aversion to co-existence with other ethnic and regional identities. Virtually, the writ of J&K state government ends at the borders of Ladakh. The region unfurls its own flag. The state’s flag is long gone as the state’s constitution is no more sacrosanct there. There are almost no air connection between Srinagar and Leh. Ladakhi participants had to come to the workshop via Delhi! Leh’s Buddhist population prefers Jammu and Delhi to Srinagar to get education, live at and do business with.

However, we got to know that the people of Ladakh do realise the importance of Article 370. Some of our Ladakhi friends cited the Sindhu Darshan festival organised during the NDA rule on the banks of the River Indus. That is the time when they said they realised the peril from certain Hindutva forces in pushing their Hindutva agenda by saffronising the Sindh festival. There is a sub text here. For a Hindu thought Ladakh has had a Hindu past – reflected in the sculptures and wall paintings of the Hindu era even today. They feel about propagating and promoting it. Ladakh’s Buddhists find this line inconvenient.

In political terms, what was interesting to know was that Ladakh’s people supported the Musharraf Formula for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, as they saw ‘reason and sense’ in it!

When it comes to the Jammu region, there is, again, nothing black and white about it. There is no political or identity homogeneity. The voices for separate statehood represent certain fringe opinion. Regions like Rajouri-Poonch and Doda-Kishtwar-Bhaderwah do not share the political vision of Jammu and Kathua districts. Then there seems to be a divide, possibly a manufactured one, between the Gujjar and Pahari communities in the region on the issue of Scheduled Tribe status for the Pahari people.

The Amarnath Land Controversy is often seen to have deepened the gulf between the Muslims and Hindus in the state. The fact is that there are many people in Jammu who value the state’s composite culture and political make-up more than the religious fault lines.

A senior retired civil servant of the state made a strong argument saying that to him it was wrong to conclude that the BJP and the PDP reaped electoral harvest from the Amarnath land row. To buttress his argument he cited the examples of ‘five major flashpoints of the Amarnath issue’ in Jammu – Samba, Bishna, Gandhi Nagar Cantonment, Udhampur, Vijaypur. BJP lost elections in all of these constituencies despite these places being principal mobilisation points during the Amarnath crisis. And the NC’s victory over the PDP in Kashmir was another case in point.

In this environment of optimism and many underlying competitive struggles is a division of the J&K state a good idea?

These are all questions related to an internal political system in J&K. They also impact the larger unresolved and disputed status of the state. The fact is that J&K’s self determination movement remains in a crisis with this obsession for inclusiveness. Many believe that minus Jammu plains and Leh, the state’s movement for right to self determination is more logical and sans any ‘baggage of liabilities’. And there is no situation wherein minority voices hold the majoritarian aspirations hostage. This is a larger question which needs a larger debate.

What is often neglected in this debate is the revenues issue of the state. Can the three regions generate enough public revenues on their own to sustain economically?

Then there is the question of equitable development of the state, which has become too narrow to mean public spending for infrastructure development, rather than broader human development.

In this debate what is ignored is that equal representation disproportionate to population negates fundamental democratic principles and constitutes gross injustice. Equal public spending, across the regions, in disregard to their contribution to the overall public tax kitty, is again a problem. Contribution to the tax kitty and ability to raise taxes need to be a major consideration in the development discourse of J&K. Why are we competing for creating petty entities based on dependence, sans any strong taxation system?

Contribution to the Union of India treasury in terms of other resources, other than direct and indirect taxes is another factor that is neglected. And all this needs to be done objectively, so that there is no injustice with any region. However, contribution to the tax kitty needs to be based on actual consumption and not where the tax is booked.

Our identities are rooted in our idea of our histories. Without histories, identities would become crude ‘verbs’ and not respectable ‘nouns.’ What is seen as a ‘collective suffering’ could become a collective quest for excellence and human development if we see beyond the confines of the valleys we live in. There are many beautiful worlds beyond the mountains we have been brought up in.

Perhaps, as what the participants at the workshop finally resolved, we need to start our children’s education with ‘J&K ki sair’, rather than ‘Bharat ki sair’ to understand each other better.

Concluded.

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Divisions between Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh

J&K's Collective Suffering

Are Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh really incompatible?

DATELINE SRINAGAR BY ARJIMAND HUSSAIN TALIB

Rational human thought makes the difference between self-interest and want clear. When we humans mature through our early days, we learn that being conscious of one’s interests as an individual and as a community is but natural. But when this consciousness reaches the level of obsession of racial superiority, and assumed victimhood, it borders a sort of narcissism. That sort of narcissism is what, sadly, seems to have gripped the J&K state today.

The unsettled nature of the political status of J&K is a reality. The massive exploitation of its resources by New Delhi - and to some measure by Islamabad - has enlarged the debate on political justice in the state. However, the discourse on regional, sub-regional and ethnic identities is a new construct, which has served two purposes.

One, it has created a ‘complex’ issue out of a simple issue of self determination of this formerly Princely State. Two, it has sought to create an aggressor out of the victim – the Muslims of the J&K state.

The result is tragic. Today almost all the communities in the state are up in arms against each other - making use of regional, sub-regional and ethnic identity cards to promote their economic interests.

The process of manufacturing identities and divergent political goals in the state has been going on on an industrial scale for many decades now. Who is responsible for this? New Delhi? State governments? Both? The implanted bureaucracy? Or it has been a natural process of political evolution?

This debate is not only important for that we have for long remained a good example of syncretism; this debate is critical because we live in a fiercely interdependent and integrated world. Preserving one’s own identity while working in a multi cultural system is very much possible in today’s world. There are ample examples of such systems working well throughout the world. Then why some sections of Jammu and Ladakh regions do not want to co-exist with Kashmir? Or why doesn’t a section of Kashmiri Pandits want to live with Kashmiri Muslims side by side again?

The three-day intra-J&K workshop at the Jammu University last week, organised jointly by the Jammu University; IPCS, New Delhi and the British High Commission provided answers to many of these questions. Many questions, as expected, continue to remain unanswered.

Any such exercise debating regional, sub-regional and other ethnic ‘aspirations’ of J&K is normally interesting. Importantly, what added to the richness of the deliberations was the presence of a few former civil servants, including a few chief secretaries, and their input to the discussions.

Any intra-J&K debate has two essential backdrops. One, that it holds the larger question of ‘Kashmir dispute’ ransom to internal political disagreements, which are not all necessarily natural. Some are manufactured too. Two, it degenerates the larger issue of political emancipation based on inclusive right to self determination into a majority-minority debate.

This tendency of degeneration must bring us back to two fundamental questions. One, why can’t we contemplate a discourse which talks of political inclusiveness and equal citizenship rather than the narrow majority-minority rights? Why for heavens sake we in J&K can’t think of an inclusive polity as an alternative to the narrow regional, sub regional and ethnic-based competitive politicking?

Two, are Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism so incompatible and irreconcilable that the state cannot think of a common future based on our common history and heritage? Why do we demonize Kashmiri Muslims – the real oppressed ones – as the aggressors? Why do we reject their quest for collective justice and the state’s territorial integrity and political inclusiveness as a ‘dangerous ideology’? Is being inclusive radical?

The discussions at the workshop began with an underlying assumption that we guys are not questioning our common future. Yet there were layers and layers of opinions and aspirations. Sadly, a common future is not a widely shared vision.

In the discussions a former senior-most civil servant of the state shared an interesting ‘thought’. To him, he said, the creation of ‘District Autonomous Councils’ on the pattern of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) for all the districts was the best solution to ‘J&K’s problems’. And it opened a floodgate of questions.

Where would this Balkanisation of sorts lead us to? Would there be an end to this competitive quest for best economic opportunities? Would such autonomous councils satiate the thirst for control over power/resources? Isn’t the canard of regional and sub-regional ‘identity’ being used as a façade for competitive political domination in J&K state today? Isn’t this trend serving to make the larger question of Kashmir’s right to self determination fuzzy?

When it came to the presentation of the Ladakhi viewpoint, it began with a rather categorical assertion – that they do not wish to remain with the Kashmir region, or identify with the region’s political goals, under any circumstances.

However, there were voices of disagreement from within the region too. The Muslims of Kargil do not share this vision, we were told. Muslims from Zanaskar and Leh itself do not necessarily share this vision of isolation. To them, this viewpoint – as propagated by the LAHDC – represents a centralised system of top-down political manoeuvring.

Ladakh’s Buddhists, however, see this polarisation within the region as a ‘process of ‘democratisation’. They have some other opinions too: ‘Ladakhi Muslims who had chosen to migrate to Kashmir Valley must learn a lesson from the ill treatment they got from Kashmiri Muslims there’. To LAHDC, ‘all Ladakhis’ future lies in Ladakh and its identity.’ To them, ‘LAHDC remains the best model of governance in the whole of India’. ‘Such a model, if implemented in other regions of the state, would not work’, because ‘Ladakhis are wiser, live values which are far more sophisticated than others in the state’. And, if Ladakh got statehood, ‘it would be the best state in the whole of India’.

This perception, I found, has many takers outside the LAHDC as well. A few former civil servants of the state showed their silent admiration for this thought by nodding their heads.

Ladakh’s Buddhist community also has a few words of caution both for Srinagar and New Delhi. That if Ladakh’s Buddhist aspirations continue to be dishonoured, a time might come when the Chinese might just walk over to the Zojila Pass. ‘Kashmiris must realise, Ladakh is a buffer between them and an ambitious China’, we were told.

And then Chinese Mahayana Buddhism was getting very popular in Ladakh each passing day. Alarm bells are ringing.

To be concluded next week
Feedback at arjimand@greaterkashmir.com